*Edwina wrote:*
EW: 3) Again, the exact reference ought to have been provided.
Sung: The quote was from Definition #30 listed at
*http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM
<http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM>:*
*30 - 1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably July
1905 .*
EW: 4) You state that the 'g' or the Relation between the Representamen and
the Interpretant, is missing in Peirce - and you don't say 'missing in the
quoted definition' but instead clearly say 'missing in Peirce's definition
of the irreducible triad" - a totally different statement.
Sung: Of course, I meant the former. How can anyone think otherwise ?
If you analyze Peirce's definition of the sign, #30, carefully, you will
recognize that his definition contains three nodes or relata (A = sign, B=
object, C= intepretant), two 'dyadic relations' (Þ, µ), and a 'triadic
relation', which he did not represent with any symbol. So if I am allowed
to take the liberty of using 'ϒ' (Greek letter gamma) for this missing
symbol, the following scheme would result:
Þ ϒ
B -----> A -----> C
| ^
| |
|______________|
µ
Figure 1. A proposed diagram to represent the definition of the sign given
by Peirce in *1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft)
presumably July 1905, as quoted in #30, *
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM:
One way to express Figure 1 in words would be:
"A is determined by B and determines C in such a way that C is in turn
determined by B." (062315-1)
or
"A sign is determined by its object and determines an interpretant in such
a way (062315-2)
that the interpretant is in turn determined by the same object."
In Definition #30 (reproduced below), Peirce used the word "sign" in two
senses -- 'dyadic' (see (2)) and 'triadic' (see (3)). Therefore, Statement
(062315-2) does not do justice to Definition #30, since it uses "sign" only
in a dyadic sense. One way to remedy this deficiency may be to use
"representamen" to indicate the sign in a dyadic relation to its object and
"sign" in its triadic relation to both object and interpretant, leading to
the following statement:
"A sign is the irreducibly triadic relation among representamen, object,
and interpretant (062315-3)
where representamen is determined by its object and determines an
intepretant in
such a way that the interpretant is in turn determined by the same object."
*http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM
<http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM>*
#30. A "sign" is anything, A, which,
(1) in addition to other characters of its own,
(2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B,
(3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate,
C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a dyadic
relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the
relation Þ.
It seems to me that Statement (062315-3) is consistent not only with
Definition #30 but also with Definitions #8, #9, and #10 reproduced below.
If you do not agree, let me know:
*http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM
<http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM>*
*8 - 1896 - C.P. 1-480 - The logic of mathematics .*
[...] Indeed, representation necessary involves a genuine triad. For it
involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, inward or outward,
mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. [...]
*9 - v. 1897_- C.P. 2-228 - Division of signs .*
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is,
creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign or perhaps a more
developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the
first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that
object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I
have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. [...]
*10 - v 1899 - C.P. 1-564 - Notes on "A new list of categories" .*
[...] A very broad and important class of triadics characters [consist of]
representations. A representation is that character of a thing by virtue of
which, for the production of a certain mental effect, it may stand in place
of another thing. The thing having this character I term a representamen,
the mental effect, or thought, its interpretant, the thing for which it
stands, its object.
With all the best.
Sung
On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 at 10:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
wrote:
> 1) But that's not how the Peircean Sign (the triad) operates - in a
> reverse cycle. The Interpretant informs not only the existential reality of
> the Object but also, vitally, the reality of the Representamen.
>
> 2) Your refusal to read Peirce, and your reliance on singular
> decontextualized quotes found in a collection of quotes means that you
> don't understand the infrastructure of the Sign. Why predict? Why not
> simply read Peirce.
>
> 3) Again, the exact reference ought to have been provided.
>
> 4) You state that the 'g' or the Relation between the Representamen and
> the Interpretant, is missing in Peirce - and you don't say 'missing in the
> quoted definition' but instead clearly say 'missing in Peirce's definition
> of the irreducible triad" - a totally different statement. (And I don't
> know how you can claim this). Therefore, Peirce's definition of the
> irreducible triad and your diagram have no analogy.
>
> 5) And, of course, your misuse of the categories is another problem.
>
> Edwina
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Sungchul Ji <[email protected]>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
> *Sent:* Monday, June 22, 2015 9:19 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Survey of Relation Theory • 1
>
> Edwina,
>
> (1) First, Sung, I do indeed find a deficiency in your Firgure 1. Thus,
> if your arrows are deterministic, then, the whole set is linear.
>
> It depends on how the deterministic arrows are connected:
>
> linearly thus A -----> B ------> C
>
> or cyclically thus A -----> B -----> C
> | ^
> | |
> |____________|
>
>
> (2) Second, if you state that 'g' is missing in Peirce's definition, then
> you cannot include it in your diagram and tell us that this diagram is of
> a 'Peircean sign'.
>
> If the Pericean sign is irreducibly triadic (as Peirce clearly pointed),
> then there has to be the structure-preserving mapping "g" from
> representamen to "intepretant", although he may not have mentioned it
> explicitly in the quoted definition. If Peirce's definition of the sign
> lacks an equivalent of "g", I would have to conclude that \ Peirce's sign
> is not a member of the ur-category and hence is not irreducibly triadic.
> On the other hand, if the Peircean sign is irreducibly triadic, there has
> to be an equivalent of "g" in one of his many definitions of signs (this
> would be my prediction).
>
> (3) Third, your quotation (and a scholar ought to provide the exact
> reference) doesn't have a thing to do with your diagram.
>
> The reference is given as given
> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM: from which any
> one can find the more exact reference if needed.
>
>
> You say my quotation "doesn't have a thing to do with your diagram." You
> must have some good reasons to come to such a definite conclusion. Can you
> explain what they are ?
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
>
>
> On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 at 7:53 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>> First, Sung, I do indeed find a deficiency in your Firgure 1. Thus, if
>> your arrows are deterministic, then, the whole set is linear. Second, if
>> you state that 'g' is missing in Peirce's definition, then you
>> cannot include it in your diagram and tell us that this diagram is of a
>> 'Peircean sign'. Third, your quotation (and a scholar ought to provide the
>> exact reference) doesn't have a thing to do with your diagram.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> *From:* Sungchul Ji <[email protected]>
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
>> *Sent:* Monday, June 22, 2015 6:09 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Survey of Relation Theory • 1
>>
>> Edwina wrote:
>>
>> "Sung's diagram doesn't represent the Peircean triad (which, if one
>> wants (062215-1)
>> to diagram it, is better done as a 'spoked umbrella') because Sung's
>> diagram
>> is simply a linear cumulation, and the Peircean sign is definitely not
>> that."
>>
>> My diagram (reproduced below) is not "simply a linear cumulation" as the
>> evidence will show.
>>
>>
>> f g
>> Object ------> Representamen ------> Interpretant
>> | ^
>> | |
>> |_____________________________ __|
>> h
>>
>> Figure 1. The Peircean sign viewed as a mathematical category (i.e., as
>> members of the ur-category).
>> f = sign production; g = sign intepretation; f = grounding (or
>> information flow).
>> the commutative condition is satisfied in that f x g = h. The arrows can
>> be read as "determines".
>>
>> This diagram is almost identical to Peircean definition of signs (given
>> below), if you accept the following identities:
>>
>> f = Þ
>> h = µ
>> g = missing in Peirce's definition of the irreducible triad.
>>
>> A = Representamen
>> B = Object
>> C = Interpretant
>>
>> Peirecan defintion of signs, reproduced from
>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM:
>>
>>
>>
>> A "sign" is anything, A, which,
>>
>> (1) in addition to other characters of its own,
>>
>>
>>
>> (2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B,
>>
>>
>>
>> (3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive
>> correlate, C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a
>> dyadic relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way
>> to the relation Þ.
>>
>>
>> The concept of the ur-category introduced in my post dated 7/23/14 (to be
>> forwarded separately for your reference) has been proven useful (at least
>> for me) and seems to apply to defining Peircean signs as indicated in
>> Figure 1. Obviously Figure 1 cannot capture all the rich details of the
>> Peircean sign but only some of its key features.
>>
>> If you see any deficiency in Figure 1, let me know.
>>
>> All the best.
>>
>> Sung
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 at 3:55 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I agree with Jon here. Sung's diagram doesn't represent the Peircean
>>> triad (which, if one wants to diagram it, is better done as a 'spoked
>>> umbrella') because Sung's diagram is simply a linear cumulation, and the
>>> Peircean sign is definitely not that.
>>>
>>> In addition, Thirdness is a categorical mode of organization, and no-one
>>> considers that it operates only in the Interpretant. If you check the ten
>>> Peircean classes of signs (2.256), you'll see that the Interpretant is in a
>>> mode of Thirdness in only ONE Sign - the Argument. In the other 9 classes,
>>> it is never in a mode of Thirdness but is either in a mode of Firstness or
>>> Secondness. In addition, the term 'Thirdness' also doesn't apply to 'the
>>> whole 3-node network'; the triad's three Relations are only ALL in a mode
>>> of Thirdness in that one Sign: the Argument.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jon Awbrey" <[email protected]>
>>> To: "Sungchul Ji" <[email protected]>
>>> Cc: "Helmut Raulien" <[email protected]>; "Peirce List" <
>>> [email protected]>
>>> Sent: Monday, June 22, 2015 3:32 PM
>>> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Survey of Relation Theory • 1
>>>
>>>
>>> Sung, List,
>>>>
>>>> Like I keep saying, but maybe some folks haven't heard it yet,
>>>> the main problem with the diagram you keep drawing is that it
>>>> does not represent an irreducibly triadic sign relation at all.
>>>> What it does represent is the decomposition of the function or
>>>> dyadic relation h as a composition f o g of two other functions
>>>> or dyadic relations f and g. But decomposability is just another
>>>> word for reducibility and so your diagram depicts the very opposite
>>>> of the property you keep saying it depicts.
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Jon
>>>>
>>>> On 6/22/2015 2:57 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Jon wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> "So it's perfectly okay to say that relations exist in the world and
>>>>> you can even say that thirdness is the essence of triadic relations,
>>>>> meaning that all triadic relations have a property in common that
>>>>> you might as well call “thirdness” as anything else, but when you
>>>>> turn to saying that thirdness inheres in one of the places of the
>>>>> relation and not the others then that is a matter of another sort
>>>>> and it does not automatically follow. Here we risk what I have
>>>>> called the “Fallacy Of Misplaced Essence” (FOME) and avoiding
>>>>> that takes quite a bit more care."
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree.
>>>>> The following diagram may help us avoid FOME. That is, the term
>>>>> "thirdness" applies to the whole 3-node network, not to Interpretant
>>>>> alone,
>>>>> as some may be tempted to assume.
>>>>>
>>>>> f g
>>>>> Object ------> Representamen ------> Interpretant
>>>>> | ^
>>>>> | |
>>>>> |_______________________________________|
>>>>> h
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In other words, "thirdness" to me is the name given to the irreducible
>>>>> triadicity depicted in this figure consisting of 3 nodes and 3 edges
>>>>> that
>>>>> satisfy the commutative condition, which I conveniently represent as f
>>>>> x g
>>>>> = h, where f = sign production, g = sign interpretation, h =
>>>>> validation,
>>>>> grounding, proof, information flow, etc.
>>>>>
>>>>> All the best.
>>>>>
>>>>> Sung
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 at 9:50 AM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Helmut, List,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A day in the yard meditatively pulling weeds helped me to clear my
>>>>>> head and
>>>>>> I think I can see where this all went agley. I still think that what
>>>>>> Harry
>>>>>> wrote is an apt statement of a critical point in Peirce's theory of
>>>>>> signs
>>>>>> and I'm sorry if I stepped on it with my nonce-ens words about
>>>>>> “ontologism”
>>>>>> so I'll put off the long version explanation of that to another time.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Edwina's prompting I did take the trouble to look the word up
>>>>>> and I see that it really was already in use, however obscurely,
>>>>>> at least to a non-mediæval scholar like me:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ☞ http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11257a.htm
>>>>>>
>>>>>> “Ontologism is an ideological system which maintains that God and
>>>>>> Divine ideas> are the first object of our intelligence and the
>>>>>> intuition of God the first act of our intellectual knowledge.”
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Although I can dimly see, or imagine a link between that ideology
>>>>>> and the ideology I was trying to criticize I think it's probably
>>>>>> best to avoid conflating the two ideas and so I'll go back to
>>>>>> using words like “essentialism” that I've used before, as in
>>>>>> this record of an earlier discussion:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ☞ Nominalism and Essentialism are the Scylla and Charybdis
>>>>>> that Pragmatism Must Navigate Its Middle Way Between
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/09/21/nominalism-and-essentialism-are-the-scylla-and-charybdis-that-pragmatism-must-navigate-its-middle-way-between/
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A famous physicist whose name I've forgotten
>>>>>> once said something to the following effect:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> “An -ism never did much for science, except for prism.”
>>>>>>
>>>>>> To prism I'd add pragmatism and maybe schism but the point is that
>>>>>> I almost always speak of isms in a critical vein, as emphases that
>>>>>> have closed out their complementary emphases or as ideologies that
>>>>>> have taken their initial idea a bridge too far. So I was thinking
>>>>>> of the series ontology, ontologist, ontologism on analogy with the
>>>>>> series science, scientist, scientism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So it's perfectly okay to say that relations exist in the world and
>>>>>> you can even say that thirdness is the essence of triadic relations,
>>>>>> meaning that all triadic relations have a property in common that
>>>>>> you might as well call “thirdness” as anything else, but when you
>>>>>> turn to saying that thirdness inheres in one of the places of the
>>>>>> relation and not the others then that is a matter of another sort
>>>>>> and it does not automatically follow. Here we risk what I have
>>>>>> called the “Fallacy Of Misplaced Essence” (FOME) and avoiding
>>>>>> that takes quite a bit more care.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jon
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>> --
>>>>
>>>> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
>>>> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
>>>> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
>>>> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
>>>> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
>>>> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> -----------------------------
>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>>
>> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
>> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
>> Rutgers University
>> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
>> 732-445-4701
>>
>> www.conformon.net
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
>
> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
> Rutgers University
> Piscataway, N.J. 08855
> 732-445-4701
>
> www.conformon.net
>
>
--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
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