Jon,
You suggest reading of Logic of Relatives because it worked for you in interpreting Peirce. I use the same argument for phi spiral abduction. So, why Logic of Relatives and not phi spiral? Well, because Peirce. But both are Peirce. But Logic is closer to Peirce because he wrote it. But Logic was written before his mature years, before he realized people don’t bother to read his deeply detailed analysis. They don’t care for it. So, why phi spiral? Well, because it addresses real, contemporary problems. Also, because Nietzsche. That is, “The more abstract the truth you want to teach, the more you must seduce the senses to it… Essential: to begin with the body and use it as a guiding thread. It is the much richer phenomenon and affords clearer observation. Belief in the body is better established than belief in the mind.” ~On Truth and Untruth, Selected Writings, Taylor Carman On Wed, Mar 2, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary, List, > > Time and again Peirce refers to his logic of relatives > as the means necessary to understand the more complex > and subtle issues in his theory of inquiry and his > theory of signs. I find this to be good advice. > > The best antidote for confusion about triadic sign relations > and the three basic modes of inference can be found in study > of his early papers on the logic of relatives and the logic > of science. His first expeditions, for all their rough and > exploratory character, perhaps even because of it, give far > more concrete examples of relations in general and triadic > sign relations in particular, plus a better idea of actual > practice in the ways of inquiry, than the often detached > abstractions of his later speculations and summations. > > From what I've seen through many years of watching people > struggle with Peirce, it is almost impossible to get what > Peirce is talking about in his later work without getting > a foothold on the concrete foundation he laid down at the > outset of his work. > > I proposed some time ago that a close reading of Peirce's > 1870 “Logic of Relatives” could be extremely beneficial in > understanding and applying Peirce's ideas to real problems. > It's where I began way back when and I have already put my > own notes on the foothills of the paper on the web several > times, the current best version on the InterSciWiki, here: > > http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Peirce's_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives > > Regards, > > Jon > > On 3/1/2016 4:42 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Edwina, Frances, List, > > > > This may possible be, at least in part, something of a linguistic > dispute. > > If one sees the Representamen as 'sign' (one of Peirce's uses of the > term), > > then, one could argue that, say, a rhematic iconic qualisign (sign 1 in > the > > 10-fold sign classification) hasn't any meaning apart from its embodiment > > in some actual (or potential) semiosis. But this, it seems to me, is only > > the case in a strictly analytical or formal sense. > > > > If, however,one employs 'sign' to mean the fullness of the triadic > semiosis > > (another richer way in which Peirce employs the term), then as soon as > > an *actual > > *interpretant is involved, *there is 'meaning'* in some sense (at least > in > > some primitive sense, for example, as even in Peirce's sunflower example > > which Edwina occasionally refers to). > > > > I must admit that I still have some trouble with Edwina's requirement > that > > a sign be defined as the *three* relations, "input/mediation/output*" > > *because that > > formulation doesn't seem to me to convey an essential characteristic of a > > Peircean sign (taken in the broader sense), namely, that the interpretant > > shall stand in the same relation to the object as the representamen > itself > > stands. This again brings up the question of what constitutes a *genuine > > triadic relation* in Peircean semiotics; or, in a slighly different > > formulation, is it one relation or three? I recall that John Collier and > > others on this list, including me, have argued that it is *one genuine > > triadic* relation, and that seeing semiosis--especially in consideration > of > > its continuity--as three relations (such as input/ mediation/ output) > > suggests a kind of linear and, indeed, dyadic character. Perhaps I'm just > > not seeing this clearly enough, so I'm simply ask you, Edwina, does your > > "three relations" model square with Peirce's seeming insistence that > > > > …a sign is something, *A*, which brings something, *B*, its > *interpretant* sign > > determined or created by it, *into the same sort of correspondence with > > something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C*. (emphasis > > added. NEM 4:20-1 in the *Commens* dictionary) > > > > > > and if so, how does it? > > > > I do agree with Edwina that talk of a 'sign vehicle' 'bearing' some 'sign > > object' smacks perhaps of semiology, but perhaps even more so of Morris' > > syntactics (I believe it was Morris who introduced the term "sign > vehicle" > > into semiotics). > > > > Best, > > > > Gary > > > > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > > > *Gary Richmond* > > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > > *Communication Studies* > > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *C 745* > > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > > > > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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