Gary F, list, Gary, your study is quite helpful and I look forward to its continuation. Before I comment in a separate post on a remark you made in your most recent installment, I'd like to say a few general things about semiosis as distinct from the abstract involutional analysis of classes of possible signs, exactly the table of ten classes.
Everyone agrees that for Peirce semiosis is a triadic process. But, as you've suggested, a confusion arises when his table of signs isn't put into an appropriate context. As I see it, speaking now only of each of the ten classes, it is *just *that,an abstract analysis of one of ten classes of *possible *signs*. *Further*,* even in the abstraction of Peirce's table, some of these classes cannot stand on their own and must be part of a more developed sign class when embodied (as you've already noted, Gary). To try to keep this as uncomplicated at possible, I'll consider only the first class, the rhematic iconic qualisign, or *qualisign* for short. Neither this sign nor any of the others of the ten classesr represent an actual *semiosis* (being that triadic quasi-movement whereas the object (2ns) determines the sign (1ns) for the interpretant sign (3ns). Rather, each is a class of that *kind of representamen* which Peirce calls a *sign *(thanks for making this point as clearly as you did, Gary, and with definitive textual support, as far as I'm concerned). And each is analyzed, *not* in the order of some impossible semiosis (in which absurd case this first sign, the qualisign, might wholly nonsensically be termed an iconic qualisignific rheme following the semiosic O -> S -> I formula just mentioned]). Rather, Peirce analyzes them involutionally whereas the Interpretant (3ns) *involves* the object (2ns) which in turn *involves* the sign itself (1ns) in order to render, in this case, the class rhematic iconic *qualisign * [following the *strictly analytical* formula, I involves O involves S (note, Peirce refers to this both as the order of involution and as the order of analysis, by which he means specifically categorial analysis from 3ns, through 2ns, to 1ns]. So, the first sign of ten, the *qualisign*, when embodied *will be* rhematic (qualitatively possible) in relation to its interpretant; it *will be* iconic in relation to its object; and it *will be*, as *the very sign that it is*, a sign of quality. Each of the ten classes require embodiment, and it is only then that we can even begin to speak of semiosis. Most agree, I assume, that the classification of signs belongs to semiotic grammar, the analysis of *how* signs can signify (and closely related matters). I'll discuss your intriguing comment in a separate post with a different Subject heading. Best, Gary [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Nov 28, 2015 at 12:10 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Continuing the study (begun yesterday) of Nomenclature and Divisions of > Triadic Relations: > > > > CP 2.238. Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, > according as the First, the Second, or the Third *Correlate*, > respectively, *is a mere possibility, an actual existent, or a law*. > These three trichotomies, taken together, divide all triadic relations into > ten classes. These ten classes will have certain subdivisions according as > the existent correlates are individual subjects or individual facts, and > according as the correlates that are laws are general subjects, general > modes of fact, or general modes of law. > > [If we substitute the names of the three Correlates of S-O-I as given in > 242 (yesterday), the first sentence tells us that this type of triadic > relation is divisible into three trichotomies. The first is according to > whether the Sign is a mere possibility (i.e. qualisign), an actual existent > (sinsign), or a law (legisign). The second is according to whether the > Object is a mere possibility, an actual existent, or a law. The third is > according to whether the Interpretant is a mere possibility, an actual > existent, or a law. Due to the principle cited just previously (235-7), > this would give us ten classes of S-O-I. But only the first trichotomy > gives us classes *of Signs*, and only that one is used by Peirce to > define the ten types *of signs*. In this essay he does not elaborate > further on the other two trichotomies, or the ten classes of triadic > relations they would generate, or their subdivisions.] > > > > 239. There will be besides a second similar division of triadic relations > into ten classes, *according as the dyadic relations which they > constitute between* either *the First and Second Correlates*, or the > First and Third, or the Second and Third *are of the nature of > possibilities, facts, or laws*; and these ten classes will be subdivided > in different ways. > > [This would give us a second set of trichotomies that would generate ten > classes of triadic relation, but again, Peirce uses only the first of those > trichotomies in his analysis of sign types. This trichotomy is according as > the dyadic relations between Sign and Object (constituted by the S-O-I > relation) are of the nature of possibilities (icon), facts (index), or laws > (symbol). Or as Peirce puts it in 243, “according as the relation of the > sign to its object consists in the sign's having some character in itself, > or in some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an > interpretant”; for that last relation can only be a law, or habit, in > Peircean terms.] > > > > 240. It may be convenient to collect the ten classes of either set of ten > into three groups according as all three of the correlates or dyadic > relations, as the case may be, are of different natures, or all are of the > same nature, or two are of one nature while the third is of a different > nature. > > [As far as I can see, Peirce does not attempt such a collection in NDTR. > That leaves Peirce’s third trichotomy of Signs unaccounted for, so far; and > my guess is that this trichotomy can only apply to *genuine* triadic > relations, such as are embodied in the processes of *representing* and > *determining* — which in my opinion are both genuine, partly because they > are mirror images of each other. But the next paragraph contains the only > replica of the word “genuine” in NDTR, and Peirce does not use its antonym > term “degenerate” here at all, so I’ll say no more about it here.) > > > > 241. In every *genuine* Triadic Relation, the First Correlate may be > regarded as determining the Third Correlate in some respect; and *triadic > relations may be divided according as that determination of the Third > Correlate is to having some quality, or to being in some existential > relation to the Second Correlate, or to being in some relation of thought > to the Second for something.* > > [Again substituting the semiotic terms for the more general names of the > Correlates, this tells us that the Sign determines the Interpretant in some > respect; and this gives us Peirce’s third trichotomy of Signs: according as > that determination of the Interpretant is to having some quality (rheme), > or to being in some existential relation to the Object (dicisign), or to > being in some relation of thought to the Object for something (argument). > > > > That brings us to the point where we left off yesterday, CP 2.242, which > is followed by Peirce’s definition of the three trichotomies which will > give us his ten classes of signs. And that’s where I’ll leave it for > today. — gary f.] > > > > 242. A *Representamen* is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the > Second Correlate being termed its *Object,* and the possible Third > Correlate being termed its *Interpretant,* by which triadic relation the > possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same > triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A > *Sign* is a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a > mind. Signs are the only representamens that have been much studied. > > 243. Signs are divisible by three trichotomies: first, according as the > sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general > law; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its object consists > in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential > relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant; thirdly, > according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as > a sign of fact or a sign of reason. > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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