Forwarded ( Clark sent this, but did not CC this list serve.) On Oct 21, 2015, at 1:52 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
> >> On Oct 21, 2015, at 12:07 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> In regard to recent exchanges on open axiomatic frameworks, it is of >> critical importance to denote the distinctions between Newton's statements >> about the "hypothetical" and the nine terms of trichotomy. > > Just to be clear, I’ve not really discussed the larger topics. I’ve not read > the links that have been given. I’ve just been commenting on specific bits > related to Peirce and to what I see is misunderstanding the evolution within > science. I hope to go back through the links this weekend. Alas I have > limited time (which is why I often go weeks between posts) > >> If I understand Clark's post, his concern is his allegiance to the habits of >> physicists to invoke variables as universal explanatory operators. A >> consequence of such habits of physical scientists is the LOSS of relations >> with pragmatic indices of nature. Or, stated in more philosophical terms, >> apodictic signs are replaced by mathematical imagination and imaginary >> numbers. > > I suspect I’d say structures rather than variables. That is that structures > are broad and underlie a lot of phenomena. Variables can of course refer as > an index to many things including other structures. As such they have a sign > like function. I was more thinking in terms of what the equations point to. > So one level removed from an analysis of the logic of equations scientists > use. > > I think it is characteristic of physicists to make a double move of trying to > see how expansive such structures are (with the goal being universal laws) > while recognizing the limits our empirical investigations allow. The problems > of errors in measurement and what other laws might be causing deformations > from an expected law is one. (That is the ideal gas law is idealized and > never found in nature - and arguably this is true of most law) Then the > problems that of course we can only test a range of contexts. Thus physicists > often say Newton’s Laws are true in a certain set of areas but not at small > scale or massive scale. I’m not sure that’s a fair way to put it, but > physicists often get at the limits due to testing because of this. > > So the double move of a physicist is this expansion by trusting > laws/structures and then skepticism of such expansion. (Again this is more a > claim about intents and aims of scientists) > > The issue of losing indices seems just incorrect. First of course real > structures (the scholastic realism) have an indexical component. We can here > get into a bit of a debate regarding the debates about Platonism and how > particulars exemplify forms. I’m not sure that’s necessary in a Peircean > approach since any form that is exemplifying the form entails an indexical > relationship I’d think. To the degree a physicists thinks structures are real > (acknowledging the philosophical confusion of the typical physicist) and sees > those structures in phenomena there is always an explicit and implicit > assumption of an index. So equations as signs are representational of the > structures but also entail an indexical relationship to the degree they are > physics and not mathematics. > > This divide between physics and mathematics is something I think key to the > self-identity of physicists as physicists. It’s certainly a major component > of both sides in the rancorous string debates that are now winding down. > > >> In my view, a critical distinction that crisply separates CSP logic and >> physical logic (such as hypothetical gravitons) is centered precisely on the >> role of indices. The example of molecular numbers as indices of integers >> and the derived physical (molecular) structures (such as DNA, RNA, Proteins >> and metabolites) illustrate the conundrum faced by both the semantics and >> syntax of physical symbols. Such physical structures are simply beyond the >> language of physical variables. So, in order to paper-over the logical >> conundrums, the language of physics constructs hypothetical mathematical >> structures (n-dimensional spaces) that bear minimal connections to reality. > > Physicists often can get “lost in the equations” such that the indexical > relationship is forgotten. I think that socially this is generally seen as a > negative. Physics without the index is just mathematics. They must always be > kept in mind. > > The hypothetical aspect is hypothetical in two ways it seems to me in a > Peircean framework. First there is the issue of doubt/belief. Generally > hypothesis and especially speculative theoretical hypothesis just aren’t > believed in strongly as a practical matter. Second they are usually seen > initially as models to be put forth for verification and falsification. That > is to be a *scientific* hypothesis the index is key since it is only in the > indexical relationship that they can function. > > Any logic that neglects this empirical aspect just isn’t a logic of science. > > I just don’t see how Peirce’s logic and a logic dealing with gravitons is > different here. > > Perhaps it would be useful at this point to where in Peirce’s writings you > see the disagreement? I recognize you see the difference as between the > language of physical variables and physical structures and abstract entities > without warrant. However it seems to me the live debate in science is how > long to entertain an idea until it has warrant. > > I suspect this gets us at Ben’s comment about patience. I also suspect we > should keep clear whether we are doing phenomenology, logic of analysis, or > psychology. As Ben also hinted at. My sense is that we may all be talking > past one an other because we’re using similar terms but speaking of different > things. To be explicit, my comments were primarily about the psychology of > scientists (i.e. their motivations) and then secondarily certain elements of > logic as tied to empirics. > > > > > > >
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