oh and btw, phi spiral abduction is for *everybody*...or at least for *all who investigate*.
"Only everybody can know the truth." ~Goethe "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth. and the object represented in this opinion is the real." ~Peirce Best, Jerry Rhee On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 6:28 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > :) > > Edwina, > No worries...it's hard to go to something from nothing if one doesn't see > the connection...even if there is something there, already. > > Best, > Jerry > > On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 6:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jerry - I wouldn't dare analyze this, as the phi spiral abduction is a >> specific analysis of yours and I haven't been following that thread. My >> first 'abductive' response would be that the formation of a spiral is a >> process of habit-formation, i.e., the formation of a hypothesis, a set of >> rules. But again, I apologize but I haven't been following that thread. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> >> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> *Cc:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> ; Peirce-L >> <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 01, 2016 6:28 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, >> Inquiry >> >> Hi Edwina, >> >> It clarifies. For instance, what would you say is the >> "Object-as-it-is-meant-to-be-understood, >> i.e., the dynamic object" in phi spiral abduction? >> >> Best, >> Jerry Rhee >> >> On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 5:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> In reply to Gary, the reason I refer to Relation*s *in the plural - >>> and there are indeed those people who reject this [eg, John Deely I know!] >>> - is because each of the three can function in a different modal category. >>> I don't see how defining the semiosic triad as ONE Relation conveys this >>> possibility. >>> >>> Furthermore, Pierce himself refers to these relations in their >>> particularity. For example, 'In respect to their relations to their dynamic >>> objects" 8.335, Welby Signs and Categories, where Peirce outlines that >>> such a relation is defined as 'icon, index, symbol'. Then, he discusses "in >>> regard to its relation to its signified Interpretant"..and such is defined >>> as 'rheme, dicent, argument. And, the 'sign in itself' - a qualisign, >>> sinsign, legisign'. >>> >>> Now, the triad itself, he terms 'triadic relation*s*', as in 'genuine >>> triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations'..1.346. The >>> Categories in Detail. He refers here to 'three lines of identity...and >>> 'triadic relations' 1.347. The Sign [that triad of three relations] is >>> irreducible. It can't be built, as he says, of dyads. But - there are still >>> three 'tails', three 'lines of identity', three interactions: that with the >>> dynamic object; that of the representamen in itself, which means, with its >>> habits; and that with the 'signified interpretant'. >>> >>> As for your quotation, and he writes similarly, in the Welby section, >>> where "a sign is something by knowing which we know something more [8.332] >>> and "A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on >>> the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring >>> the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own >>> relation to the object' [8.332]. >>> >>> The whole point of this process is to truthfully 'interpret' the object >>> in itself. That is, not the object-as-it-is-represented (the immediate >>> object) but the object-in-itself [the dynamic object]. This requires >>> several Interpretants - including the Final Interpretant which can be >>> understood as the Object-as-it-is-meant-to-be-understood, i.e., the dynamic >>> object. That is, the continuous semiosic process is a process of >>> truth-gathering and truth-representation. And it can take time - many >>> semiosic Signs - before one has arrived at that genuine Final Interpretant >>> which corresponds to that Dynamic Object. >>> >>> Does this clarify or muddle? >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >>> *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> >>> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 01, 2016 4:42 PM >>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, >>> Inquiry >>> >>> Edwina, Frances, List, >>> >>> This may possible be, at least in part, something of a linguistic >>> dispute. If one sees the Representamen as 'sign' (one of Peirce's uses of >>> the term), then, one could argue that, say, a rhematic iconic qualisign >>> (sign 1 in the 10-fold sign classification) hasn't any meaning apart from >>> its embodiment in some actual (or potential) semiosis. But this, it seems >>> to me, is only the case in a strictly analytical or formal sense. >>> >>> If, however,one employs 'sign' to mean the fullness of the triadic >>> semiosis (another richer way in which Peirce employs the term), then as >>> soon as an *actual *interpretant is involved, *there is 'meaning'* in >>> some sense (at least in some primitive sense, for example, as even in >>> Peirce's sunflower example which Edwina occasionally refers to). >>> >>> I must admit that I still have some trouble with Edwina's requirement >>> that a sign be defined as the *three* relations, "input/mediation/output*" >>> *because that formulation doesn't seem to me to convey an essential >>> characteristic of a Peircean sign (taken in the broader sense), namely, >>> that the interpretant shall stand in the same relation to the object as the >>> representamen itself stands. This again brings up the question of what >>> constitutes a *genuine triadic relation* in Peircean semiotics; or, in >>> a slighly different formulation, is it one relation or three? I recall that >>> John Collier and others on this list, including me, have argued that it is >>> *one >>> genuine triadic* relation, and that seeing semiosis--especially in >>> consideration of its continuity--as three relations (such as input/ >>> mediation/ output) suggests a kind of linear and, indeed, dyadic character. >>> Perhaps I'm just not seeing this clearly enough, so I'm simply ask you, >>> Edwina, does your "three relations" model square with Peirce's seeming >>> insistence that >>> >>> …a sign is something, *A*, which brings something, *B*, its >>> *interpretant* sign determined or created by it, *into the same sort of >>> correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself >>> stands to C*. (emphasis added. NEM 4:20-1 in the *Commens* dictionary) >>> >>> >>> and if so, how does it? >>> >>> I do agree with Edwina that talk of a 'sign vehicle' 'bearing' some >>> 'sign object' smacks perhaps of semiology, but perhaps even more so of >>> Morris' syntactics (I believe it was Morris who introduced the term "sign >>> vehicle" into semiotics). >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary >>> >>> >>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> *C 745* >>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >>> >>> On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 2:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Frances - I don't consider your outline as Peircean semiosis but as >>>> semiology, where an object is a sign only when it REFERS TO something else. >>>> That's dyadic, and views the Sign as simply a kind of metaphor of something >>>> else. That's not, in my view, Peirce. >>>> >>>> My view is that the object itself, in its own composition, exists as a >>>> Sign. It is a triadic process. A Sign is a unit of matter/energy that >>>> exists as a Form in interaction with other Forms. There must be a triadic >>>> set of Relations: input/mediation/output. Without that triad - it's not a >>>> Sign. >>>> >>>> Nothing exists 'per se' on its own in isolation but is networked with >>>> other matter - whether it be one molecule interacting with another >>>> molecule, one cell with another cell; one sound with another sound. It is >>>> this continuity of Form which enables this continuity of Connections [see >>>> Peirce's outline of the development of habits' [1.412 A guess at the >>>> riddle]. This is the process of semiosis - that continuous formulation of >>>> discrete units formed within a habit, which are in interaction with other >>>> discrete units. As formed and networked, [which is not at all similar to >>>> referencing] they are therefore 'meaningful'. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> >>>> ----- Original Message ----- From: <[email protected]> >>>> To: "'Peirce List'" <[email protected]> >>>> Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 1:57 PM >>>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, >>>> Inquiry >>>> >>>> >>>> Frances to Edwina and Listers--- You partly stated in effect recently >>>> that a sign "is" meaning, and that if a sign "has" no meaning then it is >>>> not a sign, but is say mere noise. This seems wrong to me from a Peircean >>>> stance, but perhaps others here can clarify the jargon and with some >>>> references. My grasp of the matter is that in semiosis a "sign vehicle" >>>> (like say even just noise) is an ordinary object that at least represents >>>> some other referred object and to some interpreted effect, and to any kind >>>> of signer. In other words, the "sign vehicle" must informatively "bear" >>>> some "sign object" for some "sign effect" to be a sign overall, but that >>>> the "sign vehicle" need not "yield" or "endure" any meaning at all to be >>>> such a sign, even if it may or can or will "yield" some meaning to an able >>>> signer. Any meaningless sign might therefore be a crude sign or not much of >>>> a sign, but it will in any event be a sign to some degree. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> ----------------------------- >>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >
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