Hi Gary R., Gary F., (and Nathan and Ben if you reading this), List,

My aim is to see how the methods for attaining the three grades of clarity 
about the conceptions of relative, relationship and relation might give us 
insight into the phenomenological account of the categories in their more 
genuine and more degenerate forms.  One reason I am focusing on this approach 
to the problem is that, in the Carnegie Application, Peirce characterizes the 
techniques we should use in phenomenology in the following way:

"My aim in this paper, upon which I have bestowed more labor than upon any 
other, beginning two years before my first publication on the subject in May 
1867, is far more ambitious than that of Kant, or even that of Aristotle, or 
even the more extended work of Hegel. All those philosophers contented 
themselves mainly with arranging conceptions which were already current. I, on 
the contrary, undertake to look directly |103| upon the universal phenomenon, 
that is, upon all that in any way appears, whether as fact or as fiction; to 
pick out the different kinds of elements which I detect in it, aided by a 
special art developed for the purpose; and to form clear conceptions of those 
kinds, of which I find that there are only three, aided by another special art 
developed for that purpose.*"  In his discussion of this passage, Joe Ransdell 
asked on the Arisbe site what this second special art might amount to.  I tried 
to answer his question by lining these special arts up with Peirce's account in 
the Harvard Lectures of 1903 of the faculties we need to employ in doing 
phenomenology.  Here is what he says there:  

1.  The first is "that rare faculty, the faculty of seeing what stares one in 
the face, just as it presents itself, unreplaced by any interpretation, 
unsophisticated by any allowance for this or supposed modifying circumstance."
2.  The second faculty "is a resolute discrimination which fastens itself like 
a bulldog upon the particular feature that we are studying, follows it wherever 
it may lurk, and detects it beneath all its disguises." 
3.  The third faculty "is the generalizing power of the mathematician who 
produces the abstract formula that comprehends the very essence of the feature 
under examination purified from all admixture of extraneous and irrelevant 
accompaniments." (Essential Peirce, vol. 2, p. 147).

On my interpretation of the remarks in the Carnegie application, the faculty 
described in (1) is the first of the special arts he describes, and the faculty 
described in (3) is the second special art.  My hunch is that, for the purposes 
of phenomenological analysis (as opposed to logical analysis), the first of the 
faculties is essential for arriving at the first grade of clarity, the second 
of the faculties is essential for arriving at the second grade of clarity, and 
the third faculty is essential for arriving at the third grade of clarity.  The 
efforts made at the later stages in clarifying our ideas build on the results 
arrived at the earlier stages.  In doing so, we need to correct for possible 
errors made in the earlier stages.

So, if we put these three faculties to work, how might we arrive at a third 
grade of clarity about the phenomenological categories?  This, I think, is not 
an easy question.  For starters, let just compare the different sets of terms 
that Peirce uses in the various drafts of the Carnegie application to describe 
the universal categories to the table that Nathan provides in his essay.  Here 
is the list the Joe Ransdell provides:
1. quality, relation, representation
2. flavor, reaction, mediation
3. qualities of feeling, reaction, mediation
4. qualities, occurrences, meanings
5. qualities, things, meanings
6. simple qualities, subjects of force, mind
7. quality, reaction, mediation
8. quales, relates, representation
9. feeling or immediate consciousness, sense of fact, conception or mind 
strictly

Once again, here is Nathan's list:

Structure of the Phaneron
1.  Universal categories:  forms of firstness
a.  Firstness
b.  Secondness
c.  Thirdness

2. Universal categories:  forms of secondness
a. Qualia (facts of firstness)
b. Relation (facts of secondness)
c. Representamen (facts of thirdness)

3.  Universal categories:  forms of thirdness
a.  Feeling (signs of firstness)
b.  Brute fact (signs of secondness)
c.  Thought (signs of thirdness)

I see that Nathan is taking the most general terms used for the universal of 
the categories (firstness, secondness and thirdness), which he takes to be 
forms of firstness, and he is trying to line these up with forms of secondness 
and forms of thirdness.  The main idea in picking out a list for forms of 
secondness is that a representamen is taken to be a token instance of a 
continuous process of representation.  If we follow that general idea, we might 
try to picture qualia and relation as token instances of an occurance of a 
quality of feeling, and an occurrence of a relation of secondness as a singular 
fact of experience.  Then, the forms of thirdness might be thought of as have 
the general character of feeling, and a statement of a general fact along with 
a continuous process of thought as a general phenomena as signs in minds.  That 
does match some of the features that Peirce appears to be emphasizing in the 
terminology he employs in some cases in the Carnegie application.  If this is 
what Nathan is doing, then the rationale does make some sense to me.  

The problem, as I see it, is that this is only one way to slice the pie.  
Another way to carve things up is to focus on the various forms of degeneracy 
and genuineness, and to make this the basis of the division between the kinds 
of categories.  Peirce is following this line of thought in the Lowell Lectures 
of 1902, and it isn't clear to me how we might map from one way of dividing 
things onto another.  My interpretative hypothesis is that the general line of 
thought that Nathan is trying to develop emphasizes the first and second of the 
faculties we need to employ in arriving at a second grade of clarity.  That is, 
he is drawing on the powers of the artist to see the nuances in the phenomena 
we observe "unreplaced by any interpretation" along with the power of resolute 
discrimination which "fastens itself like a bulldog upon the particular feature 
that we are studying, follows it wherever it may lurk, and detects it beneath 
all its disguises."  In order to work our way up to a third grade of clarity 
about the universal categories found in all phenomena that can possible be 
observed, we need to draw on the faculty that mathematicians employ in setting 
up their hypotheses and reasoning theorematically about those hypotheses.  If 
this is on the right track, then I think we need to take our lead from the 
mathematicians and examine the kinds of diagrams that are used to study the 
kinds of topological continuities and furcations that are possible in the 
simplest system of all--which is the topology of one dimension.  With this in 
hand, we can then look at kinds of systems of graphs that would result if we 
made all three kinds of relations--monadic, dyadic and triadic--as perspicuous 
as possible (and not just the first two, as Kempe does in developing his 
system).  That, at least, has been my strategy in working up to a third grade 
of clarity about the categories.  Does this seem like an approach that is 
faithful to the methods that Peirce recommends for developing better answers to 
the kinds of questions about the universal categories that Aristotle, Kant and 
Hegel were having such trouble answering?

--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [[email protected]]
Sent: Saturday, December 05, 2015 8:16 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Gary R., List,

My suggestion was that we look at what Peirce has to say about degenerate cases 
in the Lowell Lectures of 1903.  Let's start with the examination of seconds 
and secondness at CP 1.528.  Let me try to provide a little bit of order to 
what he says so that we can pinpoint anything that catches our attention:

1.  Thus we have a division of seconds into those whose very being, or 
Firstness, it is to be seconds, and those whose Secondness is only an accretion.
a.  This distinction springs out of the essential elements of Secondness.
b.  For Secondness involves Firstness.
c.  The concepts of the two kinds of Secondness are mixed concepts composed of 
Secondness and Firstness.
d.  One is the second whose very Firstness is Secondness.
e.  The other is a second whose Secondness is second to a Firstness.

2.  The idea of mingling Firstness and Secondness in this particular way is an 
idea distinct from the ideas of Firstness and Secondness that it combines.
a.  It appears to be a conception of an entirely different series of categories.
b.  At the same time, it is an idea of which Firstness, Secondness, and 
Thirdness are component parts, since the distinction depends on whether the two 
elements of Firstness and Secondness that are united are so united as to be one 
or whether they remain two.

3.  This distinction between two kinds of seconds, which is almost involved in 
the very idea of a second, makes a distinction between two kinds of Secondness;
a.  namely, the Secondness of genuine seconds, or matters, which I call genuine 
Secondness, and
b.  the Secondness in which one of the seconds is only a Firstness, which I 
call degenerate Secondness;
c.  so that this Secondness really amounts to nothing but this, that a subject, 
in its being a second, has a Firstness, or quality.

Notice that, in (1) and (3), he points to two distinctions:  two kinds of 
seconds; and two kinds of secondness.  It would help, I think, if we could pair 
up some examples of each of these things.  What would count as an example of 
the two sorts of seconds, and what would count as an example of each of the two 
sorts of secondness?

As we reflect on these distinctions and try to come up with some examples, I 
wonder how these distinctions compare to the table that Nathan has offered for 
the universal categories.  One thing that bothers me about Nathan's table is 
that it does not appear to match Peirce's account of these different sorts of 
degeneracy and genuiness of seconds and secondness.  The same holds when it 
comes to thirds and thirdness.  My aim is to trace, as best as we are able, 
Peirce's suggestions for how we should bring better clarity to our 
understanding of relatives, relationships and relations.  His recommendation is 
that we draw on the pragmatic maxim for clarifying our understanding of the key 
notions.  At the second grade of clarity, here is what we have:

I.  A relative, then, may be defined as the equivalent of a word or phrase 
which, either as it is (when I term it a complete relative), or else when the 
verb "is" is attached to it (and if it wants such attachment, I term it a 
nominal relative), becomes a sentence with some number of proper names left 
blank.
II.  A relationship, or fundamentum relationis, is a fact relative to a number 
of objects, considered apart from those objects, as if, after the statement of 
the fact, the designations of those objects had been erased.
III.  A relation is a relationship considered as something that may be said to 
be true of one of the objects, the others being separated from the relationship 
yet kept in view. Thus, for each relationship there are as many relations as 
there are blanks.

This account is meant to help us clarify our conceptions of logical relatives, 
relationships and relations.  How might this logical analysis help clarify the 
tones and conceptions that we are working with in phenomenology?  My hunch, and 
it is only a guess, is that it might help to think of what is first, second or 
third as kinds of relations, and of firstness, secondness and thirdness as 
relationships.  My reason for venturing this guess is that he says this at 
1.526:

i.  When we think of Secondness, we naturally think of two reacting objects, a 
first and a second. And along with these, as subjects, there is their reaction.
ii.  But these are not constituents out of which the Secondness is built up.
iii.  The truth is just reverse, [in] that the being a first or a second or the 
being a reaction each involves Secondness.

So, the terms "first" and "second" pertain to the objects thought of as 
standing a particular sort of relation.  The objects themselves may be 
different sorts of things.  Peirce distinguishes in the "The Logic of 
Mathematics" between essential dyads and accidental dyads, where the latter 
kind of dyad is separated into inherential and relative dyads.  These kinds of 
dyads are the only ones that are distinguished based on the the kinds of 
subjects (i.e., the kinds of objects) are being brought into relation with one 
another.  The secondness pertains to the kind of relationship that we attend to 
when we consider the manner of connection separately from the objects.

In order to make more progress, I suspect that we will need to move from the 
second to the third grade of clarity about the character of relatives, 
relationships and relations.  In doing so, we will need to turn our attention 
from logical analyses of concepts to the study of the formal relations that are 
fundamental, for instance, in mathematics.  That, at least, is what Peirce 
seems to suggest in "The Logic of Relatives" when he turns to Kempe's analysis 
of mathematical form as he works his way up to a third grade of clarify about 
these matters.  In short, understanding Peirce's phenomenological analyses of 
the distinctions he is drawing between different sorts of seconds and 
secondness will require that we do what is necessary to move to this third 
grade of clarity.  After all, Peirce points out that this mathematical manner 
of thinking about formal relations is one of the keys to doing inquiry in 
phenomenology.  Any ideas about how we might go about doing this?

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]]
Sent: Saturday, December 05, 2015 3:37 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jeff, list,

It would be helpful if you'd explain what exactly you find problematic in 
Nathan's outline. I may have some bones to pick with it myself--although I 
think it's generally useful--at very least for stimulating a discussion. But my 
'bones' may be different from yours. So what bothers you here?

Best,

Gary R

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Sat, Dec 5, 2015 at 5:02 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Hello Gary F., List,

I'd like to learn more about the way Peirce is drawing on the phenomenological 
categories as he categorizes different kinds of signs and sign relations.  
Focusing on this first division between qualisign, sinsign and legisign, what 
guidance are we getting from Peirce's account of the more degenerate and more 
genuine features of the categories.  In "Peirce, Phenomenology and Semiotics," 
(In the Routledge Companion to Semiotics), Nathan Houser provides the following 
table as a way of clarifying Peirce's account of the universal categories.

Structure of the Phaneron

1.  Universal categories:  forms of firstness
a.  Firstness
b.  Secondness
c.  Thirdness

2. Universal categories:  forms of secondness
a. Qualia (facts of firstness)
b. Relation (facts of secondness)
c. Representamen (facts of thirdness)

3.  Universal categories:  forms of thirdness
a.  Feeling (signs of firstness)
b.  Brute fact (signs of secondness)
c.  Thought (signs of thirdness)

While I like the general idea of trying to figure out how the different aspects 
of Peirce's account of the categories might be fitted together, I'm not able to 
square what Nathan is providing in this table with the various texts on 
phenomenology and phaneroscopy.  Does anyone have suggestions for how we might 
either justify this account or how we might modify it to make it fit better 
with what Peirce says?

The reason I ask is that Nathan offers a number of rich suggestions for 
thinking about the ways that Peirce is drawing on the universal categories in 
phenomenology for the purposes of setting up the 10-fold classification of 
signs in the semiotic theory.  As such, I'd like work this out in some more 
detail.

In order to stimulate some discussion, let me point out that Peirce offers some 
interesting remarks about the degenerate forms of the universal categories in 
the Collected Papers at 1.521-44.  He describes, for instance, the differences 
involved in the firstness and secondness of a second, and the those involved in 
the firstness, secondness and thirdness of a third.  Any ideas about how we 
might draw on these distinctions for the purposes of justifying or amending the 
kind of table that Nathan has offered?

--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354<tel:928%20523-8354>
________________________________________
From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> 
[[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>]
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 9:31 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Moving on to the first trichotomy of sign types in “Nomenclature and Divisions 
of Triadic Relations”:

CP 2.244: According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a Qualisign, a 
Sinsign, or a Legisign.
A Qualisign is a quality which is a Sign. It cannot actually act as a sign 
until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character 
as a sign.
[As a Sign, this “quality” must be a correlate of a triadic relation with its 
Object and Interpretant, “by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant 
is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the 
same Object, and for some possible Interpretant” (CP 2.242). Yet it cannot act 
as a sign until it is embodied, i.e. until it becomes involved in at least a 
dyadic relation, and thus enters the universe of existence. Yet its 
significance is its quality (not its embodiment), and qualities being monadic, 
there is no real difference between Sign and Object (or Interpretant either). 
So I think we might call this a doubly degenerate kind of triadic relation, 
where the Sign is virtually self-representing, and self-determining as its own 
Interpretant. Compare the “self-sufficient” point on a map which Peirce offers 
as an example of doubly degenerate Thirdness in his third Harvard Lecture, 
EP2:162.) Or, since this degeneracy is relative, we can say that the Qualisign 
is degenerate relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign (just as the Icon is 
degenerate relative to the Index and the genuine Symbol, according to Peirce in 
both the third Harvard lecture of 1903 and “New Elements” of 1904).

On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types defined 
in NDTR, including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a possible 
ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; and possibly this problem 
is related to the concepts of embodiment, just introduced, and of involvement, 
which is introduced in the next paragraph:]

245. A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning “being only once,” 
as in single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual existent thing or event 
which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a 
qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a 
peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied.
[Evidently it is the involvement of qualisigns in a Sinsign — which, I suppose, 
constitutes their embodiment — that makes them “peculiar,” because a “normal” 
Qualisign is disembodied (and does not act as a Sign). But perhaps this will be 
clarified by the definition of Legisign, which I’ll leave for the next post.]

Gary f.



-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to 
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send 
a message not to PEIRCE-L but to 
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe 
PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




Reply via email to