Gary F. list, I agree with this analysis, Gary, and those in your earlier notes on the topic.
I think that another interesting research project might be to sort out how and when and where Peirce uses first, second, and third to refer to his categories rather than these words merely referring to 'entities'. Although early in his career he sometimes uses first, second, and third to refer to categories with no suffix -ness added, is there a moment when he clearly switches over to the from with the -ness suffix? In the *Commens* examples of Thirdness one sees him using 'Third' to refer to his third category as late as 1888 in 'A Guess at the Riddle', while with the 1894 'The List of Categories: A Second Essay' (CP 1.328) he first (among these excerpts) uses Thirdness to refer to his third category. Had there been any process intervening between the causal act and the effect, this would have been a medial, or third, element. *Thirdness*, in the sense of the category, is the same as mediation. In all the following examples at *Commens.* 'Thirdness' is used to identify the category. I should, however, add that in the 1903 Harvard Lectures he uses the expression 'Category the Third' as well as Thirdness, and in several subsequent entries, having identified the category as 'Thirdness', he goes on to discuss firsts, seconds, and thirds in a context where there can be no question as to their representing the categories (however, this seems rare). In any event, this could make for an interesting--and useful--chapter in a dissertation. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* On Wed, Oct 28, 2015 at 1:25 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > I am tempted to quote Howard Pattee here: “any analytical approach to > understanding simplicity always turns out to be very complex” (Pattee 1973, > 73). If you want to diagram all the implications of Peirce’s definition, > you will need the entire system of Existential Graphs. > > > > Peirce says, “Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it > is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other.” To me this > is equivalent to saying “Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is > such as it is, in bringing two other entities into relation to each other.” > > > > I think the perceived problem may arise from trying to assign some kind of > metaphysical substantiality to the terms “second” and “third” in Peirce’s > sentence. The reference is simply to the other two ‘entities’ (“ideas” or > “things”, to use Peirce’s words) in a triadic relation. (The reason for the > scare-quotes there should be obvious enough.) > > > > Gary f. > > > > } What expresses *itself* in language, *we* cannot express by means of > language. [Wittgenstein, Tractatus 4.121] { > > http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: 28-Oct-15 11:41 > To: [email protected]; PEIRCE-L <[email protected]> > Subject: [biosemiotics:8918] Re: Peirce's categories > > > > Hi Gary F., Kobus, Lists, > > > > For my part, I don't think the point Peirce is making in this sentence > itself is all that simple: "Thirdness is the mode of being of that which > is such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each > other." (CP 8.328) > > > > There are a number of ways of trying to diagram such a relation. Does one > of the possible ways capture something that Peirce is trying to say is > really basic? Pick any of the ways that this combination of a second and a > third might be diagrammed and see if it is adequate for articulating what > Peirce is doing in the richer discussions of the ways theses relations are > brought together, such as in the essay on "The Logic of Mathematics, an > attempt to develop my categories from within" or in the two essays on the > nomenclature and division of dyadic and triadic relations. These essays > raise hard questions about what Peirce is saying about the ways that dyads > and triads can be combined. Or, I find it hard to tease it all out. If > there is some simple way to explain what he is doing in these essays, I'm > all ears. > > > > --Jeff > > > > Jeff Downard > > Associate Professor > > Department of Philosophy > > NAU > > (o) 523-8354 > > ________________________________________ > > From: [email protected] [[email protected]] > > Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 6:23 AM > > To: [email protected] > > Subject: [biosemiotics:8917] Re: Peirce's categories > > > > I have to confess that I don't see the problem here, or the need for an > elaborate explanation. Peirce's sentence seems to me perfectly clear in its > context (CP 8.328): > > > > > > > > [[ The ideas of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are simple enough. > Giving to being the broadest possible sense, to include ideas as well as > things, and ideas that we fancy we have just as much as ideas we do have, I > should define Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness thus: > > > > Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively > and without reference to anything else. > > > > Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with > respect to a second but regardless of any third. > > > > Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing > a second and third into relation to each other. > > > > I call these three ideas the cenopythagorean categories. ]] > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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