I have to say, I just don't get this idea of "real facts" from reading
Peirce. On the one hand, we have the denotation of the subject, something
we all seem to agree on. On the other hand, Peirce describes the
signifying of the predicate, in discussing the icon more generally, as:
"If it [an icon] conveys information, it is only in the sense in which
the object that it is used to represent may be said to convey information."
[Kaina Stoicheia]
Thus, if I say "the book is red," the predicate "red" conveys information
in the sense which the book itself conveys that information. That to me is
a denotation as well, a pointing into the world of our experience, but
regardless the denotation of the book and that that object conveys the same
information as "red" is enough to say whether the proposition is true or
false. So, why are we talking about the copula being an index, as if there
is no other way of combining indices and icons, or of "real facts" like
they are not just us coupling together two kinds of representation? Why
are we going beyond the represenation to metaphysically posit the objective
existence of "real facts," and/or where is the support in Peirce for doing
that?
Tom
On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 11:20 PM, Catherine Legg <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Hi everyone,
>
>
>
> I’ve made some progress reading chapter 3.
>
>
>
> Re. 3.7: I’m very excited by this idea of replacing a copula with an
> index. (Subject and predicate are joined by “an index pointing to the *real
> fact *joining the Subject and the Object.”) I see how this idea lines up
> with the originality in Peirce’s theory of perception (which I’ve only
> recently got my head around) whereby the perceptual judgement is not a *
> *copy** of the percept but an **index** of it. This is such a powerful
> new idea Peirce offers to Western philosophy.
>
>
>
> Re. 3.9: Love the ‘top-down’ functional analysis of arguments whereby they
> are not **composed** of propositions and terms, but rather the latter are
> prescinded after the fact.
>
>
>
> Cheers, Cathy
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:[email protected]]
> *Sent:* Tuesday, 7 October 2014 12:46 p.m.
> *To:* [email protected]
> *Cc:* Peirce List
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7108] Natural Propositions,
> Chapter 3.7
>
>
>
> Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists,
>
>
>
> I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting terminological
> discussions relating, on the one hand, to the *subject (*such as *denote*
> , *designate, indicate*, etc). and on the other to the *predicate*, (such
> as *signify, comprehend, connote, etc.)* It seems to me that Frederik
> here employs such terms relating to the proposition as Peirce used them in
> his extraordinary development and vast expansion of the proposition as the
> *dicisign
> concept *in, especially, the* Syllabus* and *Kaina Stoicheia* ca.1903*.*
>
>
>
> I hope, therefore, that it is safe to say that for the present analysis
> that Peirce of this period (and Frederik) is saying:
>
>
>
> *In considering the proposition (dicisign)*:
>
> *[the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the
> Predicate signifies its characters == the depth of the sign) *
>
>
>
> And, further, for Peirce these two are joined *not*, as they've
> traditionally been, by a *copula, *but rather by an *index *of a peculiar
> kind, indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the *real
> fact *joining the Subject and the Object. Or, if I'm getting this right,
> the formulation* breadth x depth = information (*i.e,, the sum of these
> two as equaling some factual information) for the dicisign means that *true
> information represents a real fact in some world of experience*.
>
>
>
> In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition, that
> Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the fact
> being represented, the index being the *necessary *sign for joining the
> replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This
> syntactical index involves an icon (as all indices do), the icon being, in
> this case, exactly the juxtaposition of the two, that is, their
> * co-localization*, as Stjernfelt helpfully terms it.
>
>
>
> *The*
>
> * co-localization of the elements of the dicisign*:
>
> *[Subject](Predicate)*
>
>
>
> (Such a *co-localization syntax* is further understood to be primitive
> and pre-linguistic.)
>
>
>
> This syntax claims that the dicisign "is* really indexically connected* to
> the *real fact* to which the subject and predicate correspond"
> (Stjernfelt, 66), and *how* this happens forms the argumentation of the
> rest of this section and some of the next (centering on the* two objects* of
> the co-localizing index) . But, just to make sure I've got this right, I'd
> like to ask if the above summary represents a correct understanding of the
> terminology dthat Peirce is using ca. 1903 and if it correctly represents
> the argument being made regarding the syntax of the dicisign in NP 3.7?
>
>
>
> Understanding that there are in this syntax *two objects *helps explain
> how Peirce can speak of the index as being in "existential" relation to the
> fact being represented. But it seems to me that it is to the replica
> (Secondary Object) that the *existentia*l relation especially applies,
> while the *reality* (Primary Object) could be in any of the Three Worlds
> of Experience, and in that sense is different and altogether greater than
> its replica. So the language of existence, of facticity, of secondness, is
> a bit unnerving to me for* both* Objects.. Frederik's chart on page 70
> and the Peirce quotes on 71 (from KS) are quite helpful in using the
> language of reality (3ns), but cf. paragraph 1 on 68 (the quote from the
> Syllabus) where both use the language of existence (2ns). (I am aware that
> I may be making a mountain out of a molehill, and that Peirce is sometimes
> simply loose in his existence/reality terminoiogy, an understanding I've
> argued for myself in the past; I doubt that it signals a significant change
> in terminology from the Syllabus to KS)
>
>
>
> Btw, I thought your choices of quotes and examples, especially of the
> Achenbach portrait, which was a particularly apt example to make a rather
> complex point (67), as well as your explication of the co-localization synta
> *x *were both very helpful, Frederik. Thanks!
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Gary
>
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond*
>
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>
> *Communication Studies*
>
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *C 745*
>
> *718 482-5690*
>
>
>
>
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