Stephen, List, You draw the conclusions: Nothing is innate. Experience/knowing can only ever be subjective.
My suggestion was that, until we have understood how Peirce is using the conception of the innate (or how Plato, or Descartes are using the conception, for that matter), then we are just talking past each other. The temptation I would like to resist is that of re-conceiving the meaning of well established concepts unless there is some compelling reason to do so. Doing so causes too much confusion. As such, my aim is to clarify the conceptions--and the pragmatic maxim supplies us with a nice method for doing so. So, I think Peirce can accept many of the claims you are making about the plasticity of the brain and the variation between one kind of organism and another--and still conclude that the conceptions of space and time are innate for us. More importantly, he has good reasons to reject your reasons for drawing the conclusion that "Experience/knowing can only ever be subjective." The study of the validity of the inferences that are fundamental for scientific inquiry is part of a normative science. None of the conclusions that you are drawing from the special science of biology are dispositive for the questions we face about the validity of abduction, deduction or induction. This ground is all well worn, so I'll leave it at that. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Stephen Jarosek [[email protected]] Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2015 12:57 AM To: Jeffrey Brian Downard Cc: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality Jeff, one of the surprises that I have come to in my own thinking in recent years, within the context of neuroplastic "wiring" commencing early in the embryo's development, is the realization that not even space or time are "innate." Infants begin learning about space by reaching into it and crawling through it... the reaching begins in the womb. Space has different meanings for different creatures. The empty space below an elephant raised one meter in a sling will have a very different meaning to the empty space below a cat raised one meter. For the former, that one metre drop could be fatal, while for the latter, it will barely shake the dust off its back. A tumble for a horse has very different consequences to a tumble for a cat, by virtue of how mass and size interact with space and gravity, and so they learn to attribute different limitations to this empty space that they must negotiate. Pairs of animals in combat suffer different consequences, depending on size and biology, and so attribute different meanings to their experiences as constrained by space and mass. As an adult, I went to look at the house that I first grew up in. I was struck by my memory of the house, and the houses around it, from that young age, as being very much larger than they now appear. Clearly, none of the houses have changed in actual size, but the meaning that I attribute to size had changed. Same with time. The passage of time for a fly resting on a table is very different to the passage of time for someone looking at it... 5 seconds to me will be felt as far longer than that for an insect (insofar as it can be suggested that time "matters" for an insect). Notice how giant tortoises move so slowly. We infer a metabolic rate to match, with equipment (the shell) that protects it from the much nimbler creatures that might annoy or threaten it. Our life spans are no match for the 255 years of giant tortoise Adwaitya, that died recently at the Calcutta Zoo. Though, given its metabolic rate, its 255 years might be experienced as closer to our 70 years. An angry tortoise hasn't much hope of catching the much nimbler creatures that might annoy it: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RjtCS0EEoCY Conclusion? Nothing is innate. Experience/knowing can only ever be subjective. sj -----Original Message----- From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Tuesday, 13 October 2015 12:16 AM Cc: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality List, Stephen's characterization of the conception of what is innate seems to differ, in a number of important respects, from the way Peirce is using the term. The notion that" innate ideas" are those that are biologically inherited appears to fit with the explanations given, for instance, in the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on the subject. As such, it appears to be a prevalent 20th century way of conceiving the matter. Here are a couple of things Peirce says about innate ideas: CP 4.92 The very word a priori involves the mistaken notion that the operations of demonstrative reasoning are nothing but applications of plain rules to plain cases. The really unobjectionable word is innate; for that may be innate which is very abstruse, and which we can only find out with extreme difficulty. All those Cartesians who advocated innate ideas took this ground; and only Locke failed to see that learning something from experience, and having been fully aware of it since birth, did not exhaust all possibilities. So, on his account, calling an idea innate does not mean that a creature has been aware of the idea since birth. Two examples he gives of innate ideas are the conceptions of time and space: 6.416 That time is not directly perceived is evident, since no lapse of time is present, and we only perceive what is present. That, not having the idea of time, we should never be able to perceive the flow in our sensations without some particular aptitude for it, will probably also be admitted. The idea of force -- at least, in its rudiments -- is another conception so early arrived at, and found in animals so low in the scale of intelligence, that it must be supposed innate. But the innateness of an idea admits of degree, for it consists in the tendency of that idea to present itself to the mind. Some ideas, like that of space, do so present themselves irresistibly at the very dawn of intelligence, and take possession of the mind on small provocation, while of other conceptions we are prepossessed, indeed, but not so strongly, down a scale which is greatly extended. So, it appears the Peirce thinks of innate ideas as those that consist in a natural tendency for the idea to present itself to the mind and to grow. The idea need not be present at the birth of the organism in order for the idea to be innate. The larger question is one of where the natural tendency finds its source or perhaps its authority for us. Those ideas that are innate in the power of reason, such as the ideas involved in logical self control, may take some time and effort on our parts in order for the natural growth to come to fruition. Calling such ideas innate is a way of saying that they are necessary for the realization of ends that are entirely natural for us--such as the end of seeking truth--and that the seeds of these ideas are already present in us. They may be present in us regardless of the temptations that some might feel at times to call those ideas "social conventions" or even to try to stamp those ideas out when they appear to run contrary to other interests we might have--such as the interests of cultivating social status, political power, or what have you. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Stephen Jarosek [[email protected]] Sent: Monday, October 12, 2015 2:52 PM To: 'Edwina Taborsky'; 'Ozzie' Cc: 'Matt Faunce'; 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality Edwina, perhaps my long-winded reply was another way of saying that I do not believe that there is any such thing as innate knowledge. So on this specific point, it turns out that we do not agree. My problem with innate knowledge is that it cannot be incorporated into an axiomatic framework as readily as can the empty bucket theory. Basically, it is not at all unreasonable to suggest that maybe all inheritance of behaviour across the generations and across families CAN take place without the need for innate (genetically inherited) knowledge. You can do away entirely with any reference to genes/DNA, and still have a reasonable explanation for inheritance of behaviour across the generations (I posted on this a couple of times to this forum, most recently on Thu 30/04/2015 on "DNA nonlocality for a scientific Buddhism"). And many of the claims of evidence supporting the genetic inheritance of behaviour, such as the Minnesota twins studies, are controversial, and debunked as often as they are affirmed. With all the recent news of corruption in the peer-review process, colour me sceptic: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/science/rise-in-scientific-journal-retract ions-prompts-calls-for-reform.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1 http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(15)60696-1.pdf So to summarize, this is my biggest problem with the notion of innate knowledge... it is not possible to establish for it, an axiomatic framework that hangs together. By contrast, an axiomatic framework for the empty bucket interpretation is much more workable, á la Peircean biosemiotics. Without an axiomatic framework for the life sciences (analogous to what Isaac Newton provided for the physical sciences), we have no life science... hence my rejection of the innate knowledge interpretation. sj From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Monday, 12 October 2015 10:21 PM To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Ozzie' Cc: 'Matt Faunce'; 'Peirce-L' Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality Stephen J. - I'm not sure that your response deals with the point of my comment, which was that 'knowledge' is not all gained by experience - that was the 'Empty Bucket' theory to which I was referring. Instead, my point was that a certain amount of knowledge is innate, more so in plants, insects, animals and less so in the human species - but - nevertheless, our species has an innate capacity for symbolic language, for reasoning, for imagination which enables hypothetical or anticipatory decision-making, etc. Therefore, knowledge is not confined to experience. This has nothing to do with total genocentric determinism (is there such a thing?) nor with 'naive cultural relativism'. Instead, the question focuses around two issues: 1) How much of the knowledge base is innate, i.e., genetic. As I suggested, I think the ability to use symbolic language, to think rationally etc..is genetic. And how does this affect the community as well as the individual (i.e., mathematical ability, musical ability which can be shown in many cases to be genetic rather than learned).. vs 2) And how much is social; i.e., collective knowledge - which is NOT subjective but communal, (and not necessarily truthful to objective reality) and how does the collective knowledge base adapt and change? Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Stephen Jarosek<mailto:[email protected]> To: 'Edwina Taborsky'<mailto:[email protected]> ; 'Ozzie'<mailto:[email protected]> Cc: 'Matt Faunce'<mailto:[email protected]> ; 'Peirce-L'<mailto:[email protected]> Sent: Monday, October 12, 2015 3:29 PM Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality Edwina, on the face of the points you raise, I won't disagree with you. However, for clarification, let us draw a clear distinction between naive idealism versus realistic (semiotic) idealism. In the spirit of naive idealism (naive cultural relativism), we cannot just wake up one morning and announce "today is the first day of the rest of my life" and then proceed to become a different person from that point forwards, simply by the force of will. As you would realize, one must contend with mind-body predispositions and how they relate to pragmatism and semiotic principles, within the context of a compelling axiomatic framework. Thus there is an objective Truth in the sense of a Truth about semiotic principles, but experience (knowing) can only ever be subjective. Naive idealism is the flip-side of the genocentric paradigm. One says "it's all in the genes." The other says "no it's not, don't oppress me... I can be whatever I want to be." Both are embodiments of the same kind of simplistic linear thinking. sj From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Monday, 12 October 2015 3:03 PM To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Ozzie' Cc: 'Matt Faunce'; 'Peirce-L' Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality To my understanding, Stephen J., you subscribe to what is known as the 'Empty Bucket' or tabula rasa theory of the mind (Locke's theory) where the human species is born with an empty brain and 'learns how to be' from almost passive experience. A subjectivist theory - i.e., there is only one kind of knowledge - that possessed by a knowing subject. This of course leads to nominalism and relativism and of course precludes Truth, which can't exist in such an epistemology. See Karl Popper's strong criticism of this approach in his 'Objective Knowledge'. He opts instead, as did Peirce, for the existence of 'the real', the objective reality which exists outside of human cultural beliefs; and human knowledge can examine this reality and arrive at its truth, as a Peircean 'community of scholars' - within our innate dispositions to be rational, to imagine, to be analytical and to communicate - such as the disposition to learn a language. Now, you also seem to define the acquisition of knowledge as based on and only on individual subjective experience; that is, you reject any common will to knowledge or any innate capacity for examination of the objective world. I don't subscribe to the extreme reductionism of Dawkins, who places all causality in 'the genes' - and I totally reject his memes theory of culture - BUT, I think that all species have both innate knowledge of 'how to be' and the human species has the least amount of innate knowledge - and this is genetic. What the human species has, genetically, is the capacity for logic, order, organization and symbolic communication. These permit its knowledge base of 'how to be' to evolve, adapt, change, while the knowledge base of, let's say a frog, is limited, and it must change its physiology to adapt, while the human species changes its technology - a far easier and faster method of adaptation. Language - and the rational analysis of the world - which are both genetic within our species - enables man to critique, describe, the objective reality and change his methods of interaction with it. Your references to the Buddhist and Zen 'emptying the bucket' so to speak, are merely desires to empty oneself of one's beliefs - the subjectivist beliefs that one has learned - but this action doesn't include obtaining another set of beliefs to 'fill the bucket' but to open the mind to the objective world such that one's innate capacity for reason and analysis can view it objectively. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Stephen Jarosek<mailto:[email protected]> To: 'Ozzie'<mailto:[email protected]> Cc: 'Matt Faunce'<mailto:[email protected]> ; 'Peirce-L'<mailto:[email protected]> Sent: Monday, October 12, 2015 5:09 AM Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality Hi Tom, list, >”Can we use it [knowing how to be] to animate our logic and make predictions about behavior? “ Absolutely. There are several ways that an entity “learns how to be” and none of that has anything to do with instinct or programming within a DNA blueprint. Central to this concept is pragmatism... or is that pragmaticism... establishing how said entity defines the things that matter. The simplest and most obvious example I can think of here is imitation. Richard Dawkins based his memetic theory on imitation. But there are other ways of defining the things that matter, not just imitation. Imitation is a subset of “knowing how to be.” Animals have to “know how to be.” In the absence of human contact, we recognize their untamed feral natures in the wild. But subject to being raised among humans, they learn from humans civil behaviour, incorporating it within the terms of their bodily predispositions. By the same token, there are records (of varying credibility) of children raised by wild animals (e.g., the “Wild Boy of Aveyron or the Dog Girl from the Ukraine, variously affirmed or debunked by “experts” who know nothing of neural plasticity, pragmatism, or semiotic principles). There is nothing necessarily “wrong” or “broken” with the brains of feral children... their brains do what brains are meant to do, when learning how to be. Thomas Szasz has it mostly right... mental illness is a fiction... it’s about experience, choices and wiring. Then there is culture and “knowing how to be” within culture. Most people, when they travel, force-fit their observations into the pigeon-holes of their home culture. It does not occur to them that the new narratives that they must contend with are entirely different to the narratives back home. Often, radically different. In this there is utility in the theory of “knowing how to be” by realizing the extent to which one’s personal narratives are alien to those of the new culture. You make the same transactions as everyone else does, in your new culture, so you assume that they are connecting with the same narratives... nothing could be farther from the truth. So what sort of prediction would you like to make? I can predict that an animal in the wild, beyond the sphere of human knowing, will become feral. I can predict that a child raised in a knowing of abuse and violence, is going to grow up knowing the narratives of abuse and violence. And whether or not they rise above it will be contingent on the experiences to which they are exposed and the choices that they make. If they are lucky, they might chance upon a role model who might show them an alternative way of “knowing how to be.” In Christianity, Jesus provides a role model, an example of “knowing how to be.” How practical is that? Religious conflicts arise from different ways of “knowing how to be.” But of course this is where the entrenched objectivist, genocentric narrative kicks in... “it’s all in the genes, silly.” No, it’s not in the genes. It’s about knowing how to be. It’s about plasticity, especially neural plasticity, and how the brain wires itself to incorporate experience into its narratives and its identity. Genes and DNA are important, of course, but nothing as described in the spirit of the genocentric narrative. >”Finally - I don't personally believe that Pragmatic logic requires DNA (you suggest that I probably do) “ Might I suggest that, while you have an appreciation for the semiotic theory of Peirce, your narratives continue to be influenced by the established genocentric narrative. The scaffolding* for your semiotic theory is not complete, it is a work in progress. And therefore you do not have an intuitive feel for the reach of semiotic theory. This is why you have trouble with “knowing how to be” and still see it is vague. As an engineering/business graduate ignorant of Peirce, I first formulated my own theoretical outline, independently of Peirce, a couple of decades ago. And prior to that, I devoted much effort to trying to understand what motivates people in a cultural context... why are they so trapped in their cultural bs? So my scaffolding has been a work in progress for a very long time... and yet to this day, I continue to be surprised that I am still learning new things... the adventure continues. Putting the scaffolding in place takes a long time and requires considerable effort. And each stage yields more insights, more layers to work on. When I talk about the domestication of animals, for example, some less experienced Peirceans might think to themselves “how nice, I buy that” and then fail to grasp the reach of what I am trying to say because, continuing to whisper into their ears, is the genocentric narrative, along the lines of “yes, what sj is saying sounds pretty cool, but instinct because genes.” You can entertain a theory on the surface, but remain mired in a scaffolding that continues to inform the rest of your thinking. The full impact of “knowing how to be” came to me only in 2013, as I was starting a new life in the northern hemisphere. I am reminded of that cliché, “like a child seeing the world for the first time.” It’s ALL about “knowing how to be.” The concept is not vague at all. It is precise, laser sharp. It is the core with all the layers removed. You don’t see it because you continue to interpret the world with the narratives of the mainstream and the scaffolding that has established your “knowing how to be.” You need to address your scaffolding, along the lines of the following Buddhist koan: A Cup of Tea Nan-in, a Japanese master during the Meiji era (1868-1912), received a university professor who came to inquire about Zen. Nan-in served tea. He poured his visitor’s cup full, and then kept on pouring. The professor watched the overflow until he no longer could restrain himself. “It is overfull. No more will go in!” “Like this cup,” Nan-in said, “you are full of your own opinions and speculations. How can I show you Zen unless you first empty your cup?” *I only recently stumbled across the fairly new term “scaffolding” (the structure of narratives) within a semiotic context, without having access to the full journal (Biosemiotics, Springer) documents... hope I’m using the word in the right context. sj From: Ozzie [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, 9 October 2015 11:03 PM To: Stephen Jarosek Cc: Matt Faunce; Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality Stephen, List ~ In your account, the old buffalo no longer knows "how to be" while the young ones do -- but I don't recall whether (in the story) the old buffalo was eaten by crocs or made it safely across the river. If he survived the swim, then not knowing how to be evidently didn't endanger his survival. Then, the old buffalo's bulging eyes before being pushed into the water does not reveal a lot about the evolutionary story of his species. Are buffalo who are acting like real buffalo supposed to volunteer for hazardous duty, disregard their own past experiences, and not let their eyes bulge? If we don't actually know whether the old buffalo made it across the river, drawing any conclusion about evolution from a few frames of video is premature. What about the same old buffalo when he was only half that age. Did he know how to be a buffalo when he was younger? What caused the transformation? Did he have buffalo offspring who did or did not know how to be buffalo? I have trouble with "knowing how to be" because it is vague and doesn't mean anything specific to me. (Yet, perhaps it does to others.) Can we use it to animate our logic and make predictions about behavior? Finally - I don't personally believe that Pragmatic logic requires DNA (you suggest that I probably do) -- but I don't perceive the two are in conflict, either. For example, social institutions do not have DNA. Neither do water molecules. Regards, Tom Wyrick On Oct 9, 2015, at 2:16 PM, Stephen Jarosek <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >” Pushing that old buffalo to the crocs may represent nothing more complicated than self-interest. I don't believe that any species can survive (long term) without individual members having a self-interest motive.“ But Tom, self-interest relates to pragmatism, and how an entity defines the things that matter. And defining the things that matter relates to “knowing how to be.” “Knowing how to be” comes first, and the self-interest, as motivation (firstness?), is established within the context of that knowing. This vaguely defined notion “self-interest” infers a deterministic narrative... it seems to imply an “instinct” “programmed” into the DNA blueprint, which I for one do not buy into. sj From: Ozzie [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, 9 October 2015 8:42 PM To: Stephen Jarosek Cc: Matt Faunce; Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality Stephen, Matt ~ Pushing that old buffalo to the crocs may represent nothing more complicated than self-interest. I don't believe that any species can survive (long term) without individual members having a self-interest motive. Perhaps the old buffalo knows "how to be," and doesn't want to swim with crocs. Maybe that's how he got to be old. And perhaps the young bulls behind him are impatient and less afraid. Both may be self-interested, though not endowed with equal wisdom. (Don't we observe the same behavior in human wars? The young soldier charges into a machine gun nest, while the more experienced soldier keeps his head down. It's a matter of knowing how to be alive tomorrow.) I enjoy the video (and others like it), but I see the discussion as one that describes mechanisms in nature in general terms instead of offering a definitive account of nature's logic. For example, consider the example of beautiful fish that attract more mates and also attract more predators. I'm not persuaded that after a female fish lays her eggs in the weeds she can be said to be "selecting" handsome suitors for her offspring. Maybe she can do so despite having left the area, but her method is not obvious. ("Internal fertilization is not the norm for fish, and the majority of species use external fertilization. In this mating system, eggs and sperm are released separately and are fertilized outside of the body.") In some species, sex is pleasurable. In those cases an "ugly" male or female may attract short-term suitors who are looking for a good time. That allows the ugly gene to survive, and removes the genetic bias toward nonfunctional adaptations (that don't promote survival). Continuing this example, a lot of sex in nature appears to be what modern humans would describe as rape. Then, selection is more a case of the relative strength of one partner and opportunity -- not choice geared toward individual survival or that of the species. That institution (rape) mixes up the gene pool, selects for size and signals to targets of unwilling sex to stay close to home for protection. (This process may describe early human evolution.) Other species may have emotional lives (experiences) we are not aware of, and those emotions may influence behavior in ways that are presently attributed to kinship genes. Regards, Tom Wyrick On Oct 9, 2015, at 4:28 AM, Stephen Jarosek <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Matt, Good points. The point where you cue the talk, where your ‘expert’ disses cooperation... we can understand how organisms work for the good of the group only from a semiotic perspective and the realization that every organism has to “learn how to be.” As soon as you factor in “knowing how to be”, you factor in the motivation for an organism to work for the good of the group... not directly, of course, but by default... natural selection meets semiotics. Easy peazy, there is nothing illogical in that crucial insight. His reference to an elderly wildebeest being pushed into the river by the herd can also be understood within the context of “knowing how to be.” Regarding the passing of the elderly wildebeest, Darwinian natural selection is SECONDARY to its demise... PRIMARY is its failure to keep up with the “knowing how to be” of the herd. When it loses its ability to keep up with the herd and its behaviour, that is when natural selection kicks in. Natural selection is better understood in the context of failing to keep up with the group, whereas “knowing how to be” is of greater importance, first cause, and the source of complexity. Indeed, factoring in “knowing how to be” and its role in cooperation is, imho, much more compelling than reductionism and Dawkins’ idea of selfish genes. “Knowing how to be”... humans do it, bees do it, neurons do it, stem cells do it, men and women do it. “Knowing how to be” is the first source of variety. Natural selection is the filter of variety, the penalty/reward for improper/successful conduct. “Knowing how to be” is semiotics. sj From: Matt Faunce [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, 8 October 2015 10:48 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality On 10/7/15 8:47 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Matt - I have some logical questions: 1) "instincts are no longer considered to work toward the probable perpetuation of the species, but they work only toward the probable perpetuation of their specific gene type, sometimes at the expense of the species." I always dislike the passive tense "no longer considered to work'...because it leaves out the important AGENT. Who says that instincts no longer work toward the continuity of the species"? Proof? Or just some 'expert' (Appeal-to-Authority Fallacy). Here's my 'expert' cued up to where he explicitly states it: https://youtu.be/Y0Oa4Lp5fLE?t=16m21s Instincts work only toward the perpetuation of their gene type? Ah, a reductionist view - and how does the gene harm the species? Examples of both privileging the gene and harming the species? Reductionism would be the case for a theory that genes determine behavior, but I said the opposite, that behavior (instincts) works toward preserving a gene type. He later mentions fish who choose mates who are bright and colorful despite this trait making them more likely to be preyed on. A seed beetle's aggressive mating behavior favors its gene type over its competitor's but harms the species: http://www.mediadesk.uzh.ch/articles/2011/paarungsverhalten_en.html Matt ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. 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