Edwina, Stephen, Kristi, List - "Such an approach denies the nature of a discussion site - if you post something and then, refuse to explain or discuss what you posted."
Here's how I look at it: After her earlier post, Kristi was queried. She then had three options: 1-Not respond, 2-respond minimally and say she would follow up later, 3-change her schedule to provide a prompt and complete response (plus follow-ups). Kristi chose #2. If she had chosen #1, that would be contrary to the nature of a discussion forum. If she chose #3, she probably has idle time on her hands. If Kristi appears to choose #2 while not actually intending to follow up later, that is really #1 and contrary to the nature of a discussion forum. If forum members insist that an individual member upgrade his/her activity from 1 to 2 or from 2 to 3, that discourages participation by less experienced forum members. If a forum member claims that a 1 response is actually a 2 (soon to be upgraded to 3), that discourages participation by more experienced forum members. So measures of patience, forthrightness and follow-thru all promote a successful forum. I assume AND HAVE OBSERVED the existence of these, to tolerable degrees, or I would not be here. Now let's get back to business, please, and not spend too much time analyzing each other. Each of us are objects with a unique mix of interpretants, and the one we share in common is more than enough to occupy us. Regards, Tom Wyrick > On Sep 17, 2015, at 9:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > > Stephen - what the heck does 'ad feminem' mean? Surely you aren't > 'feminizing' the fallacy of 'ad hominem' ? [ I'm opposed to political > correctness]. My comment to Kirsti had nothing to do with her personally > (which is what ad hominem is all about) but about her posting a comment and > then, refusing to explain or discuss what it means. Such an approach denies > the nature of a discussion site - if you post something and then, refuse to > explain or discuss what you posted. > > And what does 'renegade moderation' mean? Please explain. > > Are you privy to Peirce's thoughts? Is that how you justify that you know > what he would think? That, by the way, is a logical fallacy of 'ad > verecundiam' or 'an appeal to authority'. Your comments should stand on their > own, as logical and debatable - and not be removed from discussion by any > 'appeal to authority' or other fallacy. > > Edwina > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Stephen C. Rose > To: Edwina Taborsky > Cc: Määttänen Kirsti ; PEIRCE-L ; [email protected] > Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2015 9:49 AM > Subject: Re: [peirce-l] [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8863] The problem with > instinct - it's a category > > Ad feminem. I used to moderate a forum that went on for a good while in the > 90s. All forums suffer the slings and arrows of various dynamics. But this is > a case of renegade moderation and I am tired of it. I think Peirce would be > too. > > Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl > Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3 > >> On Thu, Sep 17, 2015 at 9:43 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: >> Kirsti- that's not a logical response. If you wish to keep your short >> assertions without explanation and refuse to either explain or discuss them, >> then, don't post them on to a discussion site! >> >> Also, if you can't accept disagreement - again, don't post your opinions to >> a discussion site! The whole nature of such a site is not for the readers to >> passively sit back and accept what each person posts - but - to THINK about >> the posts, to ask questions, to debate, discuss - and that involves both >> agreement AND disagreement. >> >> And to declare that you are 'too busy' to explain - is a red herring >> cop-out. Again, a discussion site by its very essence, involves discussion >> - not simple short assertions which you expect the reader to accept as Truth >> and when you are questioned about them - you refuse to explain their cryptic >> meaning or enter into any discussion. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- From: <[email protected]> >> To: "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]> >> Cc: "PEIRCE-L" <[email protected]> >> Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2015 9:30 AM >> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8863] The problem with >> instinct - it's a category >> >> >>> Dear Edwina, >>> >>> My suggestion is that we both keep our views. And proceed according to >>> them. - So far, we have only disagreed. We both have work to do, so lets >>> proceed with it, separately. >>> >>> My short comments are, of course, available to use as you please. >>> >>> With kind regards, >>> >>> Kirsti >>> >>> Edwina Taborsky kirjoitti 17.9.2015 15:27: >>>> I'd disagree with Kirsti's view that instincts are unrelated to the >>>> Peircean categories. I'd say that instinct in itself is in a form of >>>> Thirdness, in that it is a genetically based knowledge. As to how it >>>> is activated and accessed - that can be via both Firstness and >>>> Secondness. >>>> >>>> As for 'the common understanding of instinct' and 'what was common in >>>> HIS times; and CSP's understanding - all of these definitions would >>>> have to be outlined by Kirsti. As well as Kirsti's own view - which >>>> she does not describe. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> >>>> ----- Original Message ----- From: <[email protected]> >>>> To: "Clark Goble" <[email protected]> >>>> Cc: "PEIRCE-L" <[email protected]> >>>> Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2015 8:11 AM >>>> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8863] The problem >>>> with instinct - it's a category >>>> >>>> >>>>> I find Helmut's comments to the point. In terms of CSP's categories, >>>>> "instincts" do not, as such have a place. - Well, a kind of >>>>> firstnesslike, but that is it. >>>>> >>>>> Nowdays, the quite common understanding of "instict" is different than >>>>> in CSP's times. Not to forget that HIS understanding differed from what >>>>> was common in HIS times. >>>>> >>>>> These are the problems we need to tacle. >>>>> >>>>> Taking 'meaning' as a simple relation of reference does not so. As such, >>>>> the question is reduced into two-placed-relations. - Which is >>>>> un-Peircean, for starters. >>>>> >>>>> What are we referring to, when taking up "instincts"? - Well, I for my >>>>> part, am referring to something very, very different from the views >>>>> expressed here. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> >>>>> Kisti >>>>> >>>>> Clark Goble kirjoitti 15.9.2015 21:13: >>>>>> Apologies - I just found out I’d sent this to the old Peirce list >>>>>> rather than the new one. My apologies for the problem. Apple Mail >>>>>> appears to autosuggest based upon what emails you have archived. >>>>>> Sometimes this leads to the old list getting picked up. Unfortunately >>>>>> Mail’s UI also doesn’t display the full email unless you click on >>>>>> it. So unless I click on the Peirce-L name I occasionally get the >>>>>> wrong email. When I’m posting regularly I always remember. When >>>>>> I’m posting infrequently (as has of late been the case) then I can >>>>>> forget. Once again my apologies again. >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2015 at 12:03 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sep 8, 2015, at 1:36 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Stephen, >>>>>>> you wrote: "The axiomatic principles of cognition (Peirce’s >>>>>>> categories) will establish how mind-bodies define the things that >>>>>>> matter." >>>>>>> Again, I think that we have different concepts of the term "know" or >>>>>>> "cognition". In my understanding, cognition does not appear in the >>>>>>> three categories from the start, but is a matter of subcategories. I >>>>>>> agree, that everything underlies the three categories >>>>>>> possibility/quality, actuality/relation, representation/continuity. >>>>>>> Secondness has two modes, and thirdness has three modes. These >>>>>>> modes, or subcategories, again have submodes, or subcategories as >>>>>>> before. I think, that knowledge is a matter of eg. thirdness of >>>>>>> thirdness of thirdness, or something like that. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It seems to me Peirce adopts a position where things are more >>>>>>> mind-like or more matter-like as a matter of degree rather than >>>>>>> kind. I’m not sure it relates directly to the categories beyond >>>>>>> the idea of consciousness seems tied to firstness in certain ways. >>>>>>> Yet the categories are always at play in an irreducible way. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> At times Peirce appears to see the more mind-like as what is less >>>>>>> constrained. So evolution is leading to the development of substance >>>>>>> as a kind of permanence. Up to that time there is more “swerve” >>>>>>> and that swerve, when seen from the inside, is likely traditional >>>>>>> phenomenal mind. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This ontology of Peirce is probably the most controversial aspect of >>>>>>> his thought but it does lead to all sorts of interesting >>>>>>> considerations. An analogy someone else brought up recently was >>>>>>> Richard Feynman’s QED really being thinking what it must be like >>>>>>> to be an electron. In this conception there’s always an inside and >>>>>>> outside and Peirce isn’t quite so divorced from Kant as people >>>>>>> assume. Yet in taking this inner view we don’t have the thing in >>>>>>> itself in quite the same fashion. If only because Peirce lets >>>>>>> firstness create a sign. Indeed remembering our experience of a >>>>>>> phenomena is always a sign (thirdness) in response to firstness. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That may be what you mean by modes or subcategories though. (Forgive >>>>>>> me - haven’t yet caught up on my reading of the list) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sep 8, 2015, at 12:18 PM, Stephen Jarosek <[email protected]> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bees are conscious in accordance with the same principles that we >>>>>>> are conscious. This is one important aspect of the axiomatic >>>>>>> framework that I base my thinking on. That is to say, Peirce’s >>>>>>> categories apply to _all_organisms, even cells. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Pierce says bees have mind. I’m not sure he means by that they are >>>>>>> conscious in any strong way. It seems a matter of degree for Peirce. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in >>>>>>>> the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical >>>>>>>> world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that >>>>>>>> the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there. >>>>>>>> Consistently adhere to that unwarrantable denial, and you will be >>>>>>>> driven to some form of idealistic nominalism akin to Fichte’s. >>>>>>>> Not only is thought in the organic world, but it develops there. >>>>>>>> But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, >>>>>>>> so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give >>>>>>>> “Sign” a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense >>>>>>>> to come within our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must >>>>>>>> have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no >>>>>>>> isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a >>>>>>>> Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are >>>>>>>> at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must >>>>>>>> nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. >>>>>>>> Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a >>>>>>>> necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should >>>>>>>> be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I admit >>>>>>>> that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. It >>>>>>>> might be filled out with argument so as to remove the greater part >>>>>>>> of this fault; but in the first place, such an expansion would >>>>>>>> require a volume - and an uninviting one; and in the second place, >>>>>>>> what I have been saying is only to be applied to a slight >>>>>>>> determination of our system of diagrammatization, which it will >>>>>>>> only slightly affect; so that, should it be incorrect, the utmost >>>>>>>> certain effect will be a danger that our system may not represent >>>>>>>> every variety of non-human thought. (“Prolegomena to an Apology >>>>>>>> for Pragmaticism CP 4.551) >>>>>>> Whenever you have signs, even physical signs, you have a >>>>>>> quasi-mind. So of course thirdness applies to them the same as it >>>>>>> does us. The question of feeling or firstness seems a bit more >>>>>>> tricky. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As I recall to the degree he talks about consciousness it’s the >>>>>>> inner aspect of the “swerve” or chaos. In other places he says >>>>>>> we have consciousness to the degree we have self-control. I think >>>>>>> this aspect of his ontology is among the most controversial of his >>>>>>> views. I think one can adopt most of his system without adopting >>>>>>> this particular thread. (Which I think comes out of the remnant of >>>>>>> Kant’s “in-itself” that survives no external thing-in-itself) >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> …whatever is First is _ipso facto _sentient. If I make atoms >>>>>>>> swerve - as I do - I make them swerve but very very little, >>>>>>>> because I conceive they are not absolutely dead. And by that I do >>>>>>>> not mean exactly that I hold them to be physically such as the >>>>>>>> materialists hold them to be, only with a small dose of sentiency >>>>>>>> superadded. For that, I grant, would be feeble enough. But what I >>>>>>>> mean is, that all there IS, is First, Feelings; Second, Efforts; >>>>>>>> Third, Habits - all of which are more familiar to us on their >>>>>>>> psychical side than on their physical side; and that dead matter >>>>>>>> would be merely the final result of the complete induration of >>>>>>>> habit reducing the free play of feeling and the brute >>>>>>>> irrationality of effort to complete death (CP 6.201) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What further is needed to clear the sign of its mental >>>>>>>> associations is furnished by generalizations too facile to arrest >>>>>>>> attention here, since nothing but feeling is exclusively mental. >>>>>>>> But while I say this, it must not be inferred that I regard >>>>>>>> consciousness as a mere “epiphenomenon”; though I heartily >>>>>>>> grant that the hypothesis that it is so has done good service to >>>>>>>> science. To my apprehension, consciousness may be defined as that >>>>>>>> congeries of non-relative predicates, varying greatly in quality >>>>>>>> and in intensity, which are symptomatic of the interaction of the >>>>>>>> outer world,— the world of those causes that are exceedingly >>>>>>>> compulsive upon the modes of consciousness, with general >>>>>>>> disturbance sometimes amounting to shock, and are acted upon only >>>>>>>> slightly, and only by a special kind of effort, muscular >>>>>>>> effort,— and of the inner world, apparently derived from the >>>>>>>> outer, and amenable to direct effort of various kinds with feeble >>>>>>>> reactions, the interaction of these two worlds chiefly consisting >>>>>>>> of a direct action of the outer world upon the inner and an >>>>>>>> indirect action of the inner world upon the outer through the >>>>>>>> operation of habits. If this be a correct account of >>>>>>>> consciousness, i.e., of the congeries of feelings, it seems to me >>>>>>>> that it exercises a real function in self-control, since without >>>>>>>> it, or at least without that of which it is symptomatic, the >>>>>>>> resolves and exercises of the inner world could not affect the >>>>>>>> real determinations and habits of the outer world. I say that >>>>>>>> these belong to the outer world because they are not mere >>>>>>>> fantasies but are real agencies. (Pierce, Pragmatism EP 2.418-419) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As I said this is controversial. At the time it put Peirce quite at >>>>>>> odds with the mechanistic determinacy that was taken for granted in >>>>>>> physics. Today we allow chance or swerve, yet it seems a kind of >>>>>>> deterministic probability that still is at odds with Peirce’s >>>>>>> notion of control. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It would seem that Peirce would allow sentiency to even an electron >>>>>>> in some degree yet it seems the ability to control ones behavior and >>>>>>> form habits that makes for the degree of consciousness. >>>> >>>> >>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> ----------------------------- >>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >>>>> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >>>>> BODY of the message. More at >>>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but >> to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of >> the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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