John, Lists, You wrote: I am not denying 1ns. Never have. I claim it does not stand on its own, and as a result cannot itself be foundational. It requires further mental actions to pick out 1ns. It is not manifested in itself. It is not "given". It cannot be the foundation for an epistemology.
But no one has suggested here, I don't think, that 1ns can "stand on its own"--that's exactly the point of Peirce's involutional argument in "The Logic of Mathematics" and in Frederik's post (the one which included diagrams). It doesn't stand alone but is caught up in "three universes of experience" as Peirce phrased it, while, as Nathan Houser discusses it in "The Scent of Truth," it *is* "given" as the percept in the perceptual judgments. He writes: "[A]ccording to Peirce, perceptual judgments are the result of a process that is too uncontrolled to be regarded as fully rational, so one cannot say unequivocally that perceptual judgments arise from sensations (or percepts, as the sensory component of perception is called) by an act of abductive inference, but Peirce insisted that 'abductive inference shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them' and that 'our first premisses, the perceptual judgments, are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences' (CP 5.181). This helps explain Peirce's commitment (somewhat reconceived) to the maixm: *'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu,'* (CP 5.181) (N. Houser, The Scent of Truth, 462) And, I guess, I'm saying that 1ns is an essential component of that which is *in sensu, *and that facet of the perceptual judgment is not an abstraction in your sense. Here's one of the several relevant passages from the 1903 *Lectures on Pragmatism*: On its side, the perceptive judgment is the result of a process, although of a process not sufficiently conscious to be controlled, or, to state it more truly, not controllable and therefore not fully conscious. If we were to subject this subconscious process to logical analysis, we should find that it terminated in what that analysis would represent as an abductive inference, resting on the result of a similar process which a similar logical analysis would represent to be terminated by a similar abductive inference, and so on ad infinitum. This analysis would be precisely analogous to that which the sophism of Achilles and the Tortoise applies to the chase of the Tortoise by Achilles, and it would fail to represent the real process for the same reason. Namely, just as Achilles does not have to make the series of distinct endeavors which he is represented as making, so this process of forming the perceptual judgment, because it is sub-conscious and so not amenable to logical criticism, does not have to make separate acts of inference, but performs its act in one continuous process (CP 5.181, Turrisi, 241). I have just read Ben's remarks and would tend to agree with them (there's some contradiction in comparing some of the quotes Ben offers, but I think this is only apparent). Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 2:33 PM, John Collier <[email protected]> wrote: > I am not denying 1ns. Never have. I claim it does not stand on its own, > and as a result cannot itself be foundational. It requires further mental > actions to pick out 1ns. It is not manifested in itself. It is not "given". > It cannot be the foundation for an epistemology. > > > > You seem to still be misunderstanding my use of "abstraction". I am using > it in the time honoured way initiated by Locke as partial consideration. > Berkeley missed this and thought of ideas as little pictures, so we can't > have an idea of man because every man has specific characteristics. Locke > had already answered this. Yesterday I saw a man in the bushes. I did not > see his colour, the number of limbs (though it was at least two) or a bunch > of other things. I have no problem saying this was a perceptual experience. > But it must have involved judgment. I know there must have been things that > I experienced that led to this, but I couldn't well say what they were, > since that would bring them under generalities, which aren't 1ns. > > > > But I further maintain that 1ns is useless for thought, because thought > requires generalities. Perhaps that is what you don't like. > > > > John > > > > *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* April 27, 2015 2:12 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Cc:* [email protected] > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8485] Re: Natural Propositions, > > > > John, > > > > You first wrote: "the experience of firstness. I maintained there is no > such thing in itself (except as an abstraction)." > > > > But now you say that you agree with Frederik's analysis. But I do not > think that Frederik is saying that there is "so such thing in itself" as an > "experience of firstness," but that we must prescissively abstract it out > if we are to "focus" on in certain analyses. > > > > Frederik has just written that he does not deny 1ns. You however seem to > to saying that it is merely "an abstraction," has its being as an > abstraction, has no other reality than that. Again, this does not appear to > me to be how Frederik sees it (he'll correct me, I'm sure, if I'm wrong). > All he seems to be saying is that for some analytical purposes it is > helpful to prescissively abstract 1ns from the other two categories. > > > > Best, > > > > Gary > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *C 745* > > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > > > On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 9:13 AM, John Collier <[email protected]> wrote: > > Agreed, Frederik. I think this is really important. > > > > John > > > > *From:* Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* April 26, 2015 6:41 PM > *To:* [email protected]; Peirce-L 1 > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8466] Re: Natural Propositions, > > > > ps - Peirce's three distinctions are subtypes of partial consideration - > > > > F > > > > Den 26/04/2015 kl. 18.37 skrev John Collier <[email protected]> > > : > > > > Gary, > > > > I would say it is an abstraction from the perceptual judgment, where > abstraction is understood as Locke's partial consideration. At least that > is the way I seem to experience things myself. Perhaps others are different. > > > > John > > > > >
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