Would "such thing" exclude capacities in a newborn that would suggest that apart from what she absorbs she is able to perform mental actions that do suggest inherent awareness that could not be said to exist externally?
Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3 On Mon, Oct 12, 2015 at 5:52 PM, Stephen Jarosek <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, perhaps my long-winded reply was another way of saying that I do > not believe that there is any such thing as innate knowledge. So on this > specific point, it turns out that we do not agree. My problem with innate > knowledge is that it cannot be incorporated into an axiomatic framework as > readily as can the empty bucket theory. > > Basically, it is not at all unreasonable to suggest that maybe all > inheritance of behaviour across the generations and across families CAN > take place without the need for innate (genetically inherited) knowledge. > You can do away entirely with any reference to genes/DNA, and still have a > reasonable explanation for inheritance of behaviour across the generations > (I posted on this a couple of times to this forum, most recently on Thu > 30/04/2015 on "DNA nonlocality for a scientific Buddhism"). > > And many of the claims of evidence supporting the genetic inheritance of > behaviour, such as the Minnesota twins studies, are controversial, and > debunked as often as they are affirmed. With all the recent news of > corruption in the peer-review process, colour me sceptic: > > http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/science/rise-in-scientific-journal-retractions-prompts-calls-for-reform.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1 > http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(15)60696-1.pdf > > So to summarize, this is my biggest problem with the notion of innate > knowledge... it is not possible to establish for it, an axiomatic framework > that hangs together. By contrast, an axiomatic framework for the empty > bucket interpretation is much more workable, á la Peircean biosemiotics. > Without an axiomatic framework for the life sciences (analogous to what > Isaac Newton provided for the physical sciences), we have no life > science... hence my rejection of the innate knowledge interpretation. > > sj > > > > *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected] <[email protected]>] > *Sent:* Monday, 12 October 2015 10:21 PM > *To:* Stephen Jarosek; 'Ozzie' > *Cc:* 'Matt Faunce'; 'Peirce-L' > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality > > > > Stephen J. - I'm not sure that your response deals with the point of my > comment, which was that 'knowledge' is not all gained by experience - that > was the 'Empty Bucket' theory to which I was referring. Instead, my point > was that a certain amount of knowledge is innate, more so in plants, > insects, animals and less so in the human species - but - nevertheless, our > species has an innate capacity for symbolic language, for reasoning, for > imagination which enables hypothetical or anticipatory decision-making, > etc. > > > > Therefore, knowledge is not confined to experience. This has nothing to > do with total genocentric determinism (is there such a thing?) nor with > 'naive cultural relativism'. Instead, the question focuses around two > issues: > > > > 1) How much of the knowledge base is innate, i.e., genetic. As I > suggested, I think the ability to use symbolic language, to think > rationally etc..is genetic. And how does this affect the community as well > as the individual (i.e., mathematical ability, musical ability which can be > shown in many cases to be genetic rather than learned).. > > vs > > 2) And how much is social; i.e., collective knowledge - which is NOT > subjective but communal, (and not necessarily truthful to objective > reality) and how does the collective knowledge base adapt and change? > > > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > > *From:* Stephen Jarosek <[email protected]> > > *To:* 'Edwina Taborsky' <[email protected]> ; 'Ozzie' > <[email protected]> > > *Cc:* 'Matt Faunce' <[email protected]> ; 'Peirce-L' > <[email protected]> > > *Sent:* Monday, October 12, 2015 3:29 PM > > *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality > > > > Edwina, on the face of the points you raise, I won't disagree with you. > However, for clarification, let us draw a clear distinction between naive > idealism versus realistic (semiotic) idealism. In the spirit of naive > idealism (naive cultural relativism), we cannot just wake up one morning > and announce "today is the first day of the rest of my life" and then > proceed to become a different person from that point forwards, simply by > the force of will. > > As you would realize, one must contend with mind-body predispositions and > how they relate to pragmatism and semiotic principles, within the context > of a compelling axiomatic framework. Thus there is an objective Truth in > the sense of a Truth about semiotic principles, but experience (knowing) > can only ever be subjective. > > Naive idealism is the flip-side of the genocentric paradigm. One says > "it's all in the genes." The other says "no it's not, don't oppress me... I > can be whatever I want to be." Both are embodiments of the same kind of > simplistic linear thinking. > > sj > > > > *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected] <[email protected]>] > *Sent:* Monday, 12 October 2015 3:03 PM > *To:* Stephen Jarosek; 'Ozzie' > *Cc:* 'Matt Faunce'; 'Peirce-L' > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality > > > > To my understanding, Stephen J., you subscribe to what is known as the > 'Empty Bucket' or *tabula rasa* theory of the mind (Locke's theory) where > the human species is born with an empty brain and 'learns how to be' from > almost passive experience. A subjectivist theory - i.e., there is only one > kind of knowledge - that possessed by a knowing subject. This of course > leads to nominalism and relativism and of course precludes Truth, which > can't exist in such an epistemology. > > > > See Karl Popper's strong criticism of this approach in his 'Objective > Knowledge'. He opts instead, as did Peirce, for the existence of 'the > real', the objective reality which exists outside of human cultural > beliefs; and human knowledge can examine this reality and arrive at its > truth, as a Peircean 'community of scholars' - within our *innate > dispositions* to be rational, to imagine, to be analytical and to > communicate - such as the disposition to learn a language. > > > > Now, you also seem to define the acquisition of knowledge as based on and > only on individual subjective experience; that is, you reject any common > will to knowledge or any innate capacity for examination of the objective > world. I don't subscribe to the extreme reductionism of Dawkins, who places > all causality in 'the genes' - and I totally reject his memes theory of > culture - BUT, I think that all species have both innate knowledge of 'how > to be' and the human species has the least amount of innate knowledge - and > this is genetic. What the human species has, genetically, is the capacity > for logic, order, organization and symbolic communication. These permit its > knowledge base of 'how to be' to evolve, adapt, change, while the knowledge > base of, let's say a frog, is limited, and it must change its physiology to > adapt, while the human species changes its technology - a far easier and > faster method of adaptation. Language - and the rational analysis of the > world - which are both genetic within our species - enables man to > critique, describe, the objective reality and change his methods of > interaction with it. > > > > Your references to the Buddhist and Zen 'emptying the bucket' so to speak, > are merely desires to empty oneself of one's beliefs - the subjectivist > beliefs that one has learned - but this action doesn't include obtaining > *another* set of beliefs to 'fill the bucket' but to open the mind to the > objective world such that one's innate capacity for reason and analysis can > view it objectively. > > > > Edwina > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > *From:* Stephen Jarosek <[email protected]> > > *To:* 'Ozzie' <[email protected]> > > *Cc:* 'Matt Faunce' <[email protected]> ; 'Peirce-L' > <[email protected]> > > *Sent:* Monday, October 12, 2015 5:09 AM > > *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality > > > > Hi Tom, list, > > >”Can we use it [knowing how to be] to animate our logic and make > predictions about behavior? “ > > Absolutely. There are several ways that an entity “learns how to be” and > none of that has anything to do with instinct or programming within a DNA > blueprint. Central to this concept is pragmatism... or is that > pragmaticism... establishing how said entity defines the things that > matter. The simplest and most obvious example I can think of here is > imitation. Richard Dawkins based his memetic theory on imitation. But there > are other ways of defining the things that matter, not just imitation. > Imitation is a subset of “knowing how to be.” > > Animals have to “know how to be.” In the absence of human contact, we > recognize their untamed feral natures in the wild. But subject to being > raised among humans, they learn from humans civil behaviour, incorporating > it within the terms of their bodily predispositions. By the same token, > there are records (of varying credibility) of children raised by wild > animals (e.g., the “Wild Boy of Aveyron or the Dog Girl from the Ukraine, > variously affirmed or debunked by “experts” who know nothing of neural > plasticity, pragmatism, or semiotic principles). There is nothing > necessarily “wrong” or “broken” with the brains of feral children... their > brains do what brains are meant to do, when learning how to be. Thomas > Szasz has it mostly right... mental illness is a fiction... it’s about > experience, choices and wiring. > > Then there is culture and “knowing how to be” within culture. Most people, > when they travel, force-fit their observations into the pigeon-holes of > their home culture. It does not occur to them that the new narratives that > they must contend with are entirely different to the narratives back home. > Often, radically different. In this there is utility in the theory of > “knowing how to be” by realizing the extent to which one’s personal > narratives are alien to those of the new culture. You make the same > transactions as everyone else does, in your new culture, so you assume that > they are connecting with the same narratives... nothing could be farther > from the truth. > > So what sort of prediction would you like to make? I can predict that an > animal in the wild, beyond the sphere of human knowing, will become feral. > I can predict that a child raised in a knowing of abuse and violence, is > going to grow up knowing the narratives of abuse and violence. And whether > or not they rise above it will be contingent on the experiences to which > they are exposed and the choices that they make. If they are lucky, they > might chance upon a role model who might show them an alternative way of > “knowing how to be.” In Christianity, Jesus provides a role model, an > example of “knowing how to be.” How practical is that? Religious conflicts > arise from different ways of “knowing how to be.” > > But of course this is where the entrenched objectivist, genocentric > narrative kicks in... “it’s all in the genes, silly.” No, it’s not in the > genes. It’s about knowing how to be. It’s about plasticity, especially > neural plasticity, and how the brain wires itself to incorporate experience > into its narratives and its identity. Genes and DNA are important, of > course, but nothing as described in the spirit of the genocentric narrative. > > >”Finally - I don't personally believe that Pragmatic logic requires DNA > (you suggest that I probably do) “ > > Might I suggest that, while you have an appreciation for the semiotic > theory of Peirce, your narratives continue to be influenced by the > established genocentric narrative. The *scaffolding** for your semiotic > theory is not complete, it is a work in progress. And therefore you do not > have an intuitive feel for the reach of semiotic theory. This is why you > have trouble with “knowing how to be” and still see it is vague. > > As an engineering/business graduate ignorant of Peirce, I first formulated > my own theoretical outline, independently of Peirce, a couple of decades > ago. And prior to that, I devoted much effort to trying to understand what > motivates people in a cultural context... why are they so trapped in their > cultural bs? So my scaffolding has been a work in progress for a very long > time... and yet to this day, I continue to be surprised that I am still > learning new things... the adventure continues. Putting the scaffolding in > place takes a long time and requires considerable effort. And each stage > yields more insights, more layers to work on. When I talk about the > domestication of animals, for example, some less experienced Peirceans > might think to themselves “how nice, I buy that” and then fail to grasp the > reach of what I am trying to say because, continuing to whisper into their > ears, is the genocentric narrative, along the lines of “yes, what sj is > saying sounds pretty cool, but instinct because genes.” You can entertain a > theory on the surface, but remain mired in a scaffolding that continues to > inform the rest of your thinking. > > The full impact of “knowing how to be” came to me only in 2013, as I was > starting a new life in the northern hemisphere. I am reminded of that > cliché, “like a child seeing the world for the first time.” It’s ALL about > “knowing how to be.” The concept is not vague at all. It is precise, laser > sharp. It is the core with all the layers removed. You don’t see it because > you continue to interpret the world with the narratives of the mainstream > and the scaffolding that has established your “knowing how to be.” You need > to address your scaffolding, along the lines of the following Buddhist koan: > > > * A Cup of Tea * Nan-in, a Japanese master during > the Meiji era (1868-1912), received a university professor who came to > inquire about Zen. > Nan-in served tea. He poured his visitor’s cup full, and then > kept on pouring. > The professor watched the overflow until he no longer could > restrain himself. > “It is overfull. No more will go in!” > “Like this cup,” Nan-in said, “you are full of your own > opinions and speculations. How can I show you Zen unless you first empty > your cup?” > > *I only recently stumbled across the fairly new term “scaffolding” (the > structure of narratives) within a semiotic context, without having access > to the full journal (Biosemiotics, Springer) documents... hope I’m using > the word in the right context. > > sj > > > > *From:* Ozzie [mailto:[email protected] <[email protected]>] > *Sent:* Friday, 9 October 2015 11:03 PM > *To:* Stephen Jarosek > *Cc:* Matt Faunce; Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality > > > > Stephen, List ~ > > In your account, the old buffalo no longer knows "how to be" while the > young ones do -- but I don't recall whether (in the story) the old buffalo > was eaten by crocs or made it safely across the river. > > > > If he survived the swim, then not knowing how to be evidently didn't > endanger his survival. Then, the old buffalo's bulging eyes before being > pushed into the water does not reveal a lot about the evolutionary story of > his species. Are buffalo who are acting like real buffalo supposed to > volunteer for hazardous duty, disregard their own past experiences, and not > let their eyes bulge? > > > > If we don't actually know whether the old buffalo made it across the > river, drawing any conclusion about evolution from a few frames of video is > premature. > > > > What about the same old buffalo when he was only half that age. Did he > know how to be a buffalo when he was younger? What caused the > transformation? Did he have buffalo offspring who did or did not know how > to be buffalo? > > > > I have trouble with "knowing how to be" because it is vague and doesn't > mean anything specific to me. (Yet, perhaps it does to others.) Can we > use it to animate our logic and make predictions about behavior? > > > > Finally - I don't personally believe that Pragmatic logic requires DNA > (you suggest that I probably do) -- but I don't perceive the two are in > conflict, either. For example, social institutions do not have DNA. > Neither do water molecules. > > > > Regards, > > Tom Wyrick > > > > > > > On Oct 9, 2015, at 2:16 PM, Stephen Jarosek <[email protected]> wrote: > > >” Pushing that old buffalo to the crocs may represent nothing more > complicated than self-interest. I don't believe that any species can > survive (long term) without individual members having a self-interest > motive.“ > > But Tom, self-interest relates to pragmatism, and how an entity defines > the things that matter. And defining the things that matter relates to > “knowing how to be.” “Knowing how to be” comes first, and the > self-interest, as motivation (firstness?), is established within the > context of that knowing. This vaguely defined notion “self-interest” infers > a deterministic narrative... it seems to imply an “instinct” “programmed” > into the DNA blueprint, which I for one do not buy into. > > sj > > > > *From:* Ozzie [mailto:[email protected] <[email protected]>] > *Sent:* Friday, 9 October 2015 8:42 PM > *To:* Stephen Jarosek > *Cc:* Matt Faunce; Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality > > > > Stephen, Matt ~ > > Pushing that old buffalo to the crocs may represent nothing more > complicated than self-interest. I don't believe that any species can > survive (long term) without individual members having a self-interest > motive. Perhaps the old buffalo knows "how to be," and doesn't want to > swim with crocs. Maybe that's how he got to be old. And perhaps the young > bulls behind him are impatient and less afraid. Both may be > self-interested, though not endowed with equal wisdom. (Don't we observe > the same behavior in human wars? The young soldier charges into a machine > gun nest, while the more experienced soldier keeps his head down. It's a > matter of knowing how to be alive tomorrow.) > > > > I enjoy the video (and others like it), but I see the discussion as one > that describes mechanisms in nature in general terms instead of offering a > definitive account of nature's logic. For example, consider the example of > beautiful fish that attract more mates and also attract more predators. > I'm not persuaded that after a female fish lays her eggs in the weeds she > can be said to be "selecting" handsome suitors for her offspring. Maybe > she can do so despite having left the area, but her method is not obvious. > ("Internal fertilization is not the norm for fish, and the majority of > species use external fertilization. In this mating system, eggs and sperm > are released separately and are fertilized outside of the body.") > > > > In some species, sex is pleasurable. In those cases an "ugly" male or > female may attract short-term suitors who are looking for a good time. > That allows the ugly gene to survive, and removes the genetic bias toward > nonfunctional adaptations (that don't promote survival). > > > > Continuing this example, a lot of sex in nature appears to be what modern > humans would describe as rape. Then, selection is more a case of the > relative strength of one partner and opportunity -- not choice geared > toward individual survival or that of the species. That institution (rape) > mixes up the gene pool, selects for size and signals to targets of > unwilling sex to stay close to home for protection. (This process may > describe early human evolution.) > > > > Other species may have emotional lives (experiences) we are not aware of, > and those emotions may influence behavior in ways that are presently > attributed to kinship genes. > > > > Regards, > > Tom Wyrick > > > > > > > On Oct 9, 2015, at 4:28 AM, Stephen Jarosek <[email protected]> wrote: > > Matt, > > Good points. The point where you cue the talk, where your ‘expert’ disses > cooperation... we can understand how organisms work for the good of the > group only from a semiotic perspective and the realization that every > organism has to “learn how to be.” As soon as you factor in “knowing how to > be”, you factor in the motivation for an organism to work for the good of > the group... not directly, of course, but by default... natural selection > meets semiotics. Easy peazy, there is nothing illogical in that crucial > insight. His reference to an elderly wildebeest being pushed into the river > by the herd can also be understood within the context of “knowing how to > be.” Regarding the passing of the elderly wildebeest, Darwinian natural > selection is SECONDARY to its demise... PRIMARY is its failure to keep up > with the “knowing how to be” of the herd. When it loses its ability to keep > up with the herd and its behaviour, that is when natural selection kicks > in. Natural selection is better understood in the context of failing to > keep up with the group, whereas “knowing how to be” is of greater > importance, first cause, and the source of complexity. Indeed, factoring > in “knowing how to be” and its role in cooperation is, imho, much more > compelling than reductionism and Dawkins’ idea of selfish genes. “Knowing > how to be”... humans do it, bees do it, neurons do it, stem cells do it, > men and women do it. “Knowing how to be” is the first source of variety. > Natural selection is the filter of variety, the penalty/reward for > improper/successful conduct. “Knowing how to be” is semiotics. > > sj > > > > > > *From:* Matt Faunce [mailto:[email protected] <[email protected]>] > *Sent:* Thursday, 8 October 2015 10:48 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality > > > > On 10/7/15 8:47 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Matt - I have some logical questions: > > > > 1) "instincts are no longer considered to work toward the probable > perpetuation of the species, but they work only toward the probable > perpetuation of their specific gene type, sometimes at the expense of the > species." > > > > I always dislike the passive tense "no longer considered to > work'...because it leaves out the important AGENT. Who says that instincts > no longer work toward the continuity of the species"? Proof? Or just some > 'expert' (Appeal-to-Authority Fallacy). > > > Here's my 'expert' cued up to where he explicitly states it: > https://youtu.be/Y0Oa4Lp5fLE?t=16m21s > > > Instincts work only toward the perpetuation of their gene type? Ah, a > reductionist view - and how does the gene harm the species? Examples of > both privileging the gene and harming the species? > > > Reductionism would be the case for a theory that genes determine behavior, > but I said the opposite, that behavior (instincts) works toward preserving > a gene type. > > He later mentions fish who choose mates who are bright and colorful > despite this trait making them more likely to be preyed on. > > A seed beetle's aggressive mating behavior favors its gene type over its > competitor's but harms the species: > http://www.mediadesk.uzh.ch/articles/2011/paarungsverhalten_en.html > > Matt > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. 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