Michael, List, I'm glad that I didn't misrepresent your position, with regard to the relationship between Peircean semiotics (and, yes, pragmaticism) and linguistics. I also hope you'll consider re-posting any of your future blog posts offering insight into that relationship.
I look forward to reading the forward of your new book. Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Sep 16, 2015 at 9:46 AM, Michael Shapiro <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary, List, > > Since my approach is mentioned below, I thought I'd respond by seconding > Gary's suggestion that linguists ought to be more actively involved in > reconceiving their discipline through Peirce's pragmaticism and his theory > of signs. Toward that end, I've now started writing a new book, of which > the Preface is attached. This book is (admittedly) a hutzpahdingish attempt > to do for our own century what Edward Sapir's *Language: An Introduction > to the Study of Speech* did for the twentieth. Comments are always > welcome. > Michael > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Gary Richmond > Sent: Sep 15, 2015 11:40 PM > To: Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is specialization ia necessary condition for the > progress of Peircean semiotics? > > Edwina, List, > > Nadin writes: > > It would be presumptuous, to say the least, to rehash here the detailed > account of how the human species defined itself, in its own making, through > the qualifier zoon semiotikon [. . .] i.e., semiotic animal. Felix > Hausdorff, concerned that his reputation as a mathematician would suffer, > published, under the pseudonym Paul Mongré, a text entitled Sant’ Ilario. > Thoughts from Zarathustra’s Landscape (1897). A short quote illustrates the > idea: > > “The human being is a semiotic animal; his humanness consists of the fact > that instead of a natural expression of his needs and gratification, he > acquired a conventional, symbolic language that is understandable only > through the intermediary of signs. He pays in nominal values, in paper, > while the animal in real, direct values […] The animal acts in Yes and No. > The human being says Yes and No and thus attains his happiness or > unhappiness abstractly and bathetically. Ratio and oratio are a tremendous > simplification of life.” > > > Hausdorff-Nadin seems here to equate the conventional, the linguistic and > symbolic with the semiotic. Nadin continues this anthropocentric view of > semiotics in citing, for example, Ernst Cassirer on "the symbolic," > referencing Saussure, etc. He goes on to say such seemingly contradictory > things as: > > Nadin: The existence of life, or the making of life, does not depend on > adding semiotic ingredients to the combination of whatever might be > necessary to make it. For that matter, it does not depend on adding > mathematics or physics or chemistry to the formula. The awareness resulting > from a semiotic perspective leads to the acknowledgment of such phenomena > as living expression. Indeed, in the absence of representations, life would > cease. > > > If by "representations" he means "signs," I could agree with the last > phrase just quoted, that "in the absence of representations, life would > cease." But the rest of the sentence seems to me to be not only > contradictory ,but just plain wrong. The raison d'être of theoretical > mathematics, or physics, or chemistry is surely *not* that of "adding. . > . ingredients [. . .] to the formula" (whatever that means), but as aiding > our understanding of phenomena (and, in some cases, paving the way to > practical applications of those understandings of laws, etc.) > > Continuing in this vein, however, Nadin gives semiotics what he calls a > different "focus": > > With meaning as its focus, semiotics will not be in the position to say > what is needed to make something—as chemistry and physics do, with the help > of mathematics—but rather to identify what meaning it might have in the > infinite sequence of interactions in which representations will be > involved. This applies to making rudimentary tools, simple machines, > computer programs, or artificial or synthetic entities. Semiotic knowledge > is about meaning as process. And this implies that changing a machine is > very different from changing the brain. Inadequate semiotics led to the > metaphor of “hardwired” functions in the brain [comment: I certainly do not > at all agree with Nadin that is was "inadequate semiotics" which led to > that, admittedly, poor metaphor GR]. There is no such thing. The brain > adapts. Activities change our mind: We become what we think, what we do. We > are our semiotics. > > > Hm. I not at all sure what is meant by that, to me, vacuous final > sentence. One might agree with Nadin that the production of "meaning" has > indeed an essential role to play in semiosis, whether it is the meaning of > a sentence, a culture, or even, generalizing the concept, an evolutionary > change in an organism. And one may, perhaps, agree with him that "semiotic > knowledge is about meaning as process," at least in some cases. But then, > in quite Sausurean fashion he goes on to define signs as "entities that > stand for other entities," Entities? Sign *replicas* may be 'entities', > but signs themselves seem, at least to me, to be something quite other, > something essentially triadic. > > He adds to the confusion when he writes this: > > One might be inclined to see interaction processes mirrored into sign > processes—or what Peirce called semiosis. But interactions are more than > sign processes. Better yet: sign processes describe only the meaning of > interactions, but not the energy processes undergirding them. > > > But 'interactions' are, at least from the standpoint of a triadic > semiotic, *less*, not more than 'sign processes' and, indeed, quite > different--and not only because interactions are dyadic, representing 2ns > and not 3ns. And, by the way, don't physics and chemistry themselves deal > with "the energy processes undergirding" interactions? Be that as it may, > Nadin continues: > > As information theory—based on the encompassing view that all there is, is > subject to energy change—emerged (Shannon & Weaver, 1949), it took away > from semiotics even the appearance of legitimacy. Why bother with > semiotics, with sign processes, in particular (and all that terminology > pertinent to sign typology), when you can focus on energy? Energy is > observable, measurable, easy to use in describing information processes > understood as the prerequisite for communication. Information is more > adequate than semiotics for conceiving new communication processes, which, > incidentally, were also iterative processes. > > > So, in his view it is Shannon & Weaver's dyadic "information theory" which > is "encompassing" "Why bother with semiotics, with sign processes [. . .] > when we can focus on energy?" Indeed, for him "Information is *more > adequate* than semiotics for conceiving new communication processes"! > (emphasis added). But wait, this 'inadequacy' would, for Nadin at least, > appear to represent an actual value for semiotics in helping it gain its > proper "focus." > > But there is also a plus side to what Shannon suggested: Information > theory made it so much more clear than any speculative approach that > semiotics should focus on meaning and significance rather than on truth > > > Hm. I had thought semiotics did in fact, at least in good part, focus on > "meaning and significance rather than on truth." And doesn't this (in the > context of what preceded) strongly suggest that, for Nadin, Shannon & > Weaver's information theory *does *focus on truth? I can't say that I can > make much sense of this portion of his paper at all, so I'll leave it at > that. > > Nadin also, in my opinion, misinterprets Peirce's comments to Lady Welby > on the *scope* of semiotics. He quotes Peirce, then comments: > > Peirce writes: “It has never been in my power to study > anything—mathematics, chemistry, comparative anatomy, psychology, > phonetics, economics, the history of science, whist, men and women, wine, > metrology—except as a study of semiotics.” The message here is that > semiotics is inclusive, and that it should not be arbitrarily fragmented. > He does not bring up a semiotics of mathematics, chemistry, comparative > anatomy, etc., because it is nonsensical to dilute the “study of semiotics” > into partial semiotics. Those who do so deny semiotics its comprehensive > perspective. > > > But it seems to me that what Peirce is saying in the above quotation is > that when one considers *logic* *as semioti*c, that one can apply those > semiotic principles to all other fields, and it seems to me that this is > so, and that in this sense at least that semiotics "comprehensive > perspective" is justified. > > Finally, Nadin's solution to the 'problem' of the proper role for > semiotics is, in his opinion, for it to return to a linguistically based > 'focus'. > > Never before has language—in its general sense, not only as the language > we speak [comment: it is not at all clear what he means in referring to > language "in its general sense" GR]—been as central to research as it is > today. Hausdorff, the mathematician who understood the semiotic nature of > the human being, anticipated this. *And since semiotics has, more often > than not, been understood as the semiotics of language, it would be only > natural to expect semioticians of all stripes to get involved in it* [emphasis > added]. > > > I would, perhaps following Michael Shapiro here, imagine that it might be > more advantageous for linguists to "get involved in" Peircean semiotics. > > About a decade or so ago Nadin seemed to me to be a thoughtful and > creative exponent of Peirce 'triadic semiotic and an innovator as regards > new directions which it might take in our time. But he has apparently moved > on (back?) to a kind of linguistically based semiotics for which I, > personally, see little value theoretically. And since what his practical > program is is stated so vaguely here, I don't see its value for practice > either, even though this has apparently been his emphasis for the last > decade. > > However, the ideas represented in this essay are, as the subtitle of it > would have it, but "preliminaries" in his reassessment of "the foundations > of semiotics," so I don't want to insist too strongly on the above critique. > > Best, > > Gary > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Mon, Sep 14, 2015 at 3:56 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Edwina, >> >> Thanks for the quick response. So far we seem to be in agreement. >> >> Again, I'll try to get to the article in the next few days, but also >> expect to have good internet connections for the week I'm away celebrating >> a 'big' birthday with some family and friends in Martha's Vineyard, MA. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >> >> On Mon, Sep 14, 2015 at 3:44 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Gary R - thanks for providing the article - I'll try to get to it in a >>> few days. >>> >>> Just a few comments from the abstract and your observations: >>> >>> - There is a great deal of interest in semiotics within human computer >>> interaction, computer, AI, ..as well as the biological and physico-chemical >>> realms. >>> >>> - I agree with you that language is not the base of semiotics. Semiotics >>> has nothing to do with language; that's only one type of semiosis. >>> >>> - but the 'sign model' is, in my view, a very good model of semiotics. >>> To me, the Sign is a unit-of-organized-information. It is organized >>> semiotically; ie, within the triad. Such a Sign can be an atom, molecule, >>> cell, bee, flower, ...or a word, painting or a whole society. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >>> *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> >>> *Sent:* Monday, September 14, 2015 3:05 PM >>> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Is specialization ia necessary condition for the >>> progress of Peircean semiotics? >>> >>> List, >>> >>> Cary Campbell posted this in the blog of the Semiotic Research Group. He >>> points to an article by Mihai Nadin, "Reassessing the Foundations of >>> Semiotics: Preliminaries." >>> >>> http://www.nadin.ws/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/nadin-article_ijsss-22.pdf >>> >>> >>> [Campbell] I have never come across a text that better lays out the >>> deplorable failure of semiotics (and semioticians) then this paper by Mihai >>> Nadin. According to Nadin semiotics as it becomes a more and more >>> cloistered and insular discipline has missed out on making important >>> contributions to disciplines where a semiotic perspective would be >>> extremely enriching. Disciplines such as Human computer Interaction, AI, >>> nanotechnology, computer science generally, stem cell research, genetics, >>> etc… He asks the important question; would Peirce, or Hjemslev, or even >>> Barthes miss the opportunity to approach these important subjects? >>> >>> >>> “In other words, there is proof that semiotics can do better than >>> indulge in useless speculative language games as it does in our time. What >>> I suggest is that specialization is a necessary condition for the progress >>> of science. But not sufficient! >>> >>> Specialists --- and there are more and more of them --- ought to relate >>> their discoveries to other fields, to build bridges. For this they need >>> semiotics as an integral part of their way of thinking, as a technique of >>> expression, and as a communication guide.” >>> >>> >>> He locates much of this failure in semiotic’s perpetual obsession with >>> centering the discipline on the sign model. >>> >>> >>> “Semiotics, if founded not around the sign concept --- quite counter >>> intuitive when it comes to language (where is the sign: the alphabet, the >>> word, the sentence?) --- but with the understanding of the interactions >>> language make possible, would contribute more than descriptions, usually of >>> no consequence to anyone, and post facto explanations.” >>> >>> >>> I really believe this is a must read for anyone who sees value in the >>> semiotic world view and the future of the discipline. >>> >>> I have not yet completed the article, but find its premise intriguing. >>> It seems clear enough, and I agree with Nadin that "Specialists [. . .] >>> ought to relate their discoveries to other fields, to build bridges. For >>> this they need semiotics as an integral part of their way of thinking, as a >>> technique of expression, and as a communication guide.” >>> >>> On the other hand I'm not sure that I can agree with him that " >>> >>> “Semiotics [should be founded] not around the sign concept [. . .] but >>> with the understanding of the interactions language make possible. >>> >>> Wouldn't his apparent deemphasis of "the sign concept" in favor of "the >>> understanding of the interactions language make possible" tend to >>> contradict Peirce's powerful notion that semiotics ought *not* be language >>> based? >>> >>> I'm wondering what others on the list may think of Nadin's argument. >>> Here is the abstract of the paper linked to above. >>> >>> ABSTRACT What justifies a discipline is its grounding in practical >>> activities. Documentary evidence is a necessary, but not sufficient, >>> condition for viability. This applies to semiotics as it applies to >>> mathematics, physics, chemistry, computer science, and all other forms of >>> questioning the world. While all forms of knowledge testify to the >>> circularity of the epistemological effort, semiotics knowledge is doubly >>> cursed. There is no knowledge that can be expressed otherwise than in >>> semiotic form; knowledge of semiotics is itself expressed semiotically. >>> Semiotics defined around the notion of the sign bears the burden of >>> unsettled questions prompted by the never-ending attempt to define signs. >>> This indeterminate condition is characteristic of all epistemological >>> constructs, whether in reference to specific knowledge domains or >>> semiotics. The alternative is to associate the knowledge domain of >>> semiotics with the meta-level, i.e., inquiry of what makes semiotics >>> necessary. In a world of action-reaction, corresponding to a rather poor >>> form of causality, semiotics is not necessary. Only in acknowledging the >>> anticipatory condition of the living can grounding for semiotics be found. >>> This perspective becomes critical in the context of a semiotized >>> civilization in which the object level of human effort is progressively >>> replaced by representations (and their associated interpretations). >>> >>> >>> I've been traveling, and am now preparing for yet more travel beginning >>> this weekend, but I'll try to complete the Nadin article this week if >>> anyone here is interested in discussing it. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> *C 745* >>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. 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