Stjernfelt Seminar: Chapter 7: 7.2-7.3 How should we classify the various different types of diagrams which can serve as predicates? According to our author, “Linguistic predicates seem to form one end of a range with very detailed, essentially continuous predicates like Myers' 4-D computer model or topographical maps in the other end” (NP, 188). It remains unclear to me why we should accept this linear description. I'm also curious why Stjernfelt does not discuss Peirce's late theory of hypoicons (images/diagrams/metaphors) at this point or mention his late realization of the importance of general icons.
Perhaps the author feels as if he has already covered this technical material in Chapter 4 of *Diagrammatology, *but I would like to know if he has changed his mind since he wrote in 2007 “that the category of pure diagrams is coextensive with mathematics as such. This implies that the question of pure diagram taxonomies is inevitably entangled in the large questions of the foundations of mathematics" (*Diagrammatology*, 111). What is clear is that the author defines a continuous diagram as one in which “every connected part of the same dimension is, in itself, a diagram” (NP, 188). Of course, this quality often comes up against the limitation of granularity, usually the fact that sometimes we cannot “zoom-in” any more based on observatory or technical limitations when viewing images. An interesting relation seems to hold between Dicisigns with continuous predicates and linguistically-stated or algebraic-expressed propositions. For example, a computer model like that of Myers can be conceived as one Large Dicisign given “the continuity of its predicate and the unambiguousness of its object reference to a duration of space-time embedding the assassination event. Such a Dicisign directly refers to a whole continuum of objects present in the 4-D space-time slice which is depicted” (NP,188). Although the Myers' model allows for Euclidean translations of objects across diagram space, it apparently does not allow us to vary object shapes within the experiment. As example of diagram types which do admit variation, the author points to both pure and empirical examples: the triangle, the elephant species *Loxodonta africanus*, the structure of Congress and makes a brief comparison to Husserl's notion of eidetic variation. But given that a taxonomy of subtypes of diagrams is a desideratum of future research, in 7.2 we are not treated to an exhaustive outline but rather a “sketch” of vistas for more clearly elucidating structures, objects of, and purposes of diagram predicates given a Peircean reading of modern cognitive fields. In Section 7.3: Propositions in the Wild—Combining Available Signs into Dicisigns, we find that subject-predicate Dicisign structure does not map isomorphically onto word-image conglomerates in mixed-media, but rather offers different possibilities for fulfilling the truth-bearing role of the functional doubleness of Dicisigns (NP, 190). Beyond the permutations of subject/predicate coupling already discussed, we also find various S-P combinations in which gestures play both roles (c.f. the typology on NP, 190). As suggestions for further taxonomical advances, the author suggests more nuanced distinctions between diagrams and pictures, the introduction of sense-modalities on top of vision, a finer distinction between diagrams depicting the passage of time, and a distinction between purely mentally represented Dicisigns and those Dicisigns dependent upon external support (Extended Dicisigns). I suspect we will return to an important discussion of hypostatic abstraction from the end of Chapter 6 shortly, but I will resume discussion of Extended Dicisigns and Clarke's Extended Mind hypothesis tomorrow. Best regards, Doug On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 2:14 PM, Gary Fuhrman <[email protected]> wrote: > > Thanks for this summary, Doug! (I’m including your whole post below, so > the biosemiotics list can see it as well as the Peirce list.) > > > > About the case of the Danish TV journalist — as Frederik points out, it > wasn’t really “fraudulent reporting”, in a sense that what the reporter > said was actually true: the troops really were leaving Iraq at the time, > although the accompanying footage showed them entering a Danish military > camp rather than leaving it. But the example shows how it is *possible* > for a combination of film and voice-over narrative to lie, and we can > probably all think of examples where this has been done on TV news. > > > > Another example occurred to me which shows that a film sequence can lie > even without the voice-over narrative. Some years ago, in one of the BBC > documentaries narrated by David Attenborough, there was a sequence where we > see a polar bear entering her den, and then a polar bear giving birth. > There was a voice-over narrative referring to the bear as “she”, but even > without that, a viewer would make the unconscious inference that it was the > same mother bear both inside and outside the den (especially when we later > see bear and cub emerging from the den in spring; Frederik’s footnote on p. > 187 explains this unconscious inference process that film sequences are > designed to prompt in the viewer.) But actually the birthing sequence was > shot in a zoo, and of course it was not the same bear we see in the wild. > > > > Again, I see nothing “fraudulent” here, because the accuracy of the film’s > depiction of the life of a generic polar bear was not undermined by the > implicit assumption that the two juxtaposed sequences showed a single > individual bear. But it does show that film viewing involves an inference > process which *can be used* to lie; and this is important because only a > sign capable of lying is capable of telling the truth, as dicisigns can do. > > > > gary f. > > > > *From:* Douglas Hare [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 7-Dec-14 5:42 PM > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Stjernfelt Seminar: Chapter 7, Dicisigns Beyond > Language ~ 7.1 > > > > List, > > Chapter 7 of *Natural Propositions* (NP) generalizes the doctrine of > Dicisigns over a broad range of human expressions, many of which are not > usually recognized as propositions by the Frege/Russell tradition(s) in > philosophy of language/logic. Stjernfelt argues one implication of Peirce's > Dicisign doctrine is that pictures and diagrams can serve as predicates in > truth claims. Diagrams themselves may also play a role in reasoning itself > because spatial structures are capable of general representation and so > furnish the possibility of further reasoning by means of experimental > manipulation (c.f. *Diagrammatology* 2007). > > Recall that for Peirce, the notion of diagrams includes not only stylized > figures on paper, but that algebras, images, maps, graphs, aspects of > linguistic grammar, logic representations, etc. also constitute subsets of > diagrams proper (NP, 4). Given the functional definition that Dicisigns are > signs which make truth claims due to their denotative and descriptive > involvement, (or indexical and iconic elements, or their simultaneous acts > of reference and description) with the same object, we can look for cases > in which non-linguistic elements form parts of or whole propositions in > themselves. This extension covers not only a wide range of biological signs > (c.f. Chapter 6) but it also deflates the notion of human propositions by > expanding it to include diagrams (extremely) broadly construed. In the > resulting naturalized framework, we find that sentences (linguistic > propositions) form only a special subset of signs which can be used to lie. > > Given the criterion that Dicisigns refer to signs which can be considered > true or false, Stjernfelt first offers an example of a diagram performing > the (misleading) role of a visual predicate in a Dicisign. The image of the > rat's brain tissue indexically connects to the experiments described and > predicatively connects the graphic content as describing the results of > those particular experiments. The second example of 7.1 offers of a case of > journalism in which the footage displayed of Danish troops not entering but > leaving Iraq counted as a case of fraudulent reporting given that the video > (images) did not match up to the text being read to the viewers. So both > examples are similar in that a mixed-media Dicisign acquires a > truth-bearing role from the co-localization of subject-predicate coupling. > The first two examples offer specific cases of how text-image Dicisigns can > be used to deceive when a diagram (image/video) serves the predicative role > of the Dicisign coupled with linguistic assertions. > > The third example of 7.1 discusses a film of and 4-D diagrammatic > representation of the Kennedy assassination. This wholly non-linguistic > example demonstrates how a diagram may play the role of the full > propositional sign (without any linguistic element whatsoever) and also how > diagrammatical reasoning in a more technical sense can be used to form > valid inferences and an indefinite amount of new Dicisigns, using both > theorematic and corollarial reasoning. The spatio-temporal origin of the > film connects it indexically to the controversial event, forming a “vast, > essentially continuous predicate” (NP, 187) from which new Dicisigns may be > inferred by means of diagrammatic reasoning. I will postpone my discussion > of the notion of a continuous predicate until my next posting on 7.2. > > I assume there will be specific questions and comments about the preceding > three examples: the Penkowa case, the journalism of Nybroe, and the Myers > 4-D model. I will await these responses before discussing 7.2 and a second > implication of the Dicisign doctrine: that differences which are usually > believed to be rely upon sharp bifurcations between perception/reason or > image/language should be analyzed as differences within a more nuanced > field of propositions requiring a typology detailing various differences in > the types of possible predicates and a new taxonomy of subtypes of > predicates. > > Regards, > > Doug > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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