Jon,

My understanding is that the 'commutative triangle' is the simplest
category.

The Peircean sign defined below (reproduced from
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM)
to me is a commutative triangle and a mathematical category:

*"30 - 1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably
July 1905 .*

A "sign" is anything, A, which,

(1) in addition to other characters of its own,

(2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B,

(3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate,
C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a dyadic
relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the
relation Þ."


Which can be diagrammed as:

                Þ                   µ
          A -------->  B  ------- >  C
           |                                     ^
           |                                      |
           |___________________|
                              h


Figure 3.  The Peircean sign as a mathematical triad.  A = object; B = sign
or representamen; C = interpretant, with the commutative condition
satisfied, i.e.,  Þ x µ = h, where  Þ = sign production; µ= sign
interpretation, and h = information flow.


If figure is right, information flow is possible only because the sign is a
mathemtical category.  Hence Figure 1 can be viewed as the definition of
information, just as it is a definition of the sign.


Let me know if you disagree.

All the best.

Sung








On Wed, Feb 4, 2015 at 5:04 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote:

> Thread:
> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15622
> ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15623
> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15625
> HR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15626
> ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15627
> SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15628
>
> Sung,
>
> Your commutative triangle represents the decomposition of a function h
> (which is a dyadic relation) as the functional composition of two other
> functions f and g (which are also dyadic relations).  This pictures the
> decomposability, factoring, or reducibility of a dyadic relation and has
> nothing to do with the irreducibility of any triadic relations.  Nor does
> it picture a category, it is only one commutative triangle in a category.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 2/4/2015 4:14 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>
>> Jon,
>>
>> An interesting post.  I remember reading the quote about 5 years ago
>> somewhere.
>>
>>   The dative verb "give" nicely illustrates an irreducibly triadic
>> relation
>> (Figure 1) as compared to the sum of two dyadic relations (Figure 2):
>>
>> (1)  Irreducibly triadic:  A gives B to C (or A gives C B) which can be
>> diagrammed as:
>>
>>                    f          g
>>               A -------> B -------> C
>>               |                     ^
>>               |                     |
>>               |_____________________|
>>                          h
>>
>> Figure 1.  Giving as a category, since f x g = h, where f = A let go of B;
>> g = B becomes the possesion of D; h = A intended B to be possessed by C
>> (and not by a stranger).
>>
>> (2) Sum of two independent dyadic relations:  A let go of B which happens
>> to be possessed by C which can be diagrammed as:
>>
>>                  f           g
>>             A ------- > B -------> C
>>
>> Figure 2.  Two independent dyadic relations connected only by f and g,
>> where f = B leaving A, and g = B falling in the hands of C.
>>
>>
>> With all the best.
>>
>> Sung
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 4, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>  I'm not sure, Jon, what your point is, in this post. Although there may
>>> be
>>> six 'mechanical' ways of relating three 'logical subjects', the reality
>>> of
>>> Mind as represented in the modal categories differentiates them by
>>> function.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jon Awbrey" <[email protected]>
>>> To: "Peirce List" <[email protected]>
>>> Sent: Wednesday, February 04, 2015 1:45 PM
>>> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Six Ways Of Looking At A Triadic Relation ⌬ 1
>>>
>>>
>>>   Post   : Six Ways Of Looking At A Triadic Relation ⌬ 1
>>>
>>>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/02/04/six-ways-of-
>>>> looking-at-a-triadic-relation-%e2%8c%ac-1/
>>>> Posted : February 4, 2015 at 1:00 pm
>>>> Author : Jon Awbrey
>>>>
>>>> Peircers,
>>>>
>>>> Here's a triadic factoid from the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism
>>>> that raises a number of important questions for me.  I isolated Peirce's
>>>> observation about the "ordinary logic of relations" from the context of
>>>> his
>>>> remarks that follow, partly in order to render the puzzle more striking.
>>>> There's better copy on my blog, and I'll copy out more as I get time.
>>>>
>>>> ---
>>>>
>>>> A triadic relation has 3! = 6 ''converses'', six grammatically and
>>>> rhetorically different ways of representing what is
>>>> logically the same information.  Peirce illustrates the situation as
>>>> follows, with six variations on the theme of giving.
>>>>
>>>> <blockquote>
>>>>
>>>> So in a triadic fact, say, for example
>>>>
>>>> A gives B to C
>>>>
>>>> we make no distinction in the ordinary logic of relations between the
>>>> ''subject nominative'', the ''direct object'', and
>>>> the ''indirect object''.  We say that the proposition has three
>>>> ''logical
>>>> subjects''.  We regard it as a mere affair of
>>>> English grammar that there are six ways of expressing this:
>>>>
>>>> A gives B to C
>>>> A benefits C with B
>>>> B enriches C at expense of A
>>>> C receives B from A
>>>> C thanks A for B
>>>> B leaves A for C
>>>>
>>>> These six sentences express one and the same indivisible phenomenon.
>>>>
>>>> </blockquote>
>>>>
>>>> References
>>>>
>>>> * Peirce, C.S., “The Categories Defended”, Harvard Lectures on
>>>> Pragmatism
>>>> : Lecture 3 (MS 308, delivered on 9 April
>>>> 1903).  Published in Collected Papers (CP 5.66–81, 88–92, in part),
>>>> Harvard Lectures (HL 167–188), Essential Peirce :
>>>> Volume 2 (EP 2, 160–178).
>>>>
>>>> * Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vols. 1–6,
>>>> Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (eds.), vols.
>>>> 7–8, Arthur W. Burks (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA,
>>>> 1931–1935, 1958.  Volume 5 : Pragmatism and
>>>> Pragmaticism, 1934.  (Cited as CP).
>>>>
>>>> * Peirce, C.S., Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking :
>>>> The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism,
>>>> Patricia Ann Turrisi (ed.), State University of New York Press, Albany,
>>>> NY, 1997.  (Cited as HL).
>>>>
>>>> Peirce, C.S., The Essential Peirce : Selected Philosophical Writings,
>>>> Volume 2 (1893–1913), Peirce Edition Project
>>>> (eds.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN,
>>>> 1998.
>>>> (Cited as EP 2).
>>>>
>>>> Add a comment to this post:
>>>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/02/04/six-ways-of-
>>>> looking-at-a-triadic-relation-%e2%8c%ac-1/#respond
>>>>
>>>>
> --
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
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> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>



-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net
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