Edwina, List, Nadin writes:
It would be presumptuous, to say the least, to rehash here the detailed account of how the human species defined itself, in its own making, through the qualifier zoon semiotikon [. . .] i.e., semiotic animal. Felix Hausdorff, concerned that his reputation as a mathematician would suffer, published, under the pseudonym Paul Mongré, a text entitled Sant’ Ilario. Thoughts from Zarathustra’s Landscape (1897). A short quote illustrates the idea: “The human being is a semiotic animal; his humanness consists of the fact that instead of a natural expression of his needs and gratification, he acquired a conventional, symbolic language that is understandable only through the intermediary of signs. He pays in nominal values, in paper, while the animal in real, direct values […] The animal acts in Yes and No. The human being says Yes and No and thus attains his happiness or unhappiness abstractly and bathetically. Ratio and oratio are a tremendous simplification of life.” Hausdorff-Nadin seems here to equate the conventional, the linguistic and symbolic with the semiotic. Nadin continues this anthropocentric view of semiotics in citing, for example, Ernst Cassirer on "the symbolic," referencing Saussure, etc. He goes on to say such seemingly contradictory things as: Nadin: The existence of life, or the making of life, does not depend on adding semiotic ingredients to the combination of whatever might be necessary to make it. For that matter, it does not depend on adding mathematics or physics or chemistry to the formula. The awareness resulting from a semiotic perspective leads to the acknowledgment of such phenomena as living expression. Indeed, in the absence of representations, life would cease. If by "representations" he means "signs," I could agree with the last phrase just quoted, that "in the absence of representations, life would cease." But the rest of the sentence seems to me to be not only contradictory ,but just plain wrong. The raison d'être of theoretical mathematics, or physics, or chemistry is surely *not* that of "adding. . . ingredients [. . .] to the formula" (whatever that means), but as aiding our understanding of phenomena (and, in some cases, paving the way to practical applications of those understandings of laws, etc.) Continuing in this vein, however, Nadin gives semiotics what he calls a different "focus": With meaning as its focus, semiotics will not be in the position to say what is needed to make something—as chemistry and physics do, with the help of mathematics—but rather to identify what meaning it might have in the infinite sequence of interactions in which representations will be involved. This applies to making rudimentary tools, simple machines, computer programs, or artificial or synthetic entities. Semiotic knowledge is about meaning as process. And this implies that changing a machine is very different from changing the brain. Inadequate semiotics led to the metaphor of “hardwired” functions in the brain [comment: I certainly do not at all agree with Nadin that is was "inadequate semiotics" which led to that, admittedly, poor metaphor GR]. There is no such thing. The brain adapts. Activities change our mind: We become what we think, what we do. We are our semiotics. Hm. I not at all sure what is meant by that, to me, vacuous final sentence. One might agree with Nadin that the production of "meaning" has indeed an essential role to play in semiosis, whether it is the meaning of a sentence, a culture, or even, generalizing the concept, an evolutionary change in an organism. And one may, perhaps, agree with him that "semiotic knowledge is about meaning as process," at least in some cases. But then, in quite Sausurean fashion he goes on to define signs as "entities that stand for other entities," Entities? Sign *replicas* may be 'entities', but signs themselves seem, at least to me, to be something quite other, something essentially triadic. He adds to the confusion when he writes this: One might be inclined to see interaction processes mirrored into sign processes—or what Peirce called semiosis. But interactions are more than sign processes. Better yet: sign processes describe only the meaning of interactions, but not the energy processes undergirding them. But 'interactions' are, at least from the standpoint of a triadic semiotic, *less*, not more than 'sign processes' and, indeed, quite different--and not only because interactions are dyadic, representing 2ns and not 3ns. And, by the way, don't physics and chemistry themselves deal with "the energy processes undergirding" interactions? Be that as it may, Nadin continues: As information theory—based on the encompassing view that all there is, is subject to energy change—emerged (Shannon & Weaver, 1949), it took away from semiotics even the appearance of legitimacy. Why bother with semiotics, with sign processes, in particular (and all that terminology pertinent to sign typology), when you can focus on energy? Energy is observable, measurable, easy to use in describing information processes understood as the prerequisite for communication. Information is more adequate than semiotics for conceiving new communication processes, which, incidentally, were also iterative processes. So, in his view it is Shannon & Weaver's dyadic "information theory" which is "encompassing" "Why bother with semiotics, with sign processes [. . .] when we can focus on energy?" Indeed, for him "Information is *more adequate* than semiotics for conceiving new communication processes"! (emphasis added). But wait, this 'inadequacy' would, for Nadin at least, appear to represent an actual value for semiotics in helping it gain its proper "focus." But there is also a plus side to what Shannon suggested: Information theory made it so much more clear than any speculative approach that semiotics should focus on meaning and significance rather than on truth Hm. I had thought semiotics did in fact, at least in good part, focus on "meaning and significance rather than on truth." And doesn't this (in the context of what preceded) strongly suggest that, for Nadin, Shannon & Weaver's information theory *does *focus on truth? I can't say that I can make much sense of this portion of his paper at all, so I'll leave it at that. Nadin also, in my opinion, misinterprets Peirce's comments to Lady Welby on the *scope* of semiotics. He quotes Peirce, then comments: Peirce writes: “It has never been in my power to study anything—mathematics, chemistry, comparative anatomy, psychology, phonetics, economics, the history of science, whist, men and women, wine, metrology—except as a study of semiotics.” The message here is that semiotics is inclusive, and that it should not be arbitrarily fragmented. He does not bring up a semiotics of mathematics, chemistry, comparative anatomy, etc., because it is nonsensical to dilute the “study of semiotics” into partial semiotics. Those who do so deny semiotics its comprehensive perspective. But it seems to me that what Peirce is saying in the above quotation is that when one considers *logic* *as semioti*c, that one can apply those semiotic principles to all other fields, and it seems to me that this is so, and that in this sense at least that semiotics "comprehensive perspective" is justified. Finally, Nadin's solution to the 'problem' of the proper role for semiotics is, in his opinion, for it to return to a linguistically based 'focus'. Never before has language—in its general sense, not only as the language we speak [comment: it is not at all clear what he means in referring to language "in its general sense" GR]—been as central to research as it is today. Hausdorff, the mathematician who understood the semiotic nature of the human being, anticipated this. *And since semiotics has, more often than not, been understood as the semiotics of language, it would be only natural to expect semioticians of all stripes to get involved in it* [emphasis added]. I would, perhaps following Michael Shapiro here, imagine that it might be more advantageous for linguists to "get involved in" Peircean semiotics. About a decade or so ago Nadin seemed to me to be a thoughtful and creative exponent of Peirce 'triadic semiotic and an innovator as regards new directions which it might take in our time. But he has apparently moved on (back?) to a kind of linguistically based semiotics for which I, personally, see little value theoretically. And since what his practical program is is stated so vaguely here, I don't see its value for practice either, even though this has apparently been his emphasis for the last decade. However, the ideas represented in this essay are, as the subtitle of it would have it, but "preliminaries" in his reassessment of "the foundations of semiotics," so I don't want to insist too strongly on the above critique. Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Sep 14, 2015 at 3:56 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, > > Thanks for the quick response. So far we seem to be in agreement. > > Again, I'll try to get to the article in the next few days, but also > expect to have good internet connections for the week I'm away celebrating > a 'big' birthday with some family and friends in Martha's Vineyard, MA. > > Best, > > Gary > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Mon, Sep 14, 2015 at 3:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Gary R - thanks for providing the article - I'll try to get to it in a >> few days. >> >> Just a few comments from the abstract and your observations: >> >> - There is a great deal of interest in semiotics within human computer >> interaction, computer, AI, ..as well as the biological and physico-chemical >> realms. >> >> - I agree with you that language is not the base of semiotics. Semiotics >> has nothing to do with language; that's only one type of semiosis. >> >> - but the 'sign model' is, in my view, a very good model of semiotics. To >> me, the Sign is a unit-of-organized-information. It is organized >> semiotically; ie, within the triad. Such a Sign can be an atom, molecule, >> cell, bee, flower, ...or a word, painting or a whole society. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* Monday, September 14, 2015 3:05 PM >> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Is specialization ia necessary condition for the >> progress of Peircean semiotics? >> >> List, >> >> Cary Campbell posted this in the blog of the Semiotic Research Group. He >> points to an article by Mihai Nadin, "Reassessing the Foundations of >> Semiotics: Preliminaries." >> >> http://www.nadin.ws/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/nadin-article_ijsss-22.pdf >> >> >> [Campbell] I have never come across a text that better lays out the >> deplorable failure of semiotics (and semioticians) then this paper by Mihai >> Nadin. According to Nadin semiotics as it becomes a more and more >> cloistered and insular discipline has missed out on making important >> contributions to disciplines where a semiotic perspective would be >> extremely enriching. Disciplines such as Human computer Interaction, AI, >> nanotechnology, computer science generally, stem cell research, genetics, >> etc… He asks the important question; would Peirce, or Hjemslev, or even >> Barthes miss the opportunity to approach these important subjects? >> >> >> “In other words, there is proof that semiotics can do better than indulge >> in useless speculative language games as it does in our time. What I >> suggest is that specialization is a necessary condition for the progress of >> science. But not sufficient! >> >> Specialists --- and there are more and more of them --- ought to relate >> their discoveries to other fields, to build bridges. For this they need >> semiotics as an integral part of their way of thinking, as a technique of >> expression, and as a communication guide.” >> >> >> He locates much of this failure in semiotic’s perpetual obsession with >> centering the discipline on the sign model. >> >> >> “Semiotics, if founded not around the sign concept --- quite counter >> intuitive when it comes to language (where is the sign: the alphabet, the >> word, the sentence?) --- but with the understanding of the interactions >> language make possible, would contribute more than descriptions, usually of >> no consequence to anyone, and post facto explanations.” >> >> >> I really believe this is a must read for anyone who sees value in the >> semiotic world view and the future of the discipline. >> >> I have not yet completed the article, but find its premise intriguing. It >> seems clear enough, and I agree with Nadin that "Specialists [. . .] >> ought to relate their discoveries to other fields, to build bridges. For >> this they need semiotics as an integral part of their way of thinking, as a >> technique of expression, and as a communication guide.” >> >> On the other hand I'm not sure that I can agree with him that " >> >> “Semiotics [should be founded] not around the sign concept [. . .] but >> with the understanding of the interactions language make possible. >> >> Wouldn't his apparent deemphasis of "the sign concept" in favor of "the >> understanding of the interactions language make possible" tend to >> contradict Peirce's powerful notion that semiotics ought *not* be language >> based? >> >> I'm wondering what others on the list may think of Nadin's argument. Here >> is the abstract of the paper linked to above. >> >> ABSTRACT What justifies a discipline is its grounding in practical >> activities. Documentary evidence is a necessary, but not sufficient, >> condition for viability. This applies to semiotics as it applies to >> mathematics, physics, chemistry, computer science, and all other forms of >> questioning the world. While all forms of knowledge testify to the >> circularity of the epistemological effort, semiotics knowledge is doubly >> cursed. There is no knowledge that can be expressed otherwise than in >> semiotic form; knowledge of semiotics is itself expressed semiotically. >> Semiotics defined around the notion of the sign bears the burden of >> unsettled questions prompted by the never-ending attempt to define signs. >> This indeterminate condition is characteristic of all epistemological >> constructs, whether in reference to specific knowledge domains or >> semiotics. The alternative is to associate the knowledge domain of >> semiotics with the meta-level, i.e., inquiry of what makes semiotics >> necessary. In a world of action-reaction, corresponding to a rather poor >> form of causality, semiotics is not necessary. Only in acknowledging the >> anticipatory condition of the living can grounding for semiotics be found. >> This perspective becomes critical in the context of a semiotized >> civilization in which the object level of human effort is progressively >> replaced by representations (and their associated interpretations). >> >> >> I've been traveling, and am now preparing for yet more travel beginning >> this weekend, but I'll try to complete the Nadin article this week if >> anyone here is interested in discussing it. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> >> >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. 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