Tom, my response is interleaved:

 

From: Tom Gollier [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: 14-Oct-14 7:58 PM



I have to say, I just don't get this idea of "real facts" from reading Peirce.  
On the one hand, we have the denotation of the subject, something we all seem 
to agree on.  On the other hand, Peirce describes the signifying of the 
predicate, in discussing the icon more generally, as:

     "If it [an icon] conveys information, it is only in the sense in which the 
object that it is used to represent may be said to convey information." [Kaina 
Stoicheia]

Thus, if I say "the book is red," the predicate "red" conveys information in 
the sense which the book itself conveys that information.  That to me is a 
denotation as well, a pointing into the world of our experience,

[GF] An icon cannot point to an object in the sense of singling it out from the 
world of experience; so, in Peirce’s strict use of “experience” which applies 
to the Universe of Secondness or “real things”, it does not denote anything. 
“Red” signifies a “quality” or “character” belonging to the Universe of 
Firstness, and a sign can attribute that quality to a particular object only by 
means of an index involving that icon. Redness can only be denoted by means of 
hypostatic abstraction, i.e. by symbolizing a quality as a quasi-thing. That’s 
a very different kind of “denoting” from the indexical function of directing 
attention to an existing thing.

but regardless the denotation of the book and that that object conveys the same 
information as "red" is enough to say whether the proposition is true or false.

[GF] Peirce doesn’t say that that object conveys the same information as “red”. 
He says that the information is the coupling of the icon/predicate “_____ is 
red” with the index/subject that fills the blank by pointing to an existing 
thing (the book) to which it stands in a real (not imaginary) relation. 

  So, why are we talking about the copula being an index, as if there is no 
other way of combining indices and icons,

[GF] What other ways do you have in mind? The index Peirce is referring to at 
this point in Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:310) is the index which connects the 
replicas of the subject-symbol and the predicate-symbol in an actual utterance. 
No general sign such as a word can do that; so it has to be an index, which is 
NOT general.

or of "real facts" like they are not just us coupling together two kinds of 
representation?  Why are we going beyond the represenation to metaphysically 
posit the objective existence of "real facts," and/or where is the support in 
Peirce for doing that?

[GF] Because the reality of Truth — its independence of what anybody thinks it 
to be — is indispensible for a logic of inquiry. This indispensibility is 
primarily logical, not metaphysical, although (as Peirce remarks) it’s 
convenient to express it in metaphysical terms.

In short, I think what you’re overlooking here is the existential aspect of 
indexicality which is involved in Peirce’s usage of the traditional term 
“denote”.

gary f.

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