Ben, list Ben, you wrote: ".[Orliaguet ]. . .. quoted a passage by Peirce that required understanding the term "triad" to refer to the three correlates in triadic action with one another — sign-object-interpretant — and not to any other trichotomy (three-way division); otherwise the passage by Peirce became nonsense. "
I've been a little "out of it" post surgery, but did someone earlier quote that passage? In any event, I can't find it in this thread. However it may appear in *that* passage, I do not believe that this holds for semeiotic "generally" (see, for example,"A Guess at the Riddle," CP 1.369-372). While the ordinary sense (that is, in the vernacular, and as it is employed in some sciences) of trichotomy is "a three fold cut," ,trichotomy can and does refer in Peirce to *all *tricategorial relations, including those which appear in semeiotic. (Note, however, that I agree with Kirsti that the trio "sinsign, index and dicisign" is NOT a trichotomy *because *it does not involve a categorially triadic relation.) Ben wrote: "Still it should be noted that on some occasions Peirce used the term "triad" to refer to a merely classificatory trichotomy." On the other hand, on some (I mean many) occasions Peirce used the term "trichotomy" to refer to categorially triadic relations as in the ms "Trichotomic." I *always* use "Trichotomy to refer to a genuine trichotomic relation (the elements of the triad involving all three categories in relation in any context, semeiotic or otherwise), while--as I would express it--not all triads are trichotomic.. Again, certainly a trichotomy can be a simple, non-categorial division into three, but I don't see how one can claim this "generally" (including generally in semeiotic) *for Peirce *even if particular passages might suggest otherwise. Ben, am I missing something here? Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Wed, Feb 1, 2017 at 6:02 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote: > Kirsti, Jerry, list, > > Kirsti is generally correct. I remember years ago at peirce-l when > Orliaguet made the same point (with superfluous sarcasm) to Kirsti. He > quoted a passage by Peirce that required understanding the term "triad" to > refer to the three correlates in triadic action with one another — > sign-object-interpretant — and not to any other trichotomy (three-way > division); otherwise the passage by Peirce became nonsense. Still it should > be noted that on some occasions Peirce used the term "triad" to refer to a > merely classificatory trichotomy. But I think that, in Peircean contexts, > Kirsti's point is not only supported in Peirce but also promotes much more > clarity than does treating "triad" and "trichotomy" as interchangeable. > Over the years commenters at peirce-l have tended to adhere to the > distinction and FWIW I always stick to it. > > Best, Ben > > > On 1/31/2017 5:22 PM, [email protected] wrote: > >> Hi, >> >> I feel a need to point out that "sinsign, index and dicisign" presents a >> trichotomy of signs. Not a triad, but a tree-part division, a >> classification, if you wish. >> >> All triads and triadicity involve mediation. Triadicity also involves >> meaning, not just signs. >> >> Kirsti >> >> >> >> Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 26.1.2017 21:07: >> >>> List, Franklin, Frederik: >>> >>> The OUP book, >>> >>> THE STRUCTURE OF OBJECTS >>> >>> by Kathrin Koslicki (2008) >>> >>> addresses some of the philosophy that appears to be difficult to >>> understand. >>> >>> More particularly, it illuminates the triad, sinsign, index and >>> dicisign in relation to parts of the whole, the illation between the >>> identity, the individual and the particular that also considers the >>> chemical perspective. >>> Unfortunately, the intertwining of the meaning of this triad with >>> diagrammatic logic as described by Mark Greaves in “The >>> Philosophical Status of Diagrams” is beyond the scope of the logic >>> presented. >>> >>> Cheers >>> >>> Jerry >>> >>> On Dec 12, 2015, at 4:10 PM, Franklin Ransom >>>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> Jerry, list, >>>> >>>> Well, I'm glad that someone agrees with me, as far as the statement >>>> went. >>>> >>>> Jerry, I think that you raise some good questions. Though, I must >>>> admit I'm not entirely sure what a couple of your terms mean, such >>>> as 'coupling' and 'grammar'. As for 'unit', I'll guess you mean >>>> something like what the original meaning of 'atom' meant, as >>>> something basic and indivisible from which other, more complex >>>> things can be built up out of. >>>> >>>> I've decided to answer the questions in the order reverse to the >>>> order in which they were presented. >>>> >>>> Do you consider this part - whole coupling to be "mereological in >>>>> character"? >>>>> >>>> >>>> I'm not sure what that means, but since it's a part-whole relation, >>>> and mereology is a study concerned with such relations, it would >>>> seem almost tautological that it is "mereological in character". But >>>> there are different and competing theories in mereology, and I don't >>>> want to be taken as supporting any one of them specifically. >>>> >>>> Is smoke a unit? Is a precept a unit? >>>>> >>>> >>>> I take it you meant "percept", not precept. I would say it depends >>>> on the context; in one context, we could take percepts as our basic >>>> elements, or units, while in another context of analysis we might >>>> try to break it down more, as presumably someone in experimental >>>> psychology might try to break down sense impressions to the physical >>>> operations of the body and the thing experienced. Similarly with >>>> smoke, if we just wanted to talk about the matter in terms of >>>> commonly understood objects and signs, then it could be considered a >>>> unit; but obviously, the chemist could try to break it down more >>>> into the specific analysis of gases, and down to the atoms, of which >>>> the smoke is composed, and so on further to particles and such. >>>> >>>> If "whole work of understanding." implies a coupling of external >>>>> events with internal processes, then what is the nature of the >>>>> grammar the generates the coupling of the parts of the whole? >>>>> >>>> >>>> This is where the meaning of 'coupling' worries me, but I'll suppose >>>> it's something like correspondence. Also not sure what grammar is >>>> supposed to be in this context. By "whole work of understanding", I >>>> meant the introduction of a concept, whether in perceptual judgment >>>> or in an abduction, for explaining the phenomenon (percept); which >>>> concept, when analyzed into possible further interactions with the >>>> object of the percept, and then put to experimental test in >>>> practical conduct, proves helpful for interacting with the object of >>>> the percept. So the whole process of semiosis, up to the following >>>> out of a scientific inquiry into the object, may be required to >>>> grasp the (whole) object. Put in terms of correspondence, I suppose >>>> that the fact that the object responds to our interactions in the >>>> way we predict is what reveals that there is a correspondence >>>> between our concept of the object and the object as it is in itself. >>>> >>>> I'm not sure how to relate that to "the nature of the grammar the >>>> generates the coupling of the parts of the whole". Part and whole >>>> here were originally about the object as immediate and the object as >>>> dynamical, but relating what is going on between external events and >>>> internal processes (i.e., perception?), is a different kind of >>>> relating. Perhaps (and this is simply a suggestion), we might think >>>> of there being the real object, which has a part of it involved in >>>> perception, and there being the mind, which has a part of it >>>> involved in perception, and these two (the real object and the mind) >>>> are themselves parts of a semiosis, and so the 'grammar' that would >>>> ultimately be appropriate would be that offered by semiotic. >>>> >>>> What is the nature of the coupling between the smoke and the >>>>> "whole" of the experience? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Hmm, that's a good question. Partly it depends upon what is meant by >>>> experience, and whether one subscribes to the doctrine of immediate >>>> perception. If one includes perception and conception, and what is >>>> perceived and conceived, then smoke would be a part of the >>>> experience; and with respect to perception, it would be a part of >>>> smoke, but with respect to conception it would be the whole of the >>>> smoke. But, it is good to recognize that in such case, we can think >>>> of experience in a somewhat flexible way, such that we could >>>> consider the initial experience as one of perception only, then the >>>> experience of seeing the smoke and coming to recognize it as smoke, >>>> and then the experience later of interacting with the fire that is >>>> the source of the smoke; or we could lump these altogether as one >>>> long experience, and include in it any other interactions we ever >>>> have or could have of perceiving the smoke. Of course, even in the >>>> latter case, the smoke and the experience of it will not be the same >>>> thing, because there is always us, the ones experiencing the smoke, >>>> either as individuals or as a community, that are also always >>>> involved in the experience. So the smoke remains part of the >>>> experience, not the whole of it; while whether we consider the smoke >>>> as experienced in part, or as a whole, depends on how experience is >>>> considered in a given context of analysis. >>>> >>>> -- Franklin >>>> >>>> ---------------------------------------------- >>>> >>>> On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 3:41 PM, Jerry LR Chandler >>>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> List, Frank: >>>> >>>> On Dec 12, 2015, at 11:16 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote: >>>> That effect of the smoke is in some sense part of what it is to be >>>> smoke. Going beyond the part of the real that we perceive, and >>>> grasping it as a whole, requires the whole work of understanding. >>>> But while the percept is not "smoke itself", i.e. is not the whole >>>> of the object, it is nevertheless as much a part of smoke as it is a >>>> part of the perceiver. >>>> >>>> While I concur with these sentences, I would ask further of your >>>> views: >>>> >>>> What is the nature of the coupling between the smoke and the "whole" >>>> of the experience? >>>> >>>> If "whole work of understanding." implies a coupling of external >>>> events with internal processes, then what is the nature of the >>>> grammar the generates the coupling of the parts of the whole? >>>> >>>> Is smoke a unit? Is a precept a unit? >>>> >>>> Do you consider this part - whole coupling to be "mereological in >>>> character"? >>>> >>>> Just curious. >>>> >>>> Cheers >>>> >>>> Jerry >>>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [1] . >>> >>> >>> >>> Links: >>> ------ >>> [1] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >>> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . 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