Dear Doug, lists, Thanks for a good summary of Ch. 7. Here a few comments.
F Den 12/12/2014 kl. 03.57 skrev Douglas Hare <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>: Stjernfelt Seminar: Chapter 7: 7.2-7.3 How should we classify the various different types of diagrams which can serve as predicates? According to our author, “Linguistic predicates seem to form one end of a range with very detailed, essentially continuous predicates like Myers' 4-D computer model or topographical maps in the other end” (NP, 188). It remains unclear to me why we should accept this linear description. I'm also curious why Stjernfelt does not discuss Peirce's late theory of hypoicons (images/diagrams/metaphors) at this point or mention his late realization of the importance of general icons. Perhaps the author feels as if he has already covered this technical material in Chapter 4 of Diagrammatology, but I would like to know if he has changed his mind since he wrote in 2007 “that the category of pure diagrams is coextensive with mathematics as such. This implies that the question of pure diagram taxonomies is inevitably entangled in the large questions of the foundations of mathematics" (Diagrammatology, 111). You're right, I think i already covered the images/diagrams/metaphors trichotomy in Diagrammatology. I do not think I have changed my mind about pure diagrams since 2007 - "pure" meaning diagrams without reference to empirical matters-of-fact. What is clear is that the author defines a continuous diagram as one in which “every connected part of the same dimension is, in itself, a diagram” (NP, 188). Of course, this quality often comes up against the limitation of granularity, usually the fact that sometimes we cannot “zoom-in” any more based on observatory or technical limitations when viewing images. An interesting relation seems to hold between Dicisigns with continuous predicates and linguistically-stated or algebraic-expressed propositions. For example, a computer model like that of Myers can be conceived as one Large Dicisign given “the continuity of its predicate and the unambiguousness of its object reference to a duration of space-time embedding the assassination event. Such a Dicisign directly refers to a whole continuum of objects present in the 4-D space-time slice which is depicted” (NP,188). Although the Myers' model allows for Euclidean translations of objects across diagram space, it apparently does not allow us to vary object shapes within the experiment. No, that would infringe on the purpose of that diagram - to establish as detailed as possible facts on the ground during the assassination. This aim involves the idealized (but not unreasonable) assumption that the involved objects are stiff during the small timeslice charted. Allowing for the variation of object shapes would prevent this purpose. As example of diagram types which do admit variation, the author points to both pure and empirical examples: the triangle, the elephant species Loxodonta africanus, the structure of Congress and makes a brief comparison to Husserl's notion of eidetic variation. But given that a taxonomy of subtypes of diagrams is a desideratum of future research, in 7.2 we are not treated to an exhaustive outline but rather a “sketch” of vistas for more clearly elucidating structures, objects of, and purposes of diagram predicates given a Peircean reading of modern cognitive fields. I do think a taxonomy of diagrams is a huge desideratum - and there is no lack of existing proposals for such a taxonomy. Most probably, several such taxonomies will have to be combined. But the close relation of pure diagrams to math implies - I think that diagram taxonomies must be connected to issues in the foundations of mathematics. So I think the development of diagram taxonomies requires far more than Peirce scholarship … Here, I limit myself to discussing the much simpler issue of possible text-image-gesture combinations within the framework of Dicisigns - also to avoid the obvious trap of assuming the painting-with-a-legend example to indicate that text subjects/image predicates should be the typical or even the only such combination. In Section 7.3: Propositions in the Wild—Combining Available Signs into Dicisigns, we find that subject-predicate Dicisign structure does not map isomorphically onto word-image conglomerates in mixed-media, but rather offers different possibilities for fulfilling the truth-bearing role of the functional doubleness of Dicisigns (NP, 190). Beyond the permutations of subject/predicate coupling already discussed, we also find various S-P combinations in which gestures play both roles (c.f. the typology on NP, 190). As suggestions for further taxonomical advances, the author suggests more nuanced distinctions between diagrams and pictures, the introduction of sense-modalities on top of vision, a finer distinction between diagrams depicting the passage of time, and a distinction between purely mentally represented Dicisigns and those Dicisigns dependent upon external support (Extended Dicisigns). I suspect we will return to an important discussion of hypostatic abstraction from the end of Chapter 6 shortly, but I will resume discussion of Extended Dicisigns and Clarke's Extended Mind hypothesis tomorrow.
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