> > I hope that you will have patience with what may be a very ignorant question. > In CP8.328, Perice defines thirdness as follows: > Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a > second and third into relation to each other. > > Now, I would have thought that thirdness brings a first and a second into > relation to each other. Why would Peirce say that thirdness brings a second > and a third into relation to each other? In which sense could thirdness bring > a second into relation with itself? Or what am I missing here?
I assume he means the relationship between quality/feeling and force in terms of phenomenology. At least that’s how I’ve always taken it. The other way to think of it is in the more ontological rather than phenomenological realm. That is the connection between actuality and potential. Firstness is pure potential while secondness is actuality. However the move from potential to actuality depends upon Peirce’s semiotic realism (or objective idealism). I’d again point to Kelly Parker’s “Peirce as a neoPlatonist” that I’ve referred to several times over the last week. While again I note there are a few problems in it, I think it does a fantastic job getting at how Peirce conceived of this ontologically. At least how he did in his early period. I’d love to read Jeffrey’s paper if he’s interested in sharing - although I won’t get to it until this weekend. Halloween and children being cooperative of course.
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