Jeff, continuing my response to your post (copied below)
JD: In "Peirce, Phenomenology and Semiotics," (In the Routledge Companion to
Semiotics), Nathan Houser provides the following table as a way of clarifying
Peirce's account of the universal categories.
Structure of the Phaneron
1. Universal categories: forms of firstness a. Firstness b. Secondness c.
Thirdness
2. Universal categories: forms of secondness
a. Qualia (facts of firstness)
b. Relation (facts of secondness)
c. Representamen (facts of thirdness)
3. Universal categories: forms of thirdness
a. Feeling (signs of firstness)
b. Brute fact (signs of secondness)
c. Thought (signs of thirdness)
GF: This doesn’t quite match Table 6.2 in my copy of the book, which has “Sign”
instead of “Representamen” for 2.c., “Reaction” instead of “Brute Fact” for
3.b., and “Relations” (plural) for 2.b. — all of which seem preferable to me.
Like Gary R., I’d like to know where you see discrepancies with other Peirce
writings; I don’t see them, not even in the passage from the 1903 Lowell
lectures that you cite; hence no need for amending Nathan’s table.
Gary f.
} {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 5-Dec-15 17:02
To: 'Peirce-L' <[email protected]>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Hello Gary F., List,
I'd like to learn more about the way Peirce is drawing on the phenomenological
categories as he categorizes different kinds of signs and sign relations.
Focusing on this first division between qualisign, sinsign and legisign, what
guidance are we getting from Peirce's account of the more degenerate and more
genuine features of the categories. In "Peirce, Phenomenology and Semiotics,"
(In the Routledge Companion to Semiotics), Nathan Houser provides the following
table as a way of clarifying Peirce's account of the universal categories.
Structure of the Phaneron
1. Universal categories: forms of firstness a. Firstness b. Secondness c.
Thirdness
2. Universal categories: forms of secondness
a. Qualia (facts of firstness)
b. Relation (facts of secondness)
c. Representamen (facts of thirdness)
3. Universal categories: forms of thirdness
a. Feeling (signs of firstness)
b. Brute fact (signs of secondness)
c. Thought (signs of thirdness)
While I like the general idea of trying to figure out how the different aspects
of Peirce's account of the categories might be fitted together, I'm not able to
square what Nathan is providing in this table with the various texts on
phenomenology and phaneroscopy. Does anyone have suggestions for how we might
either justify this account or how we might modify it to make it fit better
with what Peirce says?
The reason I ask is that Nathan offers a number of rich suggestions for
thinking about the ways that Peirce is drawing on the universal categories in
phenomenology for the purposes of setting up the 10-fold classification of
signs in the semiotic theory. As such, I'd like work this out in some more
detail.
In order to stimulate some discussion, let me point out that Peirce offers some
interesting remarks about the degenerate forms of the universal categories in
the Collected Papers at 1.521-44. He describes, for instance, the differences
involved in the firstness and secondness of a second, and the those involved in
the firstness, secondness and thirdness of a third. Any ideas about how we
might draw on these distinctions for the purposes of justifying or amending the
kind of table that Nathan has offered?
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
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