Frances, Edwina, list,
Just to straighten out the terminology here … For Peirce, a “representamen” is a correlate of a triadic relation, and a “sign” is a kind of representamen. By this definition, there can be representamens that are not signs; but empirically, Peirce has very little to say about them. Two passages from the 1903 “Syllabus” should make this clear: CP 2.242, EP2:290: A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A Sign is a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamens that have been much studied. CP2:274, EP2:273: A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs. Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun. But thought is the chief, if not the only, mode of representation. Gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 24-Nov-15 19:15 Frances. I'm not sure of your focus. There is no such thing as a 'representamen' all by itself, so, no such thing as a 'representamen that is not a sign'. The representamen is the mediate term or phase in the semiosic triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. It can function in any of the three modes of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. Check out 2.256 for the ten classes of Signs. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca <mailto:frances.ke...@sympatico.ca> To: 'Edwina Taborsky' <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> ; 'Clark Goble' <mailto:cl...@lextek.com> ; 'PEIRCE-L' <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Sent: Tuesday, November 24, 2015 6:45 PM Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments Frances to Edwina and Clark and others--- To muse the point, could it be for Peirce that pure feeling at least as "primal" phenomena and as felt by any basic "phanerism" might be a representamen that is not a sign, but that pure or sure feeling as felt by any mechanism of matter or organism of life could also be a representamen that is an object and a sign, with some categorial status say of at least firstness. This muse of course assumes metaphysically that there are representamen in the vast "phaneros" of phenomena that are not signs or that have not yet evolved as continuent things or existent objects to become and behave as signs to signers.
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