Jeff, list, It would be helpful if you'd explain what exactly you find problematic in Nathan's outline. I may have some bones to pick with it myself--although I think it's generally useful--at very least for stimulating a discussion. But my 'bones' may be different from yours. So what bothers *you* here?
Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Dec 5, 2015 at 5:02 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Hello Gary F., List, > > I'd like to learn more about the way Peirce is drawing on the > phenomenological categories as he categorizes different kinds of signs and > sign relations. Focusing on this first division between qualisign, sinsign > and legisign, what guidance are we getting from Peirce's account of the > more degenerate and more genuine features of the categories. In "Peirce, > Phenomenology and Semiotics," (In the Routledge Companion to Semiotics), > Nathan Houser provides the following table as a way of clarifying Peirce's > account of the universal categories. > > Structure of the Phaneron > > 1. Universal categories: forms of firstness > a. Firstness > b. Secondness > c. Thirdness > > 2. Universal categories: forms of secondness > a. Qualia (facts of firstness) > b. Relation (facts of secondness) > c. Representamen (facts of thirdness) > > 3. Universal categories: forms of thirdness > a. Feeling (signs of firstness) > b. Brute fact (signs of secondness) > c. Thought (signs of thirdness) > > While I like the general idea of trying to figure out how the different > aspects of Peirce's account of the categories might be fitted together, I'm > not able to square what Nathan is providing in this table with the various > texts on phenomenology and phaneroscopy. Does anyone have suggestions for > how we might either justify this account or how we might modify it to make > it fit better with what Peirce says? > > The reason I ask is that Nathan offers a number of rich suggestions for > thinking about the ways that Peirce is drawing on the universal categories > in phenomenology for the purposes of setting up the 10-fold classification > of signs in the semiotic theory. As such, I'd like work this out in some > more detail. > > In order to stimulate some discussion, let me point out that Peirce offers > some interesting remarks about the degenerate forms of the universal > categories in the Collected Papers at 1.521-44. He describes, for > instance, the differences involved in the firstness and secondness of a > second, and the those involved in the firstness, secondness and thirdness > of a third. Any ideas about how we might draw on these distinctions for > the purposes of justifying or amending the kind of table that Nathan has > offered? > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: [email protected] [[email protected]] > Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 9:31 AM > To: 'Peirce-L' > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > Moving on to the first trichotomy of sign types in “Nomenclature and > Divisions of Triadic Relations”: > > CP 2.244: According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a > Qualisign, a Sinsign, or a Legisign. > A Qualisign is a quality which is a Sign. It cannot actually act as a sign > until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its > character as a sign. > [As a Sign, this “quality” must be a correlate of a triadic relation with > its Object and Interpretant, “by which triadic relation the possible > Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic > relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant” (CP > 2.242). Yet it cannot act as a sign until it is embodied, i.e. until it > becomes involved in at least a dyadic relation, and thus enters the > universe of existence. Yet its significance is its quality (not its > embodiment), and qualities being monadic, there is no real difference > between Sign and Object (or Interpretant either). So I think we might call > this a doubly degenerate kind of triadic relation, where the Sign is > virtually self-representing, and self-determining as its own Interpretant. > Compare the “self-sufficient” point on a map which Peirce offers as an > example of doubly degenerate Thirdness in his third Harvard Lecture, > EP2:162.) Or, since this degeneracy is relative, we can say that the > Qualisign is degenerate relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign (just > as the Icon is degenerate relative to the Index and the genuine Symbol, > according to Peirce in both the third Harvard lecture of 1903 and “New > Elements” of 1904). > > On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types > defined in NDTR, including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a > possible ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; and possibly > this problem is related to the concepts of embodiment, just introduced, and > of involvement, which is introduced in the next paragraph:] > > 245. A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning “being only > once,” as in single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual existent thing > or event which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that > it involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these > qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and only form a sign through being > actually embodied. > [Evidently it is the involvement of qualisigns in a Sinsign — which, I > suppose, constitutes their embodiment — that makes them “peculiar,” because > a “normal” Qualisign is disembodied (and does not act as a Sign). But > perhaps this will be clarified by the definition of Legisign, which I’ll > leave for the next post.] > > Gary f. > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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