Thanks Matt,
I should mention that Peirce’s own usage is sometimes a bit more complex than
this schema would suggest. For instance he sometimes refers to “a Secondness”
or “a Thirdness,” as if the mode of being were itself a being. But that’s just
hypostatic abstraction at work, and I think Peirce’s terminology is always
clear enough in its context.
} Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. [Einstein] {
<http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
From: Matt Faunce [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 29-Oct-15 16:32
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8927] Re: Peirce's categories
Correction, relata is plural. Relatum is singular. So, take two:
The word Secondness refers to the category or mode.
The word Second (capital S) refers to the referent which is in the mode of
Secondness because of its relation to a single relatum (but no other).
The word second (small s) refers to the relatum from above.
Matt
On 10/29/15 11:04 AM, [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> wrote:
Kobus, from this response, it seems to me that you still haven’t got the point
I was trying to make. So I’ll try once more (but that’s about all I will have
time for, until next week). I’m also copying to the Peirce list since this is
more about Peirce than biosemiotics.
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are all modes of being. They are not
entities or beings. These modes of being are defined by Peirce in terms of how
a being’s relation (or lack of relation) to other beings makes that being what
it is.
Let X = the being.
Firstness is the mode of being of X if X is what it is “positively and without
reference to anything else.” Such an X can be called “a First,” but this X is
by definition unrelated to anything else; there is nothing else in its
universe, and consequently nothing we can say about it that will locate it in
any universe. So it is not the first of a series.
If X is “such as it is with respect to a second but regardless of any third,”
then its mode of being is Secondness. For example, if X is an effort, it cannot
be that without resistance; there is no effort without resistance, no
resistance without effort. We can designate resistance then as Y. So we can say
that each of them is Second to the other, or “a Second.” The presence of the
other in its universe, and nothing else, makes each of them what it is. If we
think of them as a pair, or a series of two, it is completely arbitrary which
one we call X and which we call Y; and it is completely arbitrary which of them
is first or second in the series. That use of the words “first” and “second”
has nothing to do with Firstness or Secondness as Peirce is defining them.
Now let’s take an X which “is such as it is, in bringing a second and third
into relation to each other.” For example, if X is a gift, it must be given by
somebody (let’s say Y) to somebody else (Z). We can say that X is what it is
only because it brings Y into relation with Z. We can also say that Y, as
giver, brings X into relation with Z; and that Z, as recipient, brings X into
relation with Y (remember we’re talking about logical relations, not human
relations). X is what it is because of its unique role in the triadic relation
with Y and Z; and the same applies to the other two. Each of them is in the
mode of being Peirce calls Thirdness. So you could say that each of them is “a
Third.”
But if you’re just counting these beings, rather than ascertaining their mode
of being, it is completely arbitrary which one you count as first, or second,
or third. What counts is that there are three relata here, each of which is
made what it is by its role in the triadic relation. It is also irrelevant what
sort of commodity X is, or what sort of person Y is, or what the gender of Z
is. Thirdness is a mode of being, it is not an attribute or quality of a given
being. And the same applies to the other two modes.
Now to your questions: I’ve inserted brief answers into your message below,
hoping that the explanation is given above.
Gary f.
--
Matt
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