Very nice outline. I particularly like the 

"The pragmaticist's reality is a continuum of modes of being, generally, and 
with regard to any given phenomenon."

It's the notion of continuity and 'modes of being' that is distinctive and so 
attractive in Peirce. The 'mode of being' is a Sign operating within the 
continuity of habits.

Edwina
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Martin Kettelhut 
  To: sb 
  Cc: Peirce List 
  Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 3:23 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry


  One reason to appreciate the Abduction-Deduction-Induction distinction Peirce 
derives from Aristotle is because it puts us in a different reality from the 
one promulgated by Analytic Philosophy.  


  Analytic Philosophy supposes a reality of determinate logical atoms; and 
finds it challenging to determine them, given the different modes of being 
implicated by the various kinds of inference we use.  


  Whereas for Peirce, the results of real Abductions-Deductions-Inductions are 
real Possibilities-Necessities-Potentialities.  


  “A logical atom, then, like a point in space, would involve for its precise 
determination an endless process. We can only say, in a general way, that a 
term, however determinate, may be more determinate still, but not that it can 
be made absolutely determinate." (CP3.93)  


  The pragmaticist's reality is a continuum of modes of being, generally, and 
with regard to any given phenomenon.


  Martin Kettelhut, PhD
  www.listeningisthekey.com
  303 747 4449

   


    On Mar 1, 2016, at 1:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:


    Frances - I don't consider your outline as Peircean semiosis but as 
semiology, where an object is a sign only when it REFERS TO something else. 
That's dyadic, and views the Sign as simply a kind of metaphor of something 
else.  That's not, in my view, Peirce.

    My view is that the object itself, in its own composition, exists as a 
Sign. It is a triadic process. A Sign is a unit of matter/energy that exists as 
a Form in interaction with other Forms. There must be a triadic set of 
Relations: input/mediation/output. Without that triad - it's not a Sign.

    Nothing exists 'per se' on its own in isolation but is networked with other 
matter - whether it be one molecule interacting with another molecule, one cell 
with another cell; one sound with another sound. It is this continuity of Form 
which enables this continuity of Connections [see Peirce's outline of the 
development of habits' [1.412 A guess at the riddle].  This is the process of 
semiosis - that continuous formulation of discrete units formed within a habit, 
which are in interaction with other discrete units. As formed and networked, 
[which is not at all similar to referencing] they are therefore 'meaningful'.

    Edwina


    ----- Original Message ----- From: <[email protected]>
    To: "'Peirce List'" <[email protected]>
    Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 1:57 PM
    Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, 
Inquiry


    Frances to Edwina and Listers--- You partly stated in effect recently that 
a sign "is" meaning, and that if a sign "has" no meaning then it is not a sign, 
but is say mere noise. This seems wrong to me from a Peircean stance, but 
perhaps others here can clarify the jargon and with some references. My grasp 
of the matter is that in semiosis a "sign vehicle" (like say even just noise) 
is an ordinary object that at least represents some other referred object and 
to some interpreted effect, and to any kind of signer. In other words, the 
"sign vehicle" must informatively "bear" some "sign object" for some "sign 
effect" to be a sign overall, but that the "sign vehicle" need not "yield" or 
"endure" any meaning at all to be such a sign, even if it may or can or will 
"yield" some meaning to an able signer. Any meaningless sign might therefore be 
a crude sign or not much of a sign, but it will in any event be a sign to some 
degree.





    
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