Oh,

I forgot to add one more to the list of the concepts and principles
embodied in Figure 1 of my previous post, i.e.,

(vi) the mathematical theory of categories.

As you can see, I am able to connect these diverse elements of discourses
in one theoretical framework (whose validity remains to be proven) because
of the enormous power of DIAGRAMS.  If I had to depend only on words and
sentences, I probably would not have been able to do this as naturally and
convincingly.

All the best.

Sung

On Fri, May 8, 2015 at 7:18 AM, Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> wrote:

> Helmut,
>
> You are raising some interesting questions.
>
> I wonder if mind is irreducibly triadic, meaning that it has three
> properties that are inseparably linked like a Borromean.  I am inclined to
> refer to these three properties or aspects of mind as 'mind as IS' (1ns
> mind), 'mind as EXPERIENCED' (2ns mind), and 'mind as MODELED' (3ns mind),
> and these may form a mathematical category:
>
>                       f                           g
> 1ns Mind  --------> 2ns Mind  -------->  ins Mind
>        |                                                        ^
>        |                                                        |
>        |____________________________|
>                                     h
>
> Figure 1.  Mind as an irreducible triad of Peirce  (ITP).
> f = self-organization (?); g = origin of life (?); h = information flow o
> the origin of language (?)
>
> What may be significant about Figure 1 is that it provides a coherent
> framework for relating seemingly unrelated concepts --
>
> (i) mind,
> (ii) Peircean triadic metaphysics,
> (iii) principle of set-organization,
> (iv) the origin of life {i.e., biology), and
> (v) language and informatics.
>
> If you have any questions or comments, let me know.
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
>
>
>
> .
>
>
>
> On Wed, May 6, 2015 at 6:02 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>>   Supplement: Patient and agent for me are not a dyad, but parts of a
>> triad, consisting of: Patiens, Agens, Effect. Neither of these three is
>> thinkable or senseful with one of them missing.
>>  Dear Stan, Peirceans,
>> Dyadicity or triadicity? My hypothesis about dyadicity is, that there are
>> two kinds of systems, distinguished by their two kinds of space. One is
>> reality systems with their space consisting of the three dimensions we
>> know, which are usually named "x, y, z", or "width, broadth, depth". The
>> other kind of systems, the mind systems, or virtual sytems, have an
>> imaginary space. How many dimensions this space has, depends on the
>> imagination capability of the imaginer. According to Peirce though, this
>> space is one, he has called it "Phaneron". I dont know, if I can believe
>> that it is one. What do you think? So, for me dyadicity lies in the
>> existence of these two kinds of space (real and imagined by the - or some-
>> mind). Triadicity is, that both of these spaces or system types are by
>> themselves triadic. So for me, dyadicity and triadicity are not
>> contradicting each other, they just adress different things. Body-mind is a
>> dyad, or what might be there suggested for a third element? But the body,
>> physics, chemistry and so on, underlies semiotic triadicity. Also the mind.
>> Now, what is the connection between body and mind, or between reality and
>> virtuality? My proposal: It is firstness, shared by both. Not so? What do
>> you think?
>> Best regards! Helmut
>>
>>
>> *Von:* "Stanley N Salthe" <[email protected]>
>>
>>  Howard, Peirceans,
>>
>> In my model of Peircean semiotic I have the object (Peircean sense)
>> separate from the 'system of interpretance', which includes the signs as
>> well as the apparatus for generating interpretants That is, I believe that
>> I have folded the Peircean triad into a dyadic diagram, without losing its
>> triadicity. This was done because I am coming to semiotics from science.
>> Has anyone an objection to this procedure?
>>
>> STAN
>>
>> On Wed, May 6, 2015 at 8:23 AM, Howard Pattee <[email protected]>
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> At 05:46 PM 5/5/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>>>
>>> It's quite a stretch to read [the Peirce quote] as an assertion that
>>> "the subject-object relation" is "obscure and mysterious," and it has
>>> nothing to do with the "mind-matter problem" which is the legacy of
>>> Cartesian dualism.
>>>
>>>
>>> What is the stretch? Your statement makes no sense to me. The quote is
>>> explicit. It is about the relation between the mathematical *symbols*
>>> in the chemist's *mind* (the subject), and the chemical matter in
>>> nature (the object). The relation between subject and object (or image and
>>> object, mind and matter or symbol and matter, observer and observed or the
>>> knower and the known, etc.) are all cases of the same old epistemic problem
>>> -- the relation of observed shadows (in Plato's cave) to the light of
>>> reality. Here is the quote again:
>>>
>>> Peirce: “The result that the chemist *observes* is brought about by*
>>> nature*, the result that the mathematician observes is brought about by
>>> the associations of the* mind*. . . the power that connects the
>>> conditions of the mathematicians diagram with the relations he
>>> *observes* in it is just as occult and mysterious to us as the power of
>>> Nature that brings about the results of the chemical experiment."
>>>
>>> HP: Peirce clearly distinguishes the* mind* of the observer from
>>> natural *matter* that is observed. I call this an epistemic mind-matter
>>> problem. (Descartes substance dualism is irrelevant.)  All epistemic
>>> concepts like detection, observation, measurement, etc. do not make any
>>> sense without separating the categories of *subject* and *object*. This
>>> distinction is not just a metaphysical principle. It is a pragmatic
>>> empirical necessity that all sciences require.
>>>
>>> Metaphysically lumping "matter as effete mind" still leaves Peirce
>>> making the same basic epistemic subject-object distinctions: "A *sign*
>>> is a thing which serves to convey knowledge of some other thing, which it
>>> is said to* stand for *or *represent*. This thing is called the *object*
>>> of the sign; the idea in the mind that the sign excites, which is a mental
>>> sign of the same object, is called an *interpretant* of the sign.”
>>>
>>> I don't see why Peirce would have any problem with modern empiricism,
>>> other than his irrefutable and unfalsifiable metaphysics of "matter as
>>> effete mind."
>>>
>>> Howard
>>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>
> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
> Rutgers University
> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
> 732-445-4701
>
> www.conformon.net
>



-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net
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