List,

Chapter 7 of *Natural Propositions* (NP) generalizes the doctrine of
Dicisigns over a broad range of human expressions, many of which are not
usually recognized as propositions by the Frege/Russell tradition(s) in
philosophy of language/logic. Stjernfelt argues one implication of Peirce's
Dicisign doctrine is that pictures and diagrams can serve as predicates in
truth claims. Diagrams themselves may also play a role in reasoning itself
because spatial structures are capable of general representation and so
furnish the possibility of further reasoning by means of experimental
manipulation (c.f. *Diagrammatology* 2007).

Recall that for Peirce, the notion of diagrams includes not only stylized
figures on paper, but that algebras, images, maps, graphs, aspects of
linguistic grammar, logic representations, etc. also constitute subsets of
diagrams proper (NP, 4). Given the functional definition that Dicisigns are
signs which make truth claims due to their denotative and descriptive
involvement, (or indexical and iconic elements, or their simultaneous acts
of reference and description) with the same object, we can look for cases
in which non-linguistic elements form parts of or whole propositions in
themselves. This extension covers not only a wide range of biological signs
(c.f. Chapter 6) but it also deflates the notion of human propositions by
expanding it to include diagrams (extremely) broadly construed. In the
resulting naturalized framework, we find that sentences (linguistic
propositions) form only a special subset of signs which can be used to lie.

Given the criterion that Dicisigns refer to signs which can be considered
true or false, Stjernfelt first offers an example of a diagram performing
the (misleading) role of a visual predicate in a Dicisign. The image of the
rat's brain tissue indexically connects to the experiments described and
predicatively connects the graphic content as describing the results of
those particular experiments. The second example of 7.1 offers of a case of
journalism in which the footage displayed of Danish troops not entering but
leaving Iraq counted as a case of fraudulent reporting given that the video
(images) did not match up to the text being read to the viewers. So both
examples are similar in that a mixed-media Dicisign acquires a
truth-bearing role from the co-localization of subject-predicate coupling.
The first two examples offer specific cases of how text-image Dicisigns can
be used to deceive when a diagram (image/video) serves the predicative role
of the Dicisign coupled with linguistic assertions.

The third example of 7.1 discusses a film of and 4-D diagrammatic
representation of the Kennedy assassination. This wholly non-linguistic
example demonstrates how a diagram may play the role of the full
propositional sign (without any linguistic element whatsoever) and also how
diagrammatical reasoning in a more technical sense can be used to form
valid inferences and an indefinite amount of new Dicisigns, using both
theorematic and corollarial reasoning. The spatio-temporal origin of the
film connects it indexically to the controversial event, forming a “vast,
essentially continuous predicate” (NP, 187) from which new Dicisigns may be
inferred by means of diagrammatic reasoning. I will postpone my discussion
of the notion of a continuous predicate until my next posting on 7.2.

I assume there will be specific questions and comments about the preceding
three examples: the Penkowa case, the journalism of Nybroe, and the Myers
4-D model. I will await these responses before discussing 7.2 and a second
implication of the Dicisign doctrine: that differences which are usually
believed to be rely upon sharp bifurcations between perception/reason or
image/language should be analyzed as differences within a more nuanced
field of propositions requiring a typology detailing various differences in
the types of possible predicates and a new taxonomy of subtypes of
predicates.

Regards,

Doug
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