Aw: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six Ways of Looking at a Triadic Relation ⌬ 1

Helmut Raulien Sat, 14 Feb 2015 05:19:42 -0800

Paul, List,

I agree, and I dont know, whether I am right or wrong. Maybe this subject again would lead to the Aristotelian causes: Does only causa efficiens underly a universal logic (if it does), or the other causes too, such as causa finalis,...? And even pure mathematics is based on axioms (transitivity, symmetry...), and axioms are not proved, just observed. I think, Peirce saw the natural laws as nonuniversal (the laws of logic too?), but saw them due to tychism, a principle of habit-taking. But then this principle must be universal again. So at the end (resp. at the beginning of thought) there always is some universal principle, if universality is not a matter of infinite regress.

Best,

Helmut

Von: "paul eduardo" <[email protected]>

Helmut:
You would be rigth only if we accept that there are only one phisic or only one math. I mean only if we are moving inside of the non contradictory logic and the positivist thougth. But if we think in a world with several maths ir physics, a world seen with contradictory logic, you are wrong.

From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Date: Sat, 14 Feb 2015 02:36:32 +0100
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six Ways of Looking at a Triadic Relation ⌬ 1

Supplement: I think, logic or mathematics is normative only if or because its normativity is justified by proofs. Proof means, that there cannot be an exception, so it is valid for the whole nature, i.e. the universe, so it is universal. Ok, one might say, that this does not mean, that there are statements that are not universal. But, as long as there is any universal logic, these statements too must be in accord with it, or be contingent. But contingency is not a property a statement can have. Only two events can be contingent. If they have become parts of a statement though, they no longer are, because the act (the statement), with which the utterer of the statement has combined them, has happened for a reason, and this reason underlies logic, because reason implies logic, or even is synonymous with it. I think, it is not possible to utter a statement (combine two events, no matter how contingent or nonsentic towards each other they are) without a reason- maybe that is why dadaism was only a short time fashion.

Jon, List,

I see the difference between descriptive and normative semiotics. Mathematics for instance is a normative science. But "normative" I think does not mean, that it divides nature into two fields: the reasonable field and the extra-norm field. I think, normativity rather should mean, that it is applicable for the whole nature, including dadaist poetry. What would a norm be good for, if we had the free choice to obey it or not? That would not be a norm, but an arbitrary rule- and the laws of mathematics are not arbitrary rules, I think. Maybe the free associations and personal connotations that pass through a given interpreters head are chaotic- but chaos theory can cope with that, cant it? Or is there really something like nondeterministic chaos (eg. in poetry and language)??

Best regards,

Helmut

Helmut, List,

Descriptive semiotics is always available for describing whatever
manner of free associations and personal connotations might chance
to pass through a given interpreter's head or external expressions,
but logic conceived as normative semiotics is an inquiry oriented
toward more focal aims.

Regards,

Jon

On 2/12/2015 6:15 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> Jon, List,
> I was thinking of comparing the sentence "C thanks A for B" with a square root:
> The square root of a positive number has either a positive or a negative result
> (or is it both?). And, that C is thankful is also only one possibility of
> result: C might also not like B and reject it, or might not care and not react.
> Ok, this is not a proper comparison, because the square root delivers only two
> exact results, and Cs possible feelings about being given a B are on a gradual
> scale. So I guess, that in poetry and language there is logic too, but a fuzzy
> logic. When a poet tries to produce something nonlogical, eg. in Dadaism, is
> this really "extra-logical", or just very very fuzzy? I mean, can there be
> something unique extra-logical at all?

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Aw: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six Ways of Looking at a Triadic Relation ⌬ 1

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