> On Mar 10, 2016, at 2:13 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > > Are you not participating in unhelpful exposition about something about which > much can be said, of which you are only talking about a small part? > Technically, Peirce's method is not about meaningfulness as it is about > clarifying the interpretant at the end of inquiry, which deals with consensus > opinion.
The maxim is what I was referring to. I was pointing out we need to distinguish from the maxim as he used it from these broader issues. The maxim can and has been expanded. That’s more or less what happened within neo-Kantianism which took a broad ranging verificationalist principle. The best known example of this is within logical positivism. However the same thing happened in varying degrees with the neo-kantians in general. In part this was what made Husserl move against the naturalistic problem that he saw as a crisis in the sciences. Peirce wisely kept the verification principle as relating just to meanings and also (at least in his later thought) saw it in terms of potential verifications rather than actual ones. > Why not bring the discussion to a concrete example? There, you will > encounter resistance if you say something controversial because vagueness is > reduced. There, certain particular paths forward will be available to settle > disagreement. I’m fine with the example of special relativity if you’d prefer. It’s a well analyzed case of the advancement of science that is oft discussed relating to these principles. Again though, to be clear, my more pedantic comments primarily related to Peircean terminology. To me though Einsteins’ thought experiments were a great example of pushing science abductively.
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