Hi Daniel, Go to http://www.commens.org/dictionary
You'll find definitions of terms Peirce used using Peirce's own words. Matt Faunce > On Sep 27, 2015, at 1:42 PM, Daniel Guimarães <[email protected]> wrote: > > Dear Arisbe members, > > Good evening to all, > > I am researching about some developments of the cultural industry that might > be explained within the confines of Peirce’s concept of semiosis. > > I would like to know where I can find a good definition for semiosis by > Peirce in the CP’s, and how I can cite it properly. > > Any suggestion and help would immensily welcome and appreciated!! > > Thank you in advance. > > Bets regards, > Daniel > > > Daniel de Vasconcelos Guimarães > > Doctoral Course Student > Program in Frontier Sciences and Technology > Graduate School of Science and Technology > Digital Content Studies > Meiji University > Nakano campus > Tokyo, Japan > >> On Sep 18, 2015, at 4:29 AM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Tom, Edwina, Stephen, Kirsti, List, >> >> Tom wrote: So measures of patience, forthrightness and follow-thru all >> promote a successful forum. I assume AND HAVE OBSERVED the existence of >> these, to tolerable degrees, or I would not be here. >> >> Yes. However, we'd like to remind list members of a principle relating to >> this matter which Joe formulated as part of his remarks on the PEIRCE-L page >> at Arisbe on HOW THE FORUM WORKS. >> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM and with which we fully >> agree. >> >> The most pertinent comments are given below in full with a link to a further >> explication of WHY THE LIST MANAGER SHOULD DO THE CORRECTING. Here are Joe's >> remarks without additional comment. >> >> CAVEAT ABOUT CORRECTING OTHERS >> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm#correction-caveat >> >> It is expected that criticism will be vigorous and diligently pursued: >> philosophy is understood here to be essentially a critically directed and >> self-controlled conversation. But there is one important caveat in this >> connection: If you feel that some messages being posted are not to the >> purpose of the list or that there is something someone is doing which should >> be discouraged, do NOT attempt to rectify that yourself by posting a message >> to that effect to the list in general. Because there is so little overt or >> formal moderation by the list manager, it is natural to suppose that the >> individual members can and should take that role as needed. But this rarely >> if ever produces the effect intended, regardless of how reasonable it may >> seem at a particular time. Contact me instead off-list and we will see what >> can or should be done, if anything, without generating a chain reaction of >> protests and counter-protests, which are the typical result of attempting to >> rectify the problem on-list. >> >> WHY THE LIST MANAGER SHOULD DO THE CORRECTING >> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm#manager-corrects >> [....] >> >> Best, >> >> Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator, and for Ben Udell and myself as >> co-managers) >> >> >> >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> C 745 >> 718 482-5690 >> >>> On Thu, Sep 17, 2015 at 1:52 PM, Ozzie <[email protected]> wrote: >>> Edwina, Stephen, Kristi, List - >>> >>> "Such an approach denies the nature of a discussion site - if you post >>> something and then, refuse to explain or discuss what you posted." >>> >>> Here's how I look at it: After her earlier post, Kristi was queried. She >>> then had three options: 1-Not respond, 2-respond minimally and say she >>> would follow up later, 3-change her schedule to provide a prompt and >>> complete response (plus follow-ups). >>> >>> Kristi chose #2. If she had chosen #1, that would be contrary to the >>> nature of a discussion forum. If she chose #3, she probably has idle time >>> on her hands. If Kristi appears to choose #2 while not actually intending >>> to follow up later, that is really #1 and contrary to the nature of a >>> discussion forum. >>> >>> If forum members insist that an individual member upgrade his/her activity >>> from 1 to 2 or from 2 to 3, that discourages participation by less >>> experienced forum members. If a forum member claims that a 1 response is >>> actually a 2 (soon to be upgraded to 3), that discourages participation by >>> more experienced forum members. >>> >>> So measures of patience, forthrightness and follow-thru all promote a >>> successful forum. I assume AND HAVE OBSERVED the existence of these, to >>> tolerable degrees, or I would not be here. Now let's get back to business, >>> please, and not spend too much time analyzing each other. Each of us are >>> objects with a unique mix of interpretants, and the one we share in common >>> is more than enough to occupy us. >>> >>> Regards, >>> Tom Wyrick >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Sep 17, 2015, at 9:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> Stephen - what the heck does 'ad feminem' mean? Surely you aren't >>>> 'feminizing' the fallacy of 'ad hominem' ? [ I'm opposed to political >>>> correctness]. My comment to Kirsti had nothing to do with her personally >>>> (which is what ad hominem is all about) but about her posting a comment >>>> and then, refusing to explain or discuss what it means. Such an approach >>>> denies the nature of a discussion site - if you post something and then, >>>> refuse to explain or discuss what you posted. >>>> >>>> And what does 'renegade moderation' mean? Please explain. >>>> >>>> Are you privy to Peirce's thoughts? Is that how you justify that you know >>>> what he would think? That, by the way, is a logical fallacy of 'ad >>>> verecundiam' or 'an appeal to authority'. Your comments should stand on >>>> their own, as logical and debatable - and not be removed from discussion >>>> by any 'appeal to authority' or other fallacy. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>> From: Stephen C. Rose >>>> To: Edwina Taborsky >>>> Cc: Määttänen Kirsti ; PEIRCE-L ; [email protected] >>>> Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2015 9:49 AM >>>> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8863] The problem with >>>> instinct - it's a category >>>> >>>> Ad feminem. I used to moderate a forum that went on for a good while in >>>> the 90s. All forums suffer the slings and arrows of various dynamics. But >>>> this is a case of renegade moderation and I am tired of it. I think Peirce >>>> would be too. >>>> >>>> Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl >>>> Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3 >>>> >>>>> On Thu, Sep 17, 2015 at 9:43 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> Kirsti- that's not a logical response. If you wish to keep your short >>>>> assertions without explanation and refuse to either explain or discuss >>>>> them, then, don't post them on to a discussion site! >>>>> >>>>> Also, if you can't accept disagreement - again, don't post your opinions >>>>> to a discussion site! The whole nature of such a site is not for the >>>>> readers to passively sit back and accept what each person posts - but - >>>>> to THINK about the posts, to ask questions, to debate, discuss - and that >>>>> involves both agreement AND disagreement. >>>>> >>>>> And to declare that you are 'too busy' to explain - is a red herring >>>>> cop-out. Again, a discussion site by its very essence, involves >>>>> discussion - not simple short assertions which you expect the reader to >>>>> accept as Truth and when you are questioned about them - you refuse to >>>>> explain their cryptic meaning or enter into any discussion. >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ----- Original Message ----- From: <[email protected]> >>>>> To: "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]> >>>>> Cc: "PEIRCE-L" <[email protected]> >>>>> Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2015 9:30 AM >>>>> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8863] The problem with >>>>> instinct - it's a category >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Dear Edwina, >>>>>> >>>>>> My suggestion is that we both keep our views. And proceed according to >>>>>> them. - So far, we have only disagreed. We both have work to do, so lets >>>>>> proceed with it, separately. >>>>>> >>>>>> My short comments are, of course, available to use as you please. >>>>>> >>>>>> With kind regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Kirsti >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina Taborsky kirjoitti 17.9.2015 15:27: >>>>>>> I'd disagree with Kirsti's view that instincts are unrelated to the >>>>>>> Peircean categories. I'd say that instinct in itself is in a form of >>>>>>> Thirdness, in that it is a genetically based knowledge. As to how it >>>>>>> is activated and accessed - that can be via both Firstness and >>>>>>> Secondness. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As for 'the common understanding of instinct' and 'what was common in >>>>>>> HIS times; and CSP's understanding - all of these definitions would >>>>>>> have to be outlined by Kirsti. As well as Kirsti's own view - which >>>>>>> she does not describe. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Edwina >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ----- Original Message ----- From: <[email protected]> >>>>>>> To: "Clark Goble" <[email protected]> >>>>>>> Cc: "PEIRCE-L" <[email protected]> >>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2015 8:11 AM >>>>>>> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8863] The problem >>>>>>> with instinct - it's a category >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I find Helmut's comments to the point. In terms of CSP's categories, >>>>>>>> "instincts" do not, as such have a place. - Well, a kind of >>>>>>>> firstnesslike, but that is it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Nowdays, the quite common understanding of "instict" is different than >>>>>>>> in CSP's times. Not to forget that HIS understanding differed from what >>>>>>>> was common in HIS times. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> These are the problems we need to tacle. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Taking 'meaning' as a simple relation of reference does not so. As >>>>>>>> such, >>>>>>>> the question is reduced into two-placed-relations. - Which is >>>>>>>> un-Peircean, for starters. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What are we referring to, when taking up "instincts"? - Well, I for my >>>>>>>> part, am referring to something very, very different from the views >>>>>>>> expressed here. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Kisti >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Clark Goble kirjoitti 15.9.2015 21:13: >>>>>>>>> Apologies - I just found out I’d sent this to the old Peirce list >>>>>>>>> rather than the new one. My apologies for the problem. Apple Mail >>>>>>>>> appears to autosuggest based upon what emails you have archived. >>>>>>>>> Sometimes this leads to the old list getting picked up. Unfortunately >>>>>>>>> Mail’s UI also doesn’t display the full email unless you click on >>>>>>>>> it. So unless I click on the Peirce-L name I occasionally get the >>>>>>>>> wrong email. When I’m posting regularly I always remember. When >>>>>>>>> I’m posting infrequently (as has of late been the case) then I can >>>>>>>>> forget. Once again my apologies again. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2015 at 12:03 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sep 8, 2015, at 1:36 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Stephen, >>>>>>>>>> you wrote: "The axiomatic principles of cognition (Peirce’s >>>>>>>>>> categories) will establish how mind-bodies define the things that >>>>>>>>>> matter." >>>>>>>>>> Again, I think that we have different concepts of the term "know" or >>>>>>>>>> "cognition". In my understanding, cognition does not appear in the >>>>>>>>>> three categories from the start, but is a matter of subcategories. I >>>>>>>>>> agree, that everything underlies the three categories >>>>>>>>>> possibility/quality, actuality/relation, representation/continuity. >>>>>>>>>> Secondness has two modes, and thirdness has three modes. These >>>>>>>>>> modes, or subcategories, again have submodes, or subcategories as >>>>>>>>>> before. I think, that knowledge is a matter of eg. thirdness of >>>>>>>>>> thirdness of thirdness, or something like that. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It seems to me Peirce adopts a position where things >>>>>>>>>> are more >>>>>>>>>> mind-like or more matter-like as a matter of degree rather than >>>>>>>>>> kind. I’m not sure it relates directly to the categories beyond >>>>>>>>>> the idea of consciousness seems tied to firstness in certain ways. >>>>>>>>>> Yet the categories are always at play in an irreducible way. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> At times Peirce appears to see the more mind-like as what is less >>>>>>>>>> constrained. So evolution is leading to the development of substance >>>>>>>>>> as a kind of permanence. Up to that time there is more “swerve” >>>>>>>>>> and that swerve, when seen from the inside, is likely traditional >>>>>>>>>> phenomenal mind. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> This ontology of Peirce is probably the most controversial aspect of >>>>>>>>>> his thought but it does lead to all sorts of interesting >>>>>>>>>> considerations. An analogy someone else brought up recently was >>>>>>>>>> Richard Feynman’s QED really being thinking what it must be like >>>>>>>>>> to be an electron. In this conception there’s always an inside and >>>>>>>>>> outside and Peirce isn’t quite so divorced from Kant as people >>>>>>>>>> assume. Yet in taking this inner view we don’t have the thing in >>>>>>>>>> itself in quite the same fashion. If only because Peirce lets >>>>>>>>>> firstness create a sign. Indeed remembering our experience of a >>>>>>>>>> phenomena is always a sign (thirdness) in response to firstness. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> That may be what you mean by modes or subcategories though. (Forgive >>>>>>>>>> me - haven’t yet caught up on my reading of the list) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sep 8, 2015, at 12:18 PM, Stephen Jarosek <[email protected]> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Bees are conscious in accordance with the same principles that we >>>>>>>>>> are conscious. This is one important aspect of the axiomatic >>>>>>>>>> framework that I base my thinking on. That is to say, Peirce’s >>>>>>>>>> categories apply to _all_organisms, even cells. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Pierce says bees have mind. I’m not sure he means by that they are >>>>>>>>>> conscious in any strong way. It seems a matter of degree for Peirce. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in >>>>>>>>>>> the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical >>>>>>>>>>> world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that >>>>>>>>>>> the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there. >>>>>>>>>>> Consistently adhere to that unwarrantable denial, and you will be >>>>>>>>>>> driven to some form of idealistic nominalism akin to Fichte’s. >>>>>>>>>>> Not only is thought in the organic world, but it develops there. >>>>>>>>>>> But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, >>>>>>>>>>> so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give >>>>>>>>>>> “Sign” a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense >>>>>>>>>>> to come within our definition. Admitting that >>>>>>>>>>> connected Signs must >>>>>>>>>>> have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no >>>>>>>>>>> isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a >>>>>>>>>>> Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are >>>>>>>>>>> at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must >>>>>>>>>>> nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. >>>>>>>>>>> Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a >>>>>>>>>>> necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should >>>>>>>>>>> be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I admit >>>>>>>>>>> that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. It >>>>>>>>>>> might be filled out with argument so as to remove the greater part >>>>>>>>>>> of this fault; but in the first place, such an expansion would >>>>>>>>>>> require a volume - and an uninviting one; and in the second place, >>>>>>>>>>> what I have been saying is only to be applied to a slight >>>>>>>>>>> determination of our system of diagrammatization, which it will >>>>>>>>>>> only slightly affect; so that, should it be incorrect, the utmost >>>>>>>>>>> certain effect will be a danger that our system may not represent >>>>>>>>>>> every variety of non-human thought. (“Prolegomena to an Apology >>>>>>>>>>> for Pragmaticism CP 4.551) >>>>>>>>>> Whenever you have signs, even physical signs, you have a >>>>>>>>>> quasi-mind. So of course thirdness applies to them the same as it >>>>>>>>>> does us. The question of feeling or firstness seems a bit more >>>>>>>>>> tricky. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> As I recall to the degree he talks about consciousness it’s the >>>>>>>>>> inner aspect of the “swerve” or chaos. In other places he says >>>>>>>>>> we have consciousness to the degree we have self-control. I think >>>>>>>>>> this aspect of his ontology is among the most controversial of his >>>>>>>>>> views. I think one can adopt most of his system without adopting >>>>>>>>>> this particular thread. (Which I think comes out of the remnant of >>>>>>>>>> Kant’s “in-itself” that survives no external thing-in-itself) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> …whatever is First is _ipso facto _sentient. If I make atoms >>>>>>>>>>> swerve - as I do - I make them swerve but very very little, >>>>>>>>>>> because I conceive they are not absolutely dead. And by that I do >>>>>>>>>>> not mean exactly that I hold them to be physically such as the >>>>>>>>>>> materialists hold them to be, only with a small dose of sentiency >>>>>>>>>>> superadded. For that, I grant, would be feeble enough. But what I >>>>>>>>>>> mean is, that all there IS, is First, Feelings; Second, Efforts; >>>>>>>>>>> Third, Habits - all of which are more familiar to us on their >>>>>>>>>>> psychical side than on their physical side; and that dead matter >>>>>>>>>>> would be merely the final result of the complete induration of >>>>>>>>>>> habit reducing the free play of feeling and the brute >>>>>>>>>>> irrationality of effort to complete death (CP 6.201) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> What further is needed to clear the sign of its mental >>>>>>>>>>> associations is furnished by generalizations too facile to arrest >>>>>>>>>>> attention here, since nothing but feeling is exclusively mental. >>>>>>>>>>> But while I say this, it must not be inferred that I regard >>>>>>>>>>> consciousness as a mere “epiphenomenon”; though I heartily >>>>>>>>>>> grant that the hypothesis that it is so has done good service to >>>>>>>>>>> science. To my apprehension, consciousness may be defined as that >>>>>>>>>>> congeries of non-relative predicates, varying greatly in quality >>>>>>>>>>> and in intensity, which are symptomatic of the interaction of the >>>>>>>>>>> outer world,— the world of those causes that are exceedingly >>>>>>>>>>> compulsive upon the modes of consciousness, with general >>>>>>>>>>> disturbance sometimes amounting to shock, and are acted upon only >>>>>>>>>>> slightly, and only by a special kind of effort, muscular >>>>>>>>>>> effort,— and of the inner world, apparently derived from the >>>>>>>>>>> outer, and amenable to direct effort of various kinds with feeble >>>>>>>>>>> reactions, the interaction of these two worlds chiefly consisting >>>>>>>>>>> of a direct action of the outer world upon the inner and an >>>>>>>>>>> indirect action of the inner world upon the outer through the >>>>>>>>>>> operation of habits. If this be a correct account of >>>>>>>>>>> consciousness, i.e., of the congeries of feelings, it seems to me >>>>>>>>>>> that it exercises a real function in self-control, since without >>>>>>>>>>> it, or at least without that of which it is symptomatic, the >>>>>>>>>>> resolves and exercises of the inner world could not affect the >>>>>>>>>>> real determinations and habits of the outer world. I say that >>>>>>>>>>> these belong to the outer world because they are not mere >>>>>>>>>>> fantasies but are real agencies. (Pierce, Pragmatism EP 2.418-419) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> As I said this is controversial. At the time it put Peirce quite at >>>>>>>>>> odds with the mechanistic determinacy that was taken for granted in >>>>>>>>>> physics. Today we allow chance or swerve, yet it seems a kind of >>>>>>>>>> deterministic probability that still is at odds with Peirce’s >>>>>>>>>> notion of control. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It would seem that Peirce would allow sentiency to even an electron >>>>>>>>>> in some degree yet it seems the ability to control ones behavior and >>>>>>>>>> form habits that makes for the degree of consciousness. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ----------------------------- >>>>>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>>>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>>>>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>>>>>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>>>>>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>>>>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ----------------------------- >>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >>>>> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >>>>> BODY of the message. More at >>>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >>>> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >>>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >>>> . >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >>> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY >>> of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but >> to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of >> the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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