Dear Arisbe members, Good evening to all,
I am researching about some developments of the cultural industry that might be explained within the confines of Peirce’s concept of semiosis. I would like to know where I can find a good definition for semiosis by Peirce in the CP’s, and how I can cite it properly. Any suggestion and help would immensily welcome and appreciated!! Thank you in advance. Bets regards, Daniel Daniel de Vasconcelos Guimarães Doctoral Course Student Program in Frontier Sciences and Technology Graduate School of Science and Technology Digital Content Studies Meiji University Nakano campus Tokyo, Japan > On Sep 18, 2015, at 4:29 AM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > Tom, Edwina, Stephen, Kirsti, List, > > Tom wrote: So measures of patience, forthrightness and follow-thru all > promote a successful forum. I assume AND HAVE OBSERVED the existence of > these, to tolerable degrees, or I would not be here. > > Yes. However, we'd like to remind list members of a principle relating to > this matter which Joe formulated as part of his remarks on the PEIRCE-L page > at Arisbe on HOW THE FORUM WORKS. > http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM > <http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM> and with which we fully > agree. > > The most pertinent comments are given below in full with a link to a further > explication of WHY THE LIST MANAGER SHOULD DO THE CORRECTING. Here are Joe's > remarks without additional comment. > > CAVEAT ABOUT CORRECTING OTHERS > > <http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm#correction-caveat>http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm#correction-caveat > <http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm#correction-caveat> > > It is expected that criticism will be vigorous and diligently pursued: > philosophy is understood here to be essentially a critically directed and > self-controlled conversation. But there is one important caveat in this > connection: If you feel that some messages being posted are not to the > purpose of the list or that there is something someone is doing which should > be discouraged, do NOT attempt to rectify that yourself by posting a message > to that effect to the list in general. Because there is so little overt or > formal moderation by the list manager, it is natural to suppose that the > individual members can and should take that role as needed. But this rarely > if ever produces the effect intended, regardless of how reasonable it may > seem at a particular time. Contact me instead off-list and we will see what > can or should be done, if anything, without generating a chain reaction of > protests and counter-protests, which are the typical result of attempting to > rectify the problem on-list. > > WHY THE LIST MANAGER SHOULD DO THE CORRECTING > > <http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm#manager-corrects>http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm#manager-corrects > <http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm#manager-corrects> > [....] > > Best, > > Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator, and for Ben Udell and myself as > co-managers) > > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > C 745 > 718 482-5690 <tel:718%20482-5690> > On Thu, Sep 17, 2015 at 1:52 PM, Ozzie <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Edwina, Stephen, Kristi, List - > > "Such an approach denies the nature of a discussion site - if you post > something and then, refuse to explain or discuss what you posted." > > Here's how I look at it: After her earlier post, Kristi was queried. She > then had three options: 1-Not respond, 2-respond minimally and say she would > follow up later, 3-change her schedule to provide a prompt and complete > response (plus follow-ups). > > Kristi chose #2. If she had chosen #1, that would be contrary to the nature > of a discussion forum. If she chose #3, she probably has idle time on her > hands. If Kristi appears to choose #2 while not actually intending to follow > up later, that is really #1 and contrary to the nature of a discussion forum. > > > If forum members insist that an individual member upgrade his/her activity > from 1 to 2 or from 2 to 3, that discourages participation by less > experienced forum members. If a forum member claims that a 1 response is > actually a 2 (soon to be upgraded to 3), that discourages participation by > more experienced forum members. > > So measures of patience, forthrightness and follow-thru all promote a > successful forum. I assume AND HAVE OBSERVED the existence of these, to > tolerable degrees, or I would not be here. Now let's get back to business, > please, and not spend too much time analyzing each other. Each of us are > objects with a unique mix of interpretants, and the one we share in common is > more than enough to occupy us. > > Regards, > Tom Wyrick > > > > > On Sep 17, 2015, at 9:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >> Stephen - what the heck does 'ad feminem' mean? Surely you aren't >> 'feminizing' the fallacy of 'ad hominem' ? [ I'm opposed to political >> correctness]. My comment to Kirsti had nothing to do with her personally >> (which is what ad hominem is all about) but about her posting a comment and >> then, refusing to explain or discuss what it means. Such an approach denies >> the nature of a discussion site - if you post something and then, refuse to >> explain or discuss what you posted. >> >> And what does 'renegade moderation' mean? Please explain. >> >> Are you privy to Peirce's thoughts? Is that how you justify that you know >> what he would think? That, by the way, is a logical fallacy of 'ad >> verecundiam' or 'an appeal to authority'. Your comments should stand on >> their own, as logical and debatable - and not be removed from discussion by >> any 'appeal to authority' or other fallacy. >> >> Edwina >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: Stephen C. Rose <mailto:[email protected]> >> To: Edwina Taborsky <mailto:[email protected]> >> Cc: Määttänen Kirsti <mailto:[email protected]> ; PEIRCE-L >> <mailto:[email protected]> ; [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]> >> Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2015 9:49 AM >> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8863] The problem with >> instinct - it's a category >> >> Ad feminem. I used to moderate a forum that went on for a good while in the >> 90s. All forums suffer the slings and arrows of various dynamics. But this >> is a case of renegade moderation and I am tired of it. I think Peirce would >> be too. >> >> Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU <http://buff.ly/15GfdqU> Art: >> http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl <http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl> >> Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3 <http://buff.ly/1wXADj3> >> >> On Thu, Sep 17, 2015 at 9:43 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Kirsti- that's not a logical response. If you wish to keep your short >> assertions without explanation and refuse to either explain or discuss them, >> then, don't post them on to a discussion site! >> >> Also, if you can't accept disagreement - again, don't post your opinions to >> a discussion site! The whole nature of such a site is not for the readers to >> passively sit back and accept what each person posts - but - to THINK about >> the posts, to ask questions, to debate, discuss - and that involves both >> agreement AND disagreement. >> >> And to declare that you are 'too busy' to explain - is a red herring >> cop-out. Again, a discussion site by its very essence, involves discussion >> - not simple short assertions which you expect the reader to accept as Truth >> and when you are questioned about them - you refuse to explain their cryptic >> meaning or enter into any discussion. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- From: <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> To: "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Cc: "PEIRCE-L" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2015 9:30 AM >> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8863] The problem with >> instinct - it's a category >> >> >> Dear Edwina, >> >> My suggestion is that we both keep our views. And proceed according to them. >> - So far, we have only disagreed. We both have work to do, so lets proceed >> with it, separately. >> >> My short comments are, of course, available to use as you please. >> >> With kind regards, >> >> Kirsti >> >> Edwina Taborsky kirjoitti 17.9.2015 15:27: >> I'd disagree with Kirsti's view that instincts are unrelated to the >> Peircean categories. I'd say that instinct in itself is in a form of >> Thirdness, in that it is a genetically based knowledge. As to how it >> is activated and accessed - that can be via both Firstness and >> Secondness. >> >> As for 'the common understanding of instinct' and 'what was common in >> HIS times; and CSP's understanding - all of these definitions would >> have to be outlined by Kirsti. As well as Kirsti's own view - which >> she does not describe. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- From: <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> To: "Clark Goble" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Cc: "PEIRCE-L" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2015 8:11 AM >> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8863] The problem >> with instinct - it's a category >> >> >> I find Helmut's comments to the point. In terms of CSP's categories, >> "instincts" do not, as such have a place. - Well, a kind of >> firstnesslike, but that is it. >> >> Nowdays, the quite common understanding of "instict" is different than >> in CSP's times. Not to forget that HIS understanding differed from what >> was common in HIS times. >> >> These are the problems we need to tacle. >> >> Taking 'meaning' as a simple relation of reference does not so. As such, >> the question is reduced into two-placed-relations. - Which is >> un-Peircean, for starters. >> >> What are we referring to, when taking up "instincts"? - Well, I for my >> part, am referring to something very, very different from the views >> expressed here. >> >> Best, >> >> Kisti >> >> Clark Goble kirjoitti 15.9.2015 21:13: >> Apologies - I just found out I’d sent this to the old Peirce list >> rather than the new one. My apologies for the problem. Apple Mail >> appears to autosuggest based upon what emails you have archived. >> Sometimes this leads to the old list getting picked up. Unfortunately >> Mail’s UI also doesn’t display the full email unless you click on >> it. So unless I click on the Peirce-L name I occasionally get the >> wrong email. When I’m posting regularly I always remember. When >> I’m posting infrequently (as has of late been the case) then I can >> forget. Once again my apologies again. >> >> On Wed, Sep 9, 2015 at 12:03 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> On Sep 8, 2015, at 1:36 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> Stephen, >> you wrote: "The axiomatic principles of cognition (Peirce’s >> categories) will establish how mind-bodies define the things that >> matter." >> Again, I think that we have different concepts of the term "know" or >> "cognition". In my understanding, cognition does not appear in the >> three categories from the start, but is a matter of subcategories. I >> agree, that everything underlies the three categories >> possibility/quality, actuality/relation, representation/continuity. >> Secondness has two modes, and thirdness has three modes. These >> modes, or subcategories, again have submodes, or subcategories as >> before. I think, that knowledge is a matter of eg. thirdness of >> thirdness of thirdness, or something like that. >> >> It seems to me Peirce adopts a position where things are more >> mind-like or more matter-like as a matter of degree rather than >> kind. I’m not sure it relates directly to the categories beyond >> the idea of consciousness seems tied to firstness in certain ways. >> Yet the categories are always at play in an irreducible way. >> >> At times Peirce appears to see the more mind-like as what is less >> constrained. So evolution is leading to the development of substance >> as a kind of permanence. Up to that time there is more “swerve” >> and that swerve, when seen from the inside, is likely traditional >> phenomenal mind. >> >> This ontology of Peirce is probably the most controversial aspect of >> his thought but it does lead to all sorts of interesting >> considerations. An analogy someone else brought up recently was >> Richard Feynman’s QED really being thinking what it must be like >> to be an electron. In this conception there’s always an inside and >> outside and Peirce isn’t quite so divorced from Kant as people >> assume. Yet in taking this inner view we don’t have the thing in >> itself in quite the same fashion. If only because Peirce lets >> firstness create a sign. Indeed remembering our experience of a >> phenomena is always a sign (thirdness) in response to firstness. >> >> That may be what you mean by modes or subcategories though. (Forgive >> me - haven’t yet caught up on my reading of the list) >> >> On Sep 8, 2015, at 12:18 PM, Stephen Jarosek <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> wrote: >> >> Bees are conscious in accordance with the same principles that we >> are conscious. This is one important aspect of the axiomatic >> framework that I base my thinking on. That is to say, Peirce’s >> categories apply to _all_organisms, even cells. >> >> Pierce says bees have mind. I’m not sure he means by that they are >> conscious in any strong way. It seems a matter of degree for Peirce. >> >> >> Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in >> the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical >> world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that >> the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there. >> Consistently adhere to that unwarrantable denial, and you will be >> driven to some form of idealistic nominalism akin to Fichte’s. >> Not only is thought in the organic world, but it develops there. >> But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, >> so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give >> “Sign” a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense >> to come within our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must >> have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no >> isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a >> Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are >> at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must >> nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. >> Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a >> necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should >> be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I admit >> that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. It >> might be filled out with argument so as to remove the greater part >> of this fault; but in the first place, such an expansion would >> require a volume - and an uninviting one; and in the second place, >> what I have been saying is only to be applied to a slight >> determination of our system of diagrammatization, which it will >> only slightly affect; so that, should it be incorrect, the utmost >> certain effect will be a danger that our system may not represent >> every variety of non-human thought. (“Prolegomena to an Apology >> for Pragmaticism CP 4.551) >> Whenever you have signs, even physical signs, you have a >> quasi-mind. So of course thirdness applies to them the same as it >> does us. The question of feeling or firstness seems a bit more >> tricky. >> >> As I recall to the degree he talks about consciousness it’s the >> inner aspect of the “swerve” or chaos. In other places he says >> we have consciousness to the degree we have self-control. I think >> this aspect of his ontology is among the most controversial of his >> views. I think one can adopt most of his system without adopting >> this particular thread. (Which I think comes out of the remnant of >> Kant’s “in-itself” that survives no external thing-in-itself) >> >> …whatever is First is _ipso facto _sentient. If I make atoms >> swerve - as I do - I make them swerve but very very little, >> because I conceive they are not absolutely dead. And by that I do >> not mean exactly that I hold them to be physically such as the >> materialists hold them to be, only with a small dose of sentiency >> superadded. For that, I grant, would be feeble enough. But what I >> mean is, that all there IS, is First, Feelings; Second, Efforts; >> Third, Habits - all of which are more familiar to us on their >> psychical side than on their physical side; and that dead matter >> would be merely the final result of the complete induration of >> habit reducing the free play of feeling and the brute >> irrationality of effort to complete death (CP 6.201) >> >> What further is needed to clear the sign of its mental >> associations is furnished by generalizations too facile to arrest >> attention here, since nothing but feeling is exclusively mental. >> But while I say this, it must not be inferred that I regard >> consciousness as a mere “epiphenomenon”; though I heartily >> grant that the hypothesis that it is so has done good service to >> science. To my apprehension, consciousness may be defined as that >> congeries of non-relative predicates, varying greatly in quality >> and in intensity, which are symptomatic of the interaction of the >> outer world,— the world of those causes that are exceedingly >> compulsive upon the modes of consciousness, with general >> disturbance sometimes amounting to shock, and are acted upon only >> slightly, and only by a special kind of effort, muscular >> effort,— and of the inner world, apparently derived from the >> outer, and amenable to direct effort of various kinds with feeble >> reactions, the interaction of these two worlds chiefly consisting >> of a direct action of the outer world upon the inner and an >> indirect action of the inner world upon the outer through the >> operation of habits. If this be a correct account of >> consciousness, i.e., of the congeries of feelings, it seems to me >> that it exercises a real function in self-control, since without >> it, or at least without that of which it is symptomatic, the >> resolves and exercises of the inner world could not affect the >> real determinations and habits of the outer world. I say that >> these belong to the outer world because they are not mere >> fantasies but are real agencies. (Pierce, Pragmatism EP 2.418-419) >> >> As I said this is controversial. At the time it put Peirce quite at >> odds with the mechanistic determinacy that was taken for granted in >> physics. Today we allow chance or swerve, yet it seems a kind of >> deterministic probability that still is at odds with Peirce’s >> notion of control. >> >> It would seem that Peirce would allow sentiency to even an electron >> in some degree yet it seems the ability to control ones behavior and >> form habits that makes for the degree of consciousness. >> >> >> >> >> >> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, >> send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, >> send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> . 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