That's right--rather than immediate consciousness of generality, we have *mediate* consciousness of same. This is one of the principal reasons why I consider Peirce's idea of the tripartite/tricategorial minimum of time being the *moment* (cf. Bergson's duree) versus the (abstract) *instant* to be so important logically.
[image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 6:39 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R - exactly. Thanks for providing the quote. > > There is no 'immediate consciousness of generality' and 'no direct > experience of the general'...and Thirdness is a factor of our perceptual > *judgments*; that is, reasoning, which is to say, the act-of-Thirdness, > (and I include physico-chemical and biological systems in this process) is > grounded in the experience of perception. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > *To:* [email protected] > *Cc:* peirce-l at list.iupui.edu <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Friday, April 24, 2015 5:33 PM > *Subject:* [biosemiotics:8435] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. > > "If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of > generality, I grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience > of the general, I grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon > us in our very perceptual judgments, and all reasoning, so far as it > depends on necessary reasoning, that is to say, mathematical reasoning, > turns upon the perception of generality and continuity at every step (CP > 5.150) > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Fri, Apr 24, 2015 at 5:28 PM, Tommi Vehkavaara <[email protected] > > wrote: > >> Edwina >> >> If I can see right you are disagreeing with Peirce, then. >> However, I have a suspicion that there is not much real disagreements, >> but you just use words differently as me (or Peirce). I can easily agree >> that "Generals (...) are not akin to discrete matter" or that "we don't >> directly experience them as 'things-in-themselves'. A general is not a >> separate existentiality." >> >> But your statement that "We extract/synthesize generals within our direct >> empirical experience via our reasoning/cognition" I do not think is the >> whole story when it comes to Peirce's logical theory of perception (in >> 1903). That is (approximately) what happens in abductive reasoning, but its >> limit case, the formation of perceptual judgment is not reasoned because >> there is no self-control, nor question about its validity - it is always >> valid about the percept. >> >> Yours, >> >> -tommi >> >> >> Edwina wrote: >> Tommi, I'm going to continue to disagree. Generals, which are Thirdness, >> are not akin to discrete matter in a mode of Secondness. Peirce is >> following Aristotle in asserting that we know the world only through our >> direct experience of it. BUT - as he said: 'the idea of meaning is >> irreducible to those of quality and reaction' (1.345) which is the >> 'directly perceptual'. That is, within our direct experiences, we can, by >> 'mind' (and I mean 'mind' in a broad sense) understand generals. This is >> not reductionism. But since generals are laws, then, they are a 'matter of >> thought and meaning' 1.345) . These are 'relations of reason' (1.365) and >> not of fact (sensual experience of Secondness). So, 'intelligibility or >> reason objectified, is what makes Thirdness genuine' 1.366. >> >> We extract/synthesize generals within our direct empirical experience via >> our reasoning/cognition - since generals are as noted, an act of Mind - but >> we don't directly experience them as 'things-in-themselves'. A general is >> not a separate existentiality. >> >> Dear Edwina >> >> That is Peirce's conception that "perceptual judgments contain elements >> of generality, so that Thirdness is directly perceived" presented in his >> Harvard lectures (that Frederik too refers to): >> >> A bit larger quote from EP 2:223-24: "I do not think it is possible fully >> to comprehend the problem of the merits of pragmatism without recognizing >> these three truths: first, that there are no conceptions which are not >> given to us in perceptual judgments, so that we may say that all our ideas >> are perceptual ideas. This sounds like sensationalism. But in order to >> maintain this position, it is necessary to recognize, second, that >> perceptual judgments contain elements of generality, so that Thirdness is >> directly perceived; and finally, I think it of great importance to >> recognize, third, that the abductive faculty, whereby we divine the secrets >> of nature, is, as we may say, a shading off, a gradation of that which in >> its highest perfection we call perception." >> >> Yours, >> >> -Tommi >> >> On Apr 24, 2015, at 8:24 AM, Tommi Vehkavaara <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> Dear Frederik >>>> >>>> It is not clear to me how the "Austrian" (Brentano-Husserl-Smith) >>>> conception about "fallible apriori" categories like food, organism, etc. >>>> could be compatible with Peirce's conception of pragmatism, at least as >>>> formulated and argued in Peirce's Harvard lectures 1903: >>>> >>>> "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate >>>> of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and >>>> whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be >>>> arrested as unauthorized by reason." (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903) >>>> >>>> For me at least this appears rather as a quite explicit denial that >>>> there could be room for a priori concepts or categories (and mathematics >>>> included), if by a priori is meant prior to senses. I cannot see how >>>> Peirce's idea that we are able to observe real generals directly, could >>>> change the situation in any way, because our access to generals (whether >>>> real or not) has nevertheless perceptual origin. >>>> >>>> So it is not clear what is your position here, is it that you favor the >>>> fallible a priori -doctrine over this Peirce's idea about the logical role >>>> of perception in cognition, or do you think they have no differing >>>> practical consequences, i.e. that they mean the same. Or perhaps you think >>>> that Peirce changed his view in this matter later so that his more mature >>>> view would be compatible? >>>> >>>> This is part of the greater problem that bothers me concerning the >>>> scope and applicability of Peirce's doctrine of signs and such (positive) >>>> metaphysics as he describes its source, but I will not go to these now. >>>> >>>> Yours, >>>> >>>> -Tommi >>>> >>>> You wrote as a response to Howard: >>>> FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the >>>> categories food and poison are a priori, not which substances are >>>> nourishing or poisonous for the single type of organism. >>>> >>>> HP: I would say your statement that food and poison are a priori >>>> categories is only a proposition. It is not an argument. I agree that your >>>> realist mental construct of an abstract or universal category like food is >>>> logically irrefutable (except to me it violates parsimony). >>>> >>>> So I will only restate the empiricist's concept of food as whatever >>>> organisms actually eat that keeps them alive. In evolutionary terms >>>> survival is the only pragmatic test. How do logic and universal categories >>>> explain anything more? >>>> >>>> FS: I think we have been through this before. You say "Food as whatever >>>> organisms actually eat" - but this IS a universal category. It does not >>>> refer to empirical observations, individual occurrences, protocol >>>> sentences, measurements in time and space, all that which empiricism should >>>> be made from. It even involves another universal, that of "organism". It is >>>> no stranger than that. >>>> >>>> So I see no parsimony on your part. I see that you deny the existence >>>> of the universals you yourself are using. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> ******************************************************************* >>>> >>>> "Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?" >>>> - Donald T. Campbell >>>> >>>> ******************************************************************* >>>> >>>> University of Tampere >>>> School of Social Sciences and Humanities - Philosophy >>>> Tommi Vehkavaara >>>> FI-33014 University of Tampere >>>> Finland >>>> >>>> Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home) >>>> e-mail:[email protected] >>>> homepage:http://people.uta.fi/~attove >>>> https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara >>>> >>>> ******************************************************************* >>>> >>> >> -- >> ******************************************************************* >> >> "Cousins to the ameba that we are, how could we know for certain?" >> - Donald T. Campbell >> >> ******************************************************************* >> >> University of Tampere >> School of Social Sciences and Humanities - Philosophy >> Tommi Vehkavaara >> FI-33014 University of Tampere >> Finland >> >> Phone: +358-50-3186122 (work), +358-45-2056109 (home) >> e-mail: [email protected] >> homepage: http://people.uta.fi/~attove >> https://uta-fi.academia.edu/TommiVehkavaara >> >> ******************************************************************* >> >> >
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