Jon, Ben, List, I'm adding two short passages from Lalor's paper which, I hope,help clarify the distinction he is making between the 1906 & 1909 divisions of the interpretant. He writes:
[I]t should be no surprise that his 1906 classification of the interpretants as emotional, energetic, and logical, reflects an anthropomorphic way of looking at semiosis. The 1909 trichotomy lays down a general structural pattern which Peirce believed can be found in all kinds of semiosis. The 1906 taxonomy applies specifically to the way in which human semiosis manifests that structure. So the 1906 division is one which explicates this important aspect of human semiosis. Later in the paper he writes. To point to a few implications, the distinction between the emotional and immediate interpretants is not one of kind, then, but one of level of analysis. The 1909 trichotomy can be used to characterize semiosis which is finer-grained or coarser-grained than that to which the 1906 trichotomy applies. It allows the individuation of interpretants to be indefinitely narrower (as may suit theorizing about pre-conscious mental activity), or indefinitely wider (as may suit theorizing about public communication,[ 11 <https://thereitis.org/index.php?module=ContentExpress&func=display&ceid=8&meid=#fn11> ] or economics). Thus, it is more general in applicability, since unlike the emotional interpretant, the immediate interpretant does *not specify one perspective or principle of individuation. *It only characterizes the structural pattern to be found. Also, my view explicitly allows for the supervenience of one type of semiosis on another. Thus, the 1909 division is here considered a generalization of the 1906 division now applicable to all sorts of semiosis. Finally, those who followed the seminar on Stjernfelt's *Natural Propositions* may find Lalor's analysis to make good sense. Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Aug 15, 2015 at 3:50 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Ben, List, > > Thanks for this most intriguing post which, helpfully, rehearses your > discussions with Ben Udell. > > I'm afraid I haven't much to offer, especially as regards "specific > illustrative examples." But your post brought to mind a paper published > some years ago in *Semiotica*, a response by the author to a critique of > his ideas--regarding the relationship of the 1906 division of interpretants > to the 1909 division--by Tom Short in *Transactions.* > (1996, “Interpreting Peirce’s Interpretant: A Response to Lalor, Liszka, > and Meyers,” <http://www.peircesociety.org/contents.html> 32:4, pp. > 488-541)*.* > > See: "The Classification of Peirce's Interpretants," Brendan Lalor. > *Semiotica* 114-1/2, 31-40, 1997. > > https://philosophy.thereitis.org/the-classification-of-peirces-interpretants/ > (Note to Ben: the link at Arisbe doesn't take one to this paper.) > > I tended at the time--and since--to agree with him contra Tom Short > regarding his principal thesis. Here's his abstract followed by the paper's > concluding two paragraphs. > > *Abstract.* After characterizing the role of the interpretant in > semiosis, I consider two passages in which Peirce makes a threefold > division of interpretants, one from 1906, one from 1909. Then I suggest > that Thomas Short and others are wrong in holding that in the two passages, > Peirce put forward two completely separate trichotomies. Instead, I argue > that the 1906 trichotomy is in fact a special case of that put forward by > Peirce in the 1909 passage, not a separate trichotomy. I then explain more > specifically how we ought to conceive the relationship between these two > classifications. > > [The concluding two paragraphs of the paper] > > One might argue that even if my view is right, Short’s view, that the two > trichotomies of interpretant intersect yielding nine types in all, could be > right as well, in the following sense. Perhaps what at one level of > analysis is an immediate interpretant, could turn out to supervene on what > at a lower level of analysis are emotional, energetic, and logical > interpretants — and likewise in the case of dynamic and final > interpretants. In this way, for example, perhaps a dynamic interpretant > could in a sense also be said to be a logical interpretant. However, Short > is committed to the conceptual clarity of the proposition, ‘this dynamic > interpretant *is *a logical interpretant’. This is quite different from > what my view asserts as conceptually clear: i.e. that ‘this dynamic > interpretant *in part*supervenes on a logical interpretant’ — not that it > *is* one. I will not make a judgment here about the prospects for working > out some unnoticed way of showing that *something like *Short’s view is > conceptually clear after all. If such a partial vindication is possible, > however, I fail to see how it can be made apart from exploiting the notion > of coarser- and finer-grained levels of semiotic analysis. > > While I have not analyzed the other two kinds of interpretant, I want to > comment on the last kind, the ‘final interpretant’ of 1909. By defining it > as ‘the one Interpretive result to which every Interpreter is destined to > come if the sign is sufficiently considered’ (Hardwick 1977: 111), Peirce’s > general 1909 presentation of the theory provides a context for discourse > about the *truth *of an interpretant. Such an interpretant would be a > true, precise representation of the dynamical object mentioned above. Even > though we have pointed out in the first section of this paper that no > interpretant is informationally determinate in every respect, the human > version of the final interpretant is for us an ideal. It would result from > an indefinite series of interpretations of signs, perhaps by sign > processing beings with fewer ‘incapacities’ than human beings. To say that > the final interpretant is within our possible reach is the expression of a > hope. The 1906 presentation, on the other hand, specifies the context as > that of human semiosis, in which discourse about the ultimate logical > interpretant is about *meaning,*not necessarily truth. The hope of > science is that eventually the ultimate logical interpretant — that Homo > sapien version of the final interpretant — will perfectly correspond to the > final interpretant itself. Then we will have carved the world at its > joints.[ 12 > <https://thereitis.org/index.php?module=ContentExpress&func=display&ceid=8&meid=#fn12> > ] > This is, as Pape (1991) put it, ‘the intellectual hope that the sequence of > interpretations — perhaps there are infinitely many of them and we are > connecting one infinity with another — will ultimately represent reality’ > (174). > > This short paper is, I think, well worth reading. But I'll have to reread > it as my memory is quite fuzzy as to its details. > > Best, > > Gary > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Sat, Aug 15, 2015 at 2:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Greetings! I am by no means a Peirce scholar--I am a professional >> engineer and amateur philosopher--but I became interested in his ideas a >> few months ago for various reasons. I have read a considerable amount of >> the secondary literature since then, as well as EP1 and portions of EP2 >> (still in progress). I have also been looking through the list archives >> and monitoring some of the recent discussions. In one of the latter, Ben >> Udell made this comment that caught my eye: >> >> <QUOTE Ben Udell, 08/06/2015, >> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16922> >> To top it off, years ago at peirce-l, I harshly and wrong-headedly >> criticized Atkin's account of Peirce's immediate, dynamical, and >> final/normal interpretants, as regards certain points about which Atkin was >> in fact quite correct (the final/normal interpretant determines the >> dynamical interpretant, and those interpretants determine the immediate >> interpretant). >> <END QUOTE> >> >> Ben and I exchanged a few e-mails about this, which led us to the >> discovery that his memory was mistaken--his criticism had actually been >> directed at what Atkin wrote about the alignment of the three interpretants >> with the three grades of clarity. However, I was still surprised by what >> Ben said about the determination of the interpretants (If>Id>Ii); my >> previous readings had pretty consistently indicated the reverse order >> (Ii>Id>If). Digging further into the list archives led me to a 2008 post >> in which Ben cited this passage: >> >> <QUOTE Peirce, 12/23/1908, EP2:481> >> It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is >> equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a >> Necessitant. Hence it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the >> Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, >> which determines the Sign itself, >> which determines the Destinate Interpretant, >> which determines the Effective Interpretant, >> which determines the Explicit Interpretant, >> the six trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as >> they would if they were independent, only yield 28 classes ... >> <END QUOTE> >> >> Ben then added this comment: >> >> <QUOTE Ben Udell, 10/28/2008, >> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/4881> >> (It seems fair to take "Destinate Interpretant," "Effective >> Interpretant," and "Explicit Interpretant" as, respectively, "Final >> Interpretant," "Dynamic Interpretant," and "Immediate Interpretant.") >> <END QUOTE> >> >> Apparently, Peirce never spelled out how he would map the >> destinate/effective/explicit interpretants to the immediate/dynamic/final >> interpretants. Ben matched them up based on Peirce's usage elsewhere of >> "destined," "predestinate," and similar terms, along with the fact that >> "explicit" can simply mean "expressed." On the other hand, I pointed out >> that "destinate" can also mean "set apart for" or "intended," while >> "explicit" can also mean "fully revealed or expressed without vagueness" or >> "fully developed or formulated." >> >> However, it really comes down to Peirce's first sentence quoted above. >> If the immediate interpretant is an Actual, which can the final >> interpretant be--a Possible (Ii determines If) or a Necessitant (If >> determines Ii)? Same question regarding Ii/Id and Id/If. Unfortunately, >> Peirce did not provide clear answers and explanations like he did for >> Od>Oi>S (EP2:480-481,485-489, 1908), as well as S-If>S-Id (L463, 1904). >> The bare terminology from EP2:482-483,489-490 (1908) is not terribly >> illuminating: >> >> Ii = Mode of Presentation = Hypothetic, Categorical, Relative. >> Id = Mode of Being = Sympathetic/Congruentive, Shocking/Percussive, Usual. >> If = Nature or Purpose = Gratific, To produce action, To produce >> self-control. >> >> Alternatively, L463 indicates Ii = qualities of feelings or appearances, >> actual experiences, thoughts or other signs of the same kind in infinite >> series. This seems consistent with Short's thesis that all three >> interpretants can be emotional, energetic, or logical; but it is not much >> help in sorting out the order of determination. To muddy the waters >> further, Ii is often defined as a sign's interpretability, the effect that >> it *may *have (Possible); Id as any effect that it *does *have (Actual); >> and If as the effect that it *would *eventually have (Necessitant). >> >> I would be grateful for some assistance with all this, especially >> specific illustrative examples, which I have had a hard time formulating >> myself. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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