Jerry - I wouldn't dare analyze this, as the phi spiral abduction is a specific analysis of yours and I haven't been following that thread. My first 'abductive' response would be that the formation of a spiral is a process of habit-formation, i.e., the formation of a hypothesis, a set of rules. But again, I apologize but I haven't been following that thread.
Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Jerry Rhee To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 6:28 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry Hi Edwina, It clarifies. For instance, what would you say is the "Object-as-it-is-meant-to-be-understood, i.e., the dynamic object" in phi spiral abduction? Best, Jerry Rhee On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 5:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: In reply to Gary, the reason I refer to Relations in the plural - and there are indeed those people who reject this [eg, John Deely I know!] - is because each of the three can function in a different modal category. I don't see how defining the semiosic triad as ONE Relation conveys this possibility. Furthermore, Pierce himself refers to these relations in their particularity. For example, 'In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects" 8.335, Welby Signs and Categories, where Peirce outlines that such a relation is defined as 'icon, index, symbol'. Then, he discusses "in regard to its relation to its signified Interpretant"..and such is defined as 'rheme, dicent, argument. And, the 'sign in itself' - a qualisign, sinsign, legisign'. Now, the triad itself, he terms 'triadic relations', as in 'genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations'..1.346. The Categories in Detail. He refers here to 'three lines of identity...and 'triadic relations' 1.347. The Sign [that triad of three relations] is irreducible. It can't be built, as he says, of dyads. But - there are still three 'tails', three 'lines of identity', three interactions: that with the dynamic object; that of the representamen in itself, which means, with its habits; and that with the 'signified interpretant'. As for your quotation, and he writes similarly, in the Welby section, where "a sign is something by knowing which we know something more [8.332] and "A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object' [8.332]. The whole point of this process is to truthfully 'interpret' the object in itself. That is, not the object-as-it-is-represented (the immediate object) but the object-in-itself [the dynamic object]. This requires several Interpretants - including the Final Interpretant which can be understood as the Object-as-it-is-meant-to-be-understood, i.e., the dynamic object. That is, the continuous semiosic process is a process of truth-gathering and truth-representation. And it can take time - many semiosic Signs - before one has arrived at that genuine Final Interpretant which corresponds to that Dynamic Object. Does this clarify or muddle? Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce-L Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 4:42 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry Edwina, Frances, List, This may possible be, at least in part, something of a linguistic dispute. If one sees the Representamen as 'sign' (one of Peirce's uses of the term), then, one could argue that, say, a rhematic iconic qualisign (sign 1 in the 10-fold sign classification) hasn't any meaning apart from its embodiment in some actual (or potential) semiosis. But this, it seems to me, is only the case in a strictly analytical or formal sense. If, however,one employs 'sign' to mean the fullness of the triadic semiosis (another richer way in which Peirce employs the term), then as soon as an actual interpretant is involved, there is 'meaning' in some sense (at least in some primitive sense, for example, as even in Peirce's sunflower example which Edwina occasionally refers to). I must admit that I still have some trouble with Edwina's requirement that a sign be defined as the three relations, "input/mediation/output" because that formulation doesn't seem to me to convey an essential characteristic of a Peircean sign (taken in the broader sense), namely, that the interpretant shall stand in the same relation to the object as the representamen itself stands. This again brings up the question of what constitutes a genuine triadic relation in Peircean semiotics; or, in a slighly different formulation, is it one relation or three? I recall that John Collier and others on this list, including me, have argued that it is one genuine triadic relation, and that seeing semiosis--especially in consideration of its continuity--as three relations (such as input/ mediation/ output) suggests a kind of linear and, indeed, dyadic character. Perhaps I'm just not seeing this clearly enough, so I'm simply ask you, Edwina, does your "three relations" model square with Peirce's seeming insistence that …a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. (emphasis added. NEM 4:20-1 in the Commens dictionary) and if so, how does it? I do agree with Edwina that talk of a 'sign vehicle' 'bearing' some 'sign object' smacks perhaps of semiology, but perhaps even more so of Morris' syntactics (I believe it was Morris who introduced the term "sign vehicle" into semiotics). Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 2:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: Frances - I don't consider your outline as Peircean semiosis but as semiology, where an object is a sign only when it REFERS TO something else. That's dyadic, and views the Sign as simply a kind of metaphor of something else. That's not, in my view, Peirce. My view is that the object itself, in its own composition, exists as a Sign. It is a triadic process. A Sign is a unit of matter/energy that exists as a Form in interaction with other Forms. There must be a triadic set of Relations: input/mediation/output. Without that triad - it's not a Sign. Nothing exists 'per se' on its own in isolation but is networked with other matter - whether it be one molecule interacting with another molecule, one cell with another cell; one sound with another sound. It is this continuity of Form which enables this continuity of Connections [see Peirce's outline of the development of habits' [1.412 A guess at the riddle]. This is the process of semiosis - that continuous formulation of discrete units formed within a habit, which are in interaction with other discrete units. As formed and networked, [which is not at all similar to referencing] they are therefore 'meaningful'. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: <[email protected]> To: "'Peirce List'" <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2016 1:57 PM Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry Frances to Edwina and Listers--- You partly stated in effect recently that a sign "is" meaning, and that if a sign "has" no meaning then it is not a sign, but is say mere noise. This seems wrong to me from a Peircean stance, but perhaps others here can clarify the jargon and with some references. My grasp of the matter is that in semiosis a "sign vehicle" (like say even just noise) is an ordinary object that at least represents some other referred object and to some interpreted effect, and to any kind of signer. In other words, the "sign vehicle" must informatively "bear" some "sign object" for some "sign effect" to be a sign overall, but that the "sign vehicle" need not "yield" or "endure" any meaning at all to be such a sign, even if it may or can or will "yield" some meaning to an able signer. Any meaningless sign might therefore be a crude sign or not much of a sign, but it will in any event be a sign to some degree. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . 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