Jon, Frederik, lists, Jon, please see the last paragraph of my just posted excerpt from one of Nathan Houser's papers--exactly to your point, I'd say.
Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Apr 25, 2015 at 1:36 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: > Frederik, Gary, List, > > We have had several long discussions over the years regarding Peirce's > use of the words "direct" and "immediate" in this context. The matter > always comes down in the end to a study of his "Cotary Propositions". So > maybe we can steal a march or three by passing Go and cutting straight to > those whetstones of wit. > > Regards, > > Jon > > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > > On Apr 25, 2015, at 1:19 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt <[email protected]> wrote: > > Dear Gary, lists > > In the discussion of this P quote > : > > "If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of generality, > I grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience of the > general, I grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon us in > our very perceptual judgments, and all reasoning, so far as it depends on > necessary reasoning, that is to say, mathematical reasoning, turns upon the > perception of generality and continuity at every step (CP 5.150) > > > it may be too easy to get the impression that as there is "no immediate > consciousness of generality", there must be, instead, perception as > immediate consciousness of First- and Secondness from which generatlity is > then, later, construed by acts of inference, generalization etc. But that > would be to conform Peirce to the schema of logical empiricism which seems > to have grown into default schema over the last couple of generations. > And that is not, indeed, what Peirce thought. What IS "immediate > consciousness" about in Peirce? He uses the term in several connections. > Sometimes he says it is a "pure fiction" (1.343), sometimes he says it is > identical to the Feeling as the qualitiative aspect of any experience > (1.379) but that it is instantaneous and thus does not cover a timespan > (hence its fictionality because things not covering a timespan do not > exist). > But Feelings are Firstnesses and, for that reason, never appear in > isolation (all phenomena having both 1-2-3 aspects). So > immediate-consciousness-Feelings come in company with existence (2) and > generality/continuity (3). That is why what appears in perception is > perceptual judgments - so perception as such is NOT "immediate > consciousness". It is only the Feeling aspect of perception which is > immediate - and that can only be isolated and contemplated retroactively > (but then we are already in time/generality/continuity). Immediate > consciousness, then, is something accompanying all experience, but > graspable only, in itself, as a vanishing limit category. Thus, it is > nothing like stable sense data at a distance from later generalizations. > > Best > F > >
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