Frances to Edwina and others--- (This topic threads away from the current subject.)
It is my understanding that for Peirceanism there may be representamen that at least can be felt by some phanerisms to be objects, but such representamen that are not yet signs. It is my further phenomenal guess that there may be representamen that are felt as phenomena but not even as objects. It is therefore assumed by me that for Peirce all stuff that may be felt in the objective or subjective world is inaccessible and can only be indirectly accessed by any phanerism through hazy phenomena, some phenomena of which may not even be representamen and some of which may indeed be representamen. This guess entails that the stuff of the world can only be realized by phanerisms as phenomena, so that phenomena representationally stands for the whole world as a kind of analogous surrogate, including that of the phenomenal world. For advanced phanerisms who can not only feel, but who can also feel they sense and will and think and know and remember and learn and reason, then to dispel doubt about what phenomena is given uncontrolled to them, they can use phenomena that are representamen and even phenomenal representamen that are signs. In the vast hazy world felt by phanerisms as being of continuent phenomenal thingness, there may seem to be phanerons that are not representamen and there may seem to be phanerons that are representamen; and furthermore there may seem to be representamen that are not signs and there may seem to be representamen that are signs. The likely process that makes phenomenal representamen of any kind outside or inside semiosis is that of phenomenal representation. My reading of Peirce is that any representamen that emerges must seemingly be felt as a phenomenon, and cannot be other than a phenomenon nor solely alone on its own independent of phenomena; but the phenomenal representamen need not be an object or a sign, to be either continuent or existent. What is felt sensed or felt known of the world to enabled phanerisms is the seeming phenomenal haze of likely represented stuff that is inaccessible yet is guessed indirectly to be a real true fact. The feeling phanerism furthermore could presumably be a mechanism of matter like an atomic neutrino, or an organism of life like a biotic microbe and a scientific thinker. Assuming that all this fuss about the various states of feeling and phenomena is so, then the issue here might turn on the role of the phenomenal categories in being the very observable but hazy stuff of feeling and phenomena. If a phaneron is felt by a phanerism to not be a representamen, or alternatively to be a representamen that is not a sign, just exactly what phenomenal category is to be assigned to that hazy stuff becomes hazy. Any emerging continuent phenomena not felt by a phanerism to be a representamen or a sign would possibly be felt as a fleeting firstness only, and thus would be like a closed triune that is not further divisible externally by the categories, but as phenomena and thus as categorial it might nonetheless be an evolving internal trichotomy that continues to evolve. Icons as phenomenal representamen that exist as objective signs for example would seem to eventually be in semiosis and in semiotics a closed triune. An icon is classed as a hypoicon and then as an appearance and then say as a similarity, but it is not divisible any further externally. At this point it becomes a closed triune, and also preparatory to indexes. The iconic triune internally however is classed as a growing trichotomy in waiting as an image and diagram and metaphor. The last class of any phenomenal category would likely be felt as a closed triune and felt as pure firstness, whether the phenomena of feeling is a sign or an object or a representamen or a mere phaneron. It is likely that signing permeates most of the represented phenomenal world that is felt by most phanerisms. Whether feeling however permeates the whole wide world of felt phenomena is unclear to me. It may be that feeling alone at its broadest might further be of the inaccessible stuff of the world beyond hazy phenomena and categoria, but such "nomenal" or "epiphenomenal" stuff of the "menal" world would extend infinitely beyond phenomenal sentience and experience and intelligence. The state of reality may only be available and limited to able humans in the form of existent phenomenal objects. If this is a fact, then for any object or phenomena to be felt as real to them, at least some part of it must be felt to be sensed; so that phenomena is only as real as sense, and only hazy phenomena can be felt sensed as real. Extending feeling beyond the surrogacy of phenomena may simply not be realistic or necessary. PS--- It might be clearer to hold representamen that are sign vehicles within "grammatic" or informative semiosis and semiotics to be say "representants" rather than representamen; but this jargon may be wrong in a Peircean vein, if all representamen are to be held only as signs. ------ Edwina to Frances--- I'm not sure of your focus. There is no such thing as a 'representamen' all by itself, so, no such thing as a 'representamen that is not a sign'. The representamen is the mediate term or phase in the semiosic triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. It can function in any of the three modes of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. Check out 2.256 for the ten classes of Signs. ------ Frances to Edwina and Clark and others--- To muse the point, could it be for Peirce that pure feeling at least as "primal" phenomena and as felt by any basic "phanerism" might be a representamen that is not a sign, but that pure or sure feeling as felt by any mechanism of matter or organism of life could also be a representamen that is an object and a sign, with some categorial status say of at least firstness. This muse of course assumes metaphysically that there are representamen in the vast "phaneros" of phenomena that are not signs or that have not yet evolved as continuent things or existent objects to become and behave as signs to signers. ------
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