Tom, my response is interleaved:
From: Tom Gollier [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 14-Oct-14 7:58 PM I have to say, I just don't get this idea of "real facts" from reading Peirce. On the one hand, we have the denotation of the subject, something we all seem to agree on. On the other hand, Peirce describes the signifying of the predicate, in discussing the icon more generally, as: "If it [an icon] conveys information, it is only in the sense in which the object that it is used to represent may be said to convey information." [Kaina Stoicheia] Thus, if I say "the book is red," the predicate "red" conveys information in the sense which the book itself conveys that information. That to me is a denotation as well, a pointing into the world of our experience, [GF] An icon cannot point to an object in the sense of singling it out from the world of experience; so, in Peirce’s strict use of “experience” which applies to the Universe of Secondness or “real things”, it does not denote anything. “Red” signifies a “quality” or “character” belonging to the Universe of Firstness, and a sign can attribute that quality to a particular object only by means of an index involving that icon. Redness can only be denoted by means of hypostatic abstraction, i.e. by symbolizing a quality as a quasi-thing. That’s a very different kind of “denoting” from the indexical function of directing attention to an existing thing. but regardless the denotation of the book and that that object conveys the same information as "red" is enough to say whether the proposition is true or false. [GF] Peirce doesn’t say that that object conveys the same information as “red”. He says that the information is the coupling of the icon/predicate “_____ is red” with the index/subject that fills the blank by pointing to an existing thing (the book) to which it stands in a real (not imaginary) relation. So, why are we talking about the copula being an index, as if there is no other way of combining indices and icons, [GF] What other ways do you have in mind? The index Peirce is referring to at this point in Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:310) is the index which connects the replicas of the subject-symbol and the predicate-symbol in an actual utterance. No general sign such as a word can do that; so it has to be an index, which is NOT general. or of "real facts" like they are not just us coupling together two kinds of representation? Why are we going beyond the represenation to metaphysically posit the objective existence of "real facts," and/or where is the support in Peirce for doing that? [GF] Because the reality of Truth — its independence of what anybody thinks it to be — is indispensible for a logic of inquiry. This indispensibility is primarily logical, not metaphysical, although (as Peirce remarks) it’s convenient to express it in metaphysical terms. In short, I think what you’re overlooking here is the existential aspect of indexicality which is involved in Peirce’s usage of the traditional term “denote”. gary f.
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