Jerry, list, Jerry, you wrote:
The terms "coupling" and "grammar" are used in the senses of CSP. Coupling > referring to CSP's paper on the logic of Copula. Grammar in the typical > sense that that one may find in the classical text by Otto Jesperson, *The > Philosophy of Grammar *or in CSP's writings*.* Ah, coupling in the sense of the copula. That is very helpful, thank you. As for grammar, it is clear that you mean speculative grammar then, though this has not always been clear to me in your posts using the term. Of course speculative grammar is not the same thing as syntax, since a division between syntax and semantics does not fit neatly in Peirce's speculative grammar. This is largely because of the idea of the sign as a triadic relation, which is not simply a syntactical structure to which a semantics can be applied, but rather the very structure of meaning. The reason I have been confused is that it has sometimes seemed to me that you meant syntax rather than speculative grammar. "Unit" being a term of one-ness, such as the 7 basic units of physics > (mass, distance, time, temperature, light, electricity and "mole". Or > integers as numbers. Equally applicable to the basic units of chemistry (92 > different logical structures with names) and biology (cells, etc). Take > you pick for meaningfulness of the term for you and for your personal > philosophy. Sounds good. I don't see this as necessarily in disagreement with what I said, so I am content to leave it at that. But, you wrote: > Going beyond the part of the real that we perceive, and grasping it as a > whole, requires the whole work of understanding. > This is what motivated my questions: > In what sense are your using "whole-ness" where the suffix -ness infers > changing an adjective into a noun - in the grammatical sense of the > wholeness of the smoke or the sense of the wholeness of interpretation? Well, I did not use the term "whole-ness", so I suppose you meant that when I use the term "whole", in one case it at least really means "whole-ness". For one, I don't see the whole of the smoke as something grammatical, but ontological. The whole of interpretation, on the other hand, will be semiotic(al?), which will include the grammatical. I think this answers your question, though it suggests that the idea of the whole is different in kind in the case of smoke from what it is in the case of interpretation. I am not prepared at this time to articulate the differences in these kinds of wholes, because I have an intellectual project I am going to be devoting myself to for a few months. Is it correct to read this paragraph that for the term "smoke", one can > assign an arbitrary number of different percepts? And hence, the each > different percept would lead to a different perceptual judgment? In other > words, in this specific case, the premises implicit to the scenario can > lead to an arbitrary number of arguments that are consistent with symbols > and legisigns? Much hinges on the sense of 'arbitrary' here. If by arbitrary, you mean in the sense of judgement as in arbitration, there is some truth to that. If by arbitrary you mean willy-nilly or at random, then no. Consider that there are different experiences we have of smoke. Suppose one had an experience of smoke three days ago when sitting by a fireplace. Now suppose one has an experience of smoke right now from someone smoking a cigarette nearby. These are two different experiences, with different percepts, resulting in different perceptual judgments. But the term 'smoke' is still applied to both. If we wanted to treat of specific experiences of smoke such that we could classify different kinds of smoke, there would be a need for arbitrating which percepts of smoke had to with which specific kinds of smoke. This would help in identifying different chemical components, which later could help us to identify new experiences of smoke as being of one kind or another, and so understand what the smoke is composed of when it is experienced, and thus of how the smoke is related to other percepts and what might be expected in future percepts in the vicinity of the smoke. I'm not altogether sure I understood what the question was driving at though, so I can only hope this helps clarify my way of thinking about it. What do you wish to express when you think of "correspondence" in this > context of yoking? Well, I thought that I had just made that clear. Allow me to quote myself from the passage to which you responded with this question, which I think answers the question: "Put in terms of correspondence, I suppose that the fact that the object responds to our interactions in the way we predict is what reveals that there is a correspondence between our concept of the object and the object as it is in itself." Correspondence, then, is just the fact that the object responds in the way we predict it will, when we interact with it. If it does not, then our idea of the object fails to correspond with the object. I can't recall if Peirce ever explicitly puts it in this way. I am fairly certain I remember John Dewey putting it in this way. While I disagree with much that Dewey says in logic and epistemology, I have found this way of thinking about correspondence as an apt way to put the matter and that it is in harmony with Peirce's point of view about correspondence. Would you be thinking of a triad: reception, perception, conception? This is another case in which I should quote myself from the passage to which you were responding: "[W]e could consider the initial experience as one of perception only, then the experience of seeing the smoke and coming to recognize it as smoke, and then the experience later of interacting with the fire that is the source of the smoke" So the triad would be: perception, conception, interaction. Or maybe: perception, conception, conduct. I am sorry to say this, but I have decided to devote all of my time for the next few months to some intensive reading of logic texts, which includes Vol. 3 and 4 of CP; and before them, some logic texts that I see as important precursors to Peirce's work. Once I am done with that project, I will be back and probably have some questions to pose for the Peirce-L community. For now, I will not be posting again and will not respond to any posts. This is nothing personal, Jerry. I just have to commit myself to this, and it requires all of the intellectual effort I can muster to get through it. But I do look forward to future dialogue with you. -- Franklin On Mon, Jan 4, 2016 at 9:33 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]> wrote: > (This post was found in my email "Draft Box”. This response was drafted on > Dec. 13 th, 2015. > > Franklin, Matt, List: > > Some short responses to your concerns and further questions are raised. > On Dec 12, 2015, at 4:10 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > Jerry, list, > > Well, I'm glad that someone agrees with me, as far as the statement went. > > Jerry, I think that you raise some good questions. Though, I must admit > I'm not entirely sure what a couple of your terms mean, such as 'coupling' > and 'grammar'. As for 'unit', I'll guess you mean something like what the > original meaning of 'atom' meant, as something basic and indivisible from > which other, more complex things can be built up out of. > > > The terms "coupling" and "grammar" are used in the senses of CSP. > Coupling referring to CSP's paper on the logic of Copula. Grammar in the > typical sense that that one may find in the classical text by Otto > Jesperson, *The Philosophy of Grammar *or in CSP's writings*.* > "Unit" being a term of one-ness, such as the 7 basic units of physics > (mass, distance, time, temperature, light, electricity and "mole". Or > integers as numbers. Equally applicable to the basic units of chemistry (92 > different logical structures with names) and biology (cells, etc). Take > you pick for meaningfulness of the term for you and for your personal > philosophy. > > > I've decided to answer the questions in the order reverse to the order in > which they were presented. > > Do you consider this part - whole coupling to be "mereological in >> character"? > > > I'm not sure what that means, but since it's a part-whole relation, and > mereology is a study concerned with such relations, it would seem almost > tautological that it is "mereological in character". But there are > different and competing theories in mereology, and I don't want to be taken > as supporting any one of them specifically. > > > But, you wrote: > Going beyond the part of the real that we perceive, and grasping it as a > whole, requires the whole work of understanding. > > This is what motivated my questions: > In what sense are your using "whole-ness" where the suffix -ness infers > changing an adjective into a noun - in the grammatical sense of the > wholeness of the smoke or the sense of the wholeness of interpretation? > > > Is smoke a unit? Is a precept a unit? > > > I take it you meant "percept", not precept. I would say it depends on the > context; in one context, we could take percepts as our basic elements, or > units, while in another context of analysis we might try to break it down > more, as presumably someone in experimental psychology might try to break > down sense impressions to the physical operations of the body and the thing > experienced. Similarly with smoke, if we just wanted to talk about the > matter in terms of commonly understood objects and signs, then it could be > considered a unit; but obviously, the chemist could try to break it down > more into the specific analysis of gases, and down to the atoms, of which > the smoke is composed, and so on further to particles and such. > > > Is it correct to read this paragraph that for the term "smoke", one can > assign an arbitrary number of different percepts? And hence, the each > different percept would lead to a different perceptual judgment? In other > words, in this specific case, the premises implicit to the scenario can > lead to an arbitrary number of arguments that are consistent with symbols > and legisigns? > > >> If "whole work of understanding." implies a coupling of external events >> with internal processes, then what is the nature of the grammar the >> generates the coupling of the parts of the whole? > > > This is where the meaning of 'coupling' worries me, but I'll suppose it's > something like correspondence. Also not sure what grammar is supposed to be > in this context. By "whole work of understanding", I meant the introduction > of a concept, whether in perceptual judgment or in an abduction, for > explaining the phenomenon (percept); which concept, when analyzed into > possible further interactions with the object of the percept, and then put > to experimental test in practical conduct, proves helpful for interacting > with the object of the percept. So the whole process of semiosis, up to the > following out of a scientific inquiry into the object, may be required to > grasp the (whole) object. Put in terms of correspondence, I suppose that > the fact that the object responds to our interactions in the way we predict > is what reveals that there is a correspondence between our concept of the > object and the object as it is in itself. > > > The word "coupling" comes from the Gk / L. roots. It requires a minimum of > a pair to be yoked together. (But not an ordered pair as in category theory > or set theory.) > What do you wish to express when you think of "correspondence" in this > context of yoking? > > > I'm not sure how to relate that to "the nature of the grammar the > generates the coupling of the parts of the whole". Part and whole here were > originally about the object as immediate and the object as dynamical, but > relating what is going on between external events and internal processes > (i.e., perception?), is a different kind of relating. Perhaps (and this is > simply a suggestion), we might think of there being the real object, which > has a part of it involved in perception, and there being the mind, which > has a part of it involved in perception, and these two (the real object and > the mind) are themselves parts of a semiosis, and so the 'grammar' that > would ultimately be appropriate would be that offered by semiotic. > > > > > What is the nature of the coupling between the smoke and the "whole" of >> the experience? > > > Hmm, that's a good question. Partly it depends upon what is meant by > experience, and whether one subscribes to the doctrine of immediate > perception. If one includes perception and conception, and what is > perceived and conceived, then smoke would be a part of the experience; and > with respect to perception, it would be a part of smoke, but with respect > to conception it would be the whole of the smoke. But, it is good to > recognize that in such case, we can think of experience in a somewhat > flexible way, such that we could consider the initial experience as one of > perception only, then the experience of seeing the smoke and coming to > recognize it as smoke, and then the experience later of interacting with > the fire that is the source of the smoke; or we could lump these altogether > as one long experience, and include in it any other interactions we ever > have or could have of perceiving the smoke. Of course, even in the latter > case, the smoke and the experience of it will not be the same thing, > because there is always us, the ones experiencing the smoke, either as > individuals or as a community, that are also always involved in the > experience. So the smoke remains part of the experience, not the whole of > it; while whether we consider the smoke as experienced in part, or as a > whole, depends on how experience is considered in a given context of > analysis. > > Would you be thinking of a triad: reception, perception, conception? > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > > -- Franklin > > ---------------------------------------------- > > On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 3:41 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> List, Frank: >> >> On Dec 12, 2015, at 11:16 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote: >> >> That effect of the smoke is in some sense part of what it is to be smoke. >> Going beyond the part of the real that we perceive, and grasping it as a >> whole, requires the whole work of understanding. But while the percept is >> not "smoke itself", i.e. is not the whole of the object, it is nevertheless >> as much a part of smoke as it is a part of the perceiver. >> >> >> While I concur with these sentences, I would ask further of your views: >> >> What is the nature of the coupling between the smoke and the "whole" of >> the experience? >> >> If "whole work of understanding." implies a coupling of external events >> with internal processes, then what is the nature of the grammar the >> generates the coupling of the parts of the whole? >> >> Is smoke a unit? Is a precept a unit? >> >> Do you consider this part - whole coupling to be "mereological in >> character"? >> >> Just curious. >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >> >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . 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