Nice outline. The fact - that there is a difference between 'mental and
physical time'. This is not the same, I suggest, as merely the subjective vs
objective experience. But could it not mean that time itself does not function
in only one mode, but, in three modes. Within the three categories. In present
time (Firstness); in linear step by step, each point discrete time
(Secondness); and in continuity (Thirdness).
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Moore
To: Peirce List ; John N. Deely ; Jon Awbrey ; Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Monday, December 29, 2014 9:49 AM
Subject: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Cosmos
Part 326** MURDER MYSTERY! **ECO ON PEIRCE!**28 Dec 2014 9:55 am CST REVISE,
READ ORIGINAL
(Who killed truth?) FROM THE TREE TO THE LABYRINTH by Umberto Eco
CHAPTER 15: THE THRESHOLD AND THE INFINITE: PEIRCE AND PRIMARY ICONISM *
correlate with KANT AND THE PLATYPUS
[page 526]
-x-
What happens when we put ourselves in the place of a perceiving subject?
Paolo Zellini, A BRIEF HISTORY OF INFINITY, trans. David Marsh, Penguin, 2003,
pp. 26-7, reminds us that:
[page 527]
<< “Adolf Grünbaum (“Can an Infinitude of Operations be Performed in a Finite
Time?”, 1969) recently demonstrated that the measured structure of physical
time justifies applying the arithmetical theory of limits to the solution of
the paradox. Human awareness of time has a base limit of perceptibility, that
is, a minimal threshold beyond which temporal intervals vanish into
inconceivable smallness. If we consciously try to contemplate ‘all’ the
intervals of the series (a), it would be realized concretely as a countable
infinity of mental acts, and the duration of each of these larger than the
minimal threshold that time allows. But this insuperable ‘minimum’ is an
Achimedean quantity: when added to itself infinite times, it yields an infinite
result. Consequently, the mental contemplation of the entire series would
result in an impossibly unlimited period of time. This would happen, for
example, if one ‘counted’ the intervals of (a) one by one, assigning to each of
them an ordinal [the divisor in a fraction as spoken or written out (as
hundredth in one hundredth or hundredths in three hundredths] number. This
would take more time than the necessary minimum just to conceive or pronounce
them. (But it is absurd, Aristotle objected [PHYSICS 8, 8, 263a-263b], to
maintain that whatever moves, moves while counting.) In reality, by raising
doubts about the possibility of traversing the interval (0-1), Zeno exploits
the unacceptable delay that is implied by reducing the series (a) to the
corresponding mental acts of the counting process, but he fails to make clear
that this process does not reproduce exactly the measurement of the physical
time involved in the actual traversal.¶ Thus, Grünbaum finds Zeno’s argument
illegitimate because it uses what is basically an INEVITABLE confusion between
two incompatible forms of thought. He explains that we do not experience the
intervals into which we subdivide the traversal in any measure that corresponds
to their actual nature. Rather, we derive our impression of their duration from
the time needed for our acts of mental contemplation which for each fraction of
the distance must perforce exceed our minimal threshold or limit.” >>¶
----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Gary Moore <[email protected]>
To: Jon Awbrey <[email protected]>; Peirce List <[email protected]>; John
N. Deely <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2014 6:36 AM
Subject: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Cosmos
----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Gary Moore <[email protected]>
To: Jon Awbrey <[email protected]>; Peirce List <[email protected]>; John
N. Deely <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2014 5:41 AM
Subject: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Cosmos
Part 325** MURDER MYSTERY! **ECO ON PEIRCE!**28 Dec 2014 9:55 am CST REVISE,
READ ORIGINAL
(Who killed truth?) FROM THE TREE TO THE LABYRINTH by Umberto Eco
CHAPTER 15: THE THRESHOLD AND THE INFINITE: PEIRCE AND PRIMARY ICONISM *
correlate with KANT AND THE PLATYPUS
[page 526]
-x-
In the paradox Achilles must first cover half yje distance, but before that
he must cover a quarter, and before that an eighth, and so on ad infinitum, so
that he will never succeed in catching up with the tortoise. It has been
observed, however, that, although this process of fractalization can continue
infinitely, its result can never be greater than one – as occurs in any case
with irrational numbers, so that 3.14, however successful we may be in
analyzing it, will never be 4 [GCM: “virtual as “never” (Scotus) vs.
“almost”(approximately true: pragmatism)].¶
-x-
If we apply this argument to the fractal length of a coast, where the
“potential” process of division could be infinite, as least insofar as we can
always postulate smaller and smaller microbes, then this does not prevent
Achilles in practice covering the space in a single stride. Achilles will cover
a unit of distance appropriate to him in a unit of time appropriate to him.¶
-x-
Already Aristotle (PHYSICS III, 8. 206) objected to Zeno that, among
magniyudes, there exist infinity by addition (I can always find an even number
greater than thr preceeding one) but not by division, insofar as the infinity
of the subetervals into which a unit of length is divisible is always contained
in a limited totality (never greater than one) which may constitute the object
of an empirical intuition.¶
-x-
In other words, if, cosmologically speaking, there is never perhaps a
Firstness that is NOT the result of a previous Thirdness, cognitively there is
a limit to our perceptive abilities, which experience as undivided something
that, cosmologically speaking, is “in posse” [in potential but not actually]
capable of being further divided. What is “in posse” belongs to cosmology. What
is “in actu” belongs to the agent subject.¶
----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Gary Moore <[email protected]>
To: Jon Awbrey <[email protected]>; Peirce List <[email protected]>; John
N. Deely <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2014 5:39 AM
Subject: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Cosmos
Part 324** MURDER MYSTERY! **ECO ON PEIRCE!**27 Dec 2014 9:55 am CST REVISE,
READ ORIGINAL
(Who killed truth?) FROM THE TREE TO THE LABYRINTH by Umberto Eco
CHAPTER 15: THE THRESHOLD AND THE INFINITE: PEIRCE AND PRIMARY ICONISM *
correlate with KANT AND THE PLATYPUS
[page 525]
-x-
We can construct a semiotics without a subject or (what amounts to the same
thing) in which the subject is everywhere. In this semiotics there will never
be a “priman” because interpretation will proceed by “mise en abyme”. But, if
from the cosmological point of view the inferential process is infinite,
because there are no intuitions, then we cannot ignore the cognitive instance,
that is, that edge of semiosis that is formed when a subject (any instance
capable of saying “I” that somehow inters into the semiosis from the material
and corporal outside – what I am speaking about is a brain) installs itself and
touches off a chain of inferences under the stimulus of something that, from
its own point of viewand only in this precise spatiotemporal segment, ATTRACTS
ITS ATTENTION [footnote 7: At this point we might be tempted to open up another
can of worms: Why does one thing attract my attention at the expense of
another? But reconstructing a theory of attention in Peirce lies beyond my
capabilities, and beyond the scope of this chapter.] The “I” in this case
stands on that edge where on the one hand there stands, let us say, the dog –
the thing that interests him at the moment – and, on the other hand,
evcerything else – which does not interest him.¶
-x-
In this phase Firstness, as we saw, is a presence “such as it is”, nothing
but a positive characteristic , like a purple color perceived without any sense
of the beginning or end of the experience, without any self-awareness separate
from the sensation of the color; it is potentiality without existence, the
simple possibility of a perceptual process. In order to contest these “qualia”
[page 526] that precede any inference, we must take as our point of departure
the principle that they constitute an intuitive moment, without our being able
to conceive further inferential processes behind it, in a sort of infinite
fractalization. But I would like to remind the reader that the infinite
fractalization of a sea coast does not prevent a human subject, who has a molar
view compared with the molecular view of an ant, from covering in a single step
what would be for the ant an extremely long and tortuous trajectory.¶
-x-
We are back, if you will, to the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise, in
which we must take into account the distinction between POTENTIAL INFINITY and
INFINITY IN ACT, already present in Aristotle.¶
-x-
----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Gary Moore <[email protected]>
To: Jon Awbrey <[email protected]>; Peirce List <[email protected]>; John
N. Deely <[email protected]>
Sent: Saturday, December 27, 2014 6:22 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Cosmos
Part 323** MURDER MYSTERY! **ECO ON PEIRCE!**27 Dec 2014 9:55 am CST REVISE,
READ ORIGINAL
(Who killed truth?) FROM THE TREE TO THE LABYRINTH by Umberto Eco
CHAPTER 15: THE THRESHOLD AND THE INFINITE: PEIRCE AND PRIMARY ICONISM *
correlate with KANT AND THE PLATYPUS
[page 524]
-x-
15.5. PEIRCE AND THE TORTOISE
When reading Peirce, we must not confuse cosmology and gnoseology. As I
already remarked in K & P, two different but mutually interdependent
perspectives are interwoven in Peirce’s thought: the metaphysical-cosmological
and the cognitive. Unless we read them in a semiotic key, Peirce’s meyaphysics
and cosmology remain incomprehensible. But we would have to say the same thing
of his semiotics with respect to his cosmology. Categories such as Firstness,
Secondness, Thirdness and the concept of interpretation itself not only define
“modi significandi”, that is, the ways in which the world can be known: they
are also “modi essendi”, ways in which the world BEHAVES, procedures through
which the world, in the course of evolution, interprets itself. [page 525] In K
& P, I cited Matteo Mameli, “Synechism: Aspetti del pensiero di C. S. Peirce”,
1997: 4: “Given that Peirce thinks and demonstrates that intelligibility is not
an accidental characteristic of the universe, that it is not, that is, a mere
epiphenomenon of how things are, but a characteristic that ‘shapes’ the
universe, it follows that a theory of intelligibility is also a metaphysical
theory of the structure of the universe” K & P, p. 399, n. 28). The theory of
intelligibility and metaphysical theory, however, must sometimes be kept
separate.¶
-x-
Kant said that the fact that we believe we know things on the basis of the
mere evidence of our senses depends on a “vitium subreptionis” or subreption:
we are so accustomed from childhood to grasp things as if they appeared to us
already given to us in intuition that we have never thematized the role played
by the intellect in this process. Therefore even what were for him even
empirical intuitions were already the result of a work of inference.¶
-x-
We can construct a semiotics without a subject or (what amounts to the same
thing) in which the subject is everywhere. In this semiotics there will never
be a “priman” because interpretation will proceed by “mise en abyme”. But, if
from the cosmological point of view the inferential process is infinite,
because there are no intuitions, then we cannot ignore the cognitive instance,
that is, that edge of semiosis that is formed when a subject (any instance
capable of saying “I” that somehow inters into the semiosis from the material
and corporal outside – what I am speaking about is a brain) installs itself and
touches off a chain of inferences under the stimulus of something that, from
its own point of viewand only in this precise spatiotemporal segment, ATTRACTS
ITS ATTENTION [footnote 7: At this point we might be tempted to open up another
can of worms: Why does one thing attract my attention at the expense of
another? But reconstructing a theory of attention in Peirce lies beyond my
capabilities, and beyond the scope of this chapter.] The “I” in this case
stands on that edge where on the one hand there stands, let us say, the dog –
the thing that interests him at the moment – and, on the other hand,
evcerything else – which does not interest him.¶
-x-
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Jon Awbrey <[email protected]>
To: Helmut Raulien <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Sent: Friday, December 26, 2014 10:20 PM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Cosmos
Thread:
JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15230
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15235
SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15236
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15237
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15238
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15239
HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15240
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15241
HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15243
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15244
HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15246
Helmut,
One should not take that illustrative example too literally.
I was simply making another try at clarifying my use of the
word "cosmos" and replying to Sung about anthropocentricity.
Regards,
Jon
Helmut Raulien wrote:
> Hi! I do not think, that my point of view or my argumentation has anything
to do
> with celestial spheres or bearded father figures. I am a left wing
anarchist
> liberal communist feminist anticapitalist antifashist and so on. I am
against
> any authorority, except the authority of God. And, what this is, I am
trying to
> find out. Best, Helmut.
--
academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] .
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] .
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] .
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] .
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
