List, Ozzie, Clark: In regard to recent exchanges on open axiomatic frameworks, it is of critical importance to denote the distinctions between Newton's statements about the "hypothetical" and the nine terms of trichotomy.
For a summary of Newton's views, See Ernan McMullin's : http://www.paricenter.com/library/papers/mullin02.php The Impact of Newton's Principia on the Philosophy of Science Ernan McMullin Department of Philosophy University of Notre Dame, and, equally importantly, http://www.pitt.edu/~mem208/courses/phph_s15/documents/mcmullin_the_origin_of_the_field_concept.pdf Further, a critical distinction between the logic of physics and the logic of chemistry (as represented in CSP's nine terms of his trichotomy) is the hypothesis of "gravitons" as mathematical objects (nominialistic philosophy?) and the hypothesis of chemical elements (electrical particles) in the chemical table of elements. For CSP, the role of the index (molecular formula) lies at the center of his tabulation of operators. This concept of index is both the consequence of the chemical analysis and the antecedent of the arguments that generate the legisigns. If I understand Clark's post, his concern is his allegiance to the habits of physicists to invoke variables as universal explanatory operators. A consequence of such habits of physical scientists is the LOSS of relations with pragmatic indices of nature. Or, stated in more philosophical terms, apodictic signs are replaced by mathematical imagination and imaginary numbers. In my view, a critical distinction that crisply separates CSP logic and physical logic (such as hypothetical gravitons) is centered precisely on the role of indices. The example of molecular numbers as indices of integers and the derived physical (molecular) structures (such as DNA, RNA, Proteins and metabolites) illustrate the conundrum faced by both the semantics and syntax of physical symbols. Such physical structures are simply beyond the language of physical variables. So, in order to paper-over the logical conundrums, the language of physics constructs hypothetical mathematical structures (n-dimensional spaces) that bear minimal connections to reality. I believe that the history of physics is rich enough to remain apodictic and to work with local operators as well as the special cases invoking universal operators such as symmetry. It appears to me that most (if not nearly all physicists) have abandoned apodictism. CSP did not. Cheers Jerry On Oct 21, 2015, at 12:07 PM, Ozzie wrote: > Clark ~ > It doesn't seem to me that you've followed the thread of my argument. If you > have, then I'll simply say that I disagree with each of your major points. > > Regarding physics and gravitons: I asserted they are hypothetical. That is > widely known, and you didn't dispute it. People do not use hypotheticals > when they can instead rely on facts and reality. So physicists really do not > know what causes gravity; they have an unverified theory. I asserted that > physicists were stalled -- unable to explain gravity in a satisfactory way > without resorting to hypothetical particles. Your response: "It makes sense > by symmetry to assume gravity does the same sorts of things." Yes, it makes > sense, if the prior unverified logic is correct, and if symmetry applies. > That's two "ifs," each with a probability of less than one, multiplied > together. That is the analytical black box I described, with an admixture of > contents both real and imagined. That black box with gravitons inside also > gets a lot of strings, particles and extra dimensions gratuitously thrown > into it by each Nobel-hopeful, which explains your lament: "Sadly physics > went down a theoretical dead end alley in my opinion." Yet, you seem to like > that black box, as long as you first approve of its unverified contents. > > Maybe some day physicists will have the empirical data they require to answer > these questions. They're certainly working on it, so I consider their black > box exercises as hypotheticals to eventually be tested/verified. However, > those working on empirical issues regarding the physical mechanisms of > cognitive logic are brain researchers, not philosophers. Each successful > test of their theories moves purely philosophical (non-empirical) theories of > logic toward the margin. > > Regards, > Tom Wyrick > > > > On Oct 20, 2015, at 9:44 PM, CLARK GOBLE <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >>> On Oct 20, 2015, at 1:13 PM, Ozzie <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> I believe your discomfort arises from the fact that at the frontiers of >>> knowledge (in any discipline), logical abduction tips over into speculation >>> when objects do not have Pragmatic interpretants, and are replaced by >>> nominalistic black-box mechanisms whose true properties are unknown. That >>> leaves each "thinker" free to assign "reasonable" properties to the >>> mechanism, and to challenge others for doing the same -- except when they >>> happen to agree. >>> >>> This happens in all disciplines, as when physicists stalled out on gravity, >>> then conceived of a new "graviton" particle emitted by atoms to explain it. >>> They've never seen a graviton, but "it must be there." (They stay busy >>> exploring the inside of their black box by smashing atoms in >>> rarefied/unrealistic environments.) >> >> Not to get pedantic (and of course as soon as I say that I know I’m doomed). >> However I think the reason physics like the idea of graviton “particles” is >> because when you reformulate quantum mechanics in more of a lagrangian form >> rather than the hamiltonian you get virtual particles being exchanged. This >> is why Feynman was so famous with QED. He basically shifted how we do >> quantum and then gave it a more traditional pseudo-Newtonian interpretation >> in terms of particles being exchanged. Once you are able to do that with >> electro-magnetism it makes sense to at least discuss it with everything >> else. QCD soon followed for the weak and strong forces. It makes sense by >> symmetry to assume gravity does the same sorts of things. >> >> So I don’t think this came from physicists stalling out. I think the >> stalling out came more due to a lack of interesting empirical data that >> could lead them to good theories. We have dark matter with not enough >> empirical data to say much about it. Ditto dark energy. Then pushing >> symmetries gave supersymmetry and then string theory. Sadly physics went >> down a theoretical dead end alley in my opinion. I’m not sure gravitons are >> because it’s stuck though. Those came from the very productive period from >> the rise of QED through to the beginnings of string theory. >> >> Largely we’re stuck because there’s just not enough data. At least Einstein >> had the results of the falsification of the aether to work with. >> >> The larger issue of speculation and abduction is a good one. The line >> between where we use our term “speculation” and what Peirce would be >> comfortable with using abduction for is a good one. There’s a certain >> mystery and ambiguity to the term. It’s that logic where we’re apt to guess >> right. Which separates it from mere guessing of course. >> >> Whether that relates to interpretants and nominalistic black boxes is an >> interesting one. I’m not really a fan of Dewey’s move towards >> instrumentalism for various reasons. While I’ve no idea if he ever read >> Dewey, Feynman’s famous approach to physics definitely is a very >> instrumentalist one. Now is “instrumentalism as received” in philosophy of >> science (especially the hard sciences) really what Dewey meant? I confess >> I’m not enough of a Dewy expert to know. It’s one of those things I’ve been >> meaning to read up more on for years. >> >> I’m curious what others think a Peircean critique of Dewey would be on this >> point. >> >>> If someone claims that plants can/do communicate with each other, we would >>> expect them to connect all of the logical dots in that story -- the >>> physical components of plants that permits them to broadcast and receive >>> signals, the nature of the electrochemical signals, factors in the >>> environment that affect signaling, etc. If logic occurs in plants, we >>> would insist, show us exactly how it operates. >> >> While that would be desirable I’m not sure it’s necessary to establish that >> they do communication. Often we known “that” something happens long before >> we know “how.” (Not always of course - sometimes we learn the mechanism and >> then look at implications of how it functions) >> >>> Focusing solely on human cognition, then, here is my first Pragmatic >>> question about semiotic logic: If an object has interpretants, WHERE do >>> those (object+interpretants) reside in the brain, and WHAT links them >>> together? >> >> >> Why do they have to reside in the brain? A great example of this objection >> would be Christopher Nolan’s film Memento where the interpretants exist as >> traces on the protagonists skin as tatoos. The notion of interpretants as >> traces (which arises out of the analysis of the creation of matter in >> Plato’s Timaeus although it’s also key in Derrida’s take on semiotics) is >> very useful to my eyes. We often want semiotics to entail a certain bias of >> how texts functions whereas I think Peirce in particular is far more >> sophisticated in his notion signs. No doubt in part due to that appreciate >> of the Timaeus but also various writers on signs from late antiquity and the >> medieval era. >> >> We should of course also distinguish between kinds of interpretants. Between >> the final interpretant, the immediate interpretant and dynamic interpretant. >> To ask where the interpretant is first requires the context of asking what >> sign we are analyzing. >> >>> I do believe that human cognition employs semiotic logic, but belief >>> without an operational mechanism means that our views belong in the >>> nominalist, black-box category. It is inconsistent to believe that a >>> physical brain evolved/optimized to carry out Pragmatic logic does so in a >>> way divorced from physical reality. >> >> I think this confuses things somewhat. In terms of analyzing signs we can >> always break them up into sub-signs. (And given Peirce’s theory of >> continuity presumably indefinitely) At some point as a practical matter >> we’ll always reach a point of ignorance. I’m not sure how we can say that is >> nominalistic though. Peirce’s conception of scholastic realism seems to >> allow for real structures to be real. So a black box analysis if it is a >> real regularity is the exact opposite of nominalistic. It’s nominalistic to >> require that knowledge is only knowledge if we know all the material parts. >> So I think you’ve made an unfortunate inversion here. >> >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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