Frederik, Gary, List, We have had several long discussions over the years regarding Peirce's use of the words “direct” and “immediate” in this context. The matter always comes down in the end to a study of his “Cotary Propositions”. So maybe we can steal a march or three by passing Go and cutting straight to those whetstones of wit.
Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > On Apr 25, 2015, at 1:19 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt <[email protected]> wrote: > > Dear Gary, lists > > In the discussion of this P quote > : >> "If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of generality, I >> grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience of the >> general, I grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon us in >> our very perceptual judgments, and all reasoning, so far as it depends on >> necessary reasoning, that is to say, mathematical reasoning, turns upon the >> perception of generality and continuity at every step (CP 5.150) > > it may be too easy to get the impression that as there is "no immediate > consciousness of generality", there must be, instead, perception as immediate > consciousness of First- and Secondness from which generatlity is then, later, > construed by acts of inference, generalization etc. But that would be to > conform Peirce to the schema of logical empiricism which seems to have grown > into default schema over the last couple of generations. > And that is not, indeed, what Peirce thought. What IS "immediate > consciousness" about in Peirce? He uses the term in several connections. > Sometimes he says it is a "pure fiction" (1.343), sometimes he says it is > identical to the Feeling as the qualitiative aspect of any experience (1.379) > but that it is instantaneous and thus does not cover a timespan (hence its > fictionality because things not covering a timespan do not exist). > But Feelings are Firstnesses and, for that reason, never appear in isolation > (all phenomena having both 1-2-3 aspects). So > immediate-consciousness-Feelings come in company with existence (2) and > generality/continuity (3). That is why what appears in perception is > perceptual judgments - so perception as such is NOT "immediate > consciousness". It is only the Feeling aspect of perception which is > immediate - and that can only be isolated and contemplated retroactively (but > then we are already in time/generality/continuity). Immediate consciousness, > then, is something accompanying all experience, but graspable only, in > itself, as a vanishing limit category. Thus, it is nothing like stable sense > data at a distance from later generalizations. > > Best > F >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
