> On Nov 30, 2015, at 10:02 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > I agree that Peirce does not start with firstness in that sense that "in the > beginning there was 1ns." And I agree that 1ns cannot be separated from the > other Pythagorean categories (although, admittedly, in some of his > cosmological writings, often quoted, it does sound as if he 'begins' there; > perhaps he saw things better later as a consequence of his deep studies in > continuity).
I’m very interested in what you write and might reread the relevant sections when I have a minute. I’m curious as to your seeing a big difference through the era. I once was of that opinion but some of the cosmological musings where Peirce starts with nothingness are fairly late. Now as I’ve been at pains to note, I am not sure I necessarily believe Peirce here. I’d be much more partial myself to what you outline of 3rdness first. The section I quoted earlier this evening (I think ~ CP 6.200 is RLT - page 258 in the Putnam edition) The confusion is I suspect due to the Platonic forms being evolved or coming into being. That would seem to suggest evolution (and thus 3rdness) is prior to the forms or firstness. However I think the move of vagueness means this is a tad trickier than it appears at first glance. On page 259 we have the discussion of sense-quality as feeling. Such a definite potentiality can emerge from the indefinite potentiality only by its own vital Firstness, and spontaneity. here is this magenta color. What originally made such a quality of feeling possible? Evidently nothing but itself. It is a first. Yet we must not assume that the qualities arose separate and came into relation afterward. It was just the reverse. The general indefinite potentiality became limited and heterogeneous. Those who express the idea to themselves by saying that the Divine Creator determined so and so, may be incautiously clothing the idea in a garb that is open to criticism. but it is, after all, substantially the only philosophical answer to the problem. Namely, they represent the ideas as springing into a preliminary stage of being by their own inherent firstness. But so springing up they do not spring up isolated; for if they did, nothing could unite them. They spring up in reaction upon one another and thus into a kind of existence. This reaction and this existence these persons call the mind of God. […] The very first and most fundamental element that we have to assume is a Freedom or Chance or Spontaneity by virtue of which the general vague nothing-in-particularness that preceded the chaos took a thousand definite qualities. This is the standard neoplatonic conception where we have the One as pure spontaneity or potential and it’s privation that differentiates the forms and eventually leads to spirit (or in the Peircean conception thirdness) It’s this Firstness which is a continuum due to vagueness that later becomes differentiated. It’s this contraction of vagueness that enables the world of forms. This continuum of possibility is not thirdness but firstness. (See CP 6.455) It’s true that in this emergence there is an element of secondness and thirdness. As evolution continues secondness predominates and then thirdness. Again I think Parker does a good job with this although there are a few issues I take exception with. I think the confusion is this already-relatedness that’s due to undifferentiated firstness. When differentiation takes place then you’re making a division in something that’s essentially unified. Thus even after differentiation takes place essential relations have to take place. So there is continuity due to Firstness. The continuity of Thirdness comes later. First you have what Peirce calls the quasi-flow (CP 1.412) However as habits develop (the symmetry breaking) then they get separated more (not less). Parker does a slightly more involved job on this topic in The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought starting around page 209. It’s more or less an expansion from that earlier paper. https://books.google.com/books?id=iy76kUCZYb0C&pg=PA209#v=onepage&q&f=false <https://books.google.com/books?id=iy76kUCZYb0C&pg=PA209#v=onepage&q&f=false> Again I think Parker gets some things wrong. But I more or less changed my mind several years ago over how to conceive of this evolution. Primarily because several key texts are fairly late. (I used to see this primarily as just of his early period)
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