Jon,
I think there's a troubling narrowness interpreting this situation as
something like:
"In this narrative we can identify the characters of the sign relation
as
follows: *coolness *is a Sign of the Object *rain*, and the
Interpretant is *the*
* thought of the rain’s likelihood*."
First of all, how can something that has not yet occurred be the object?
And what of all the other things "coolness" might indicate (be a sign of in
that sense)? And the interpretant introduces the person as part of the
object-sign-interpretant structure?
Personally, I prefer to see the "sign" as a diagram of the elements and
relationships abstracted from this situation, the "object". And, the
interpretant, "rain," is then the inference being made using one of those
elements, "coolness", and its relationship to rain. I think this view
would accord well with Peirce's description of a diagram used in
problem-solving; it would allow the "rain" to remain virtual rather than
actual (along the lines set out by Deleuze); and it also doesn't bring the
man into the sign structure itself. He enters only in his use of it to make
the personal inference that he ought to quicken his pace.
Tom
On Tue, Mar 15, 2016 at 9:24 AM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote:
> Jerry, List,
>
> A very good question.
>
> Susan Awbrey and I tried our hands at answering the “What Next?”
> question in the medium of analyzing Dewey's “Sign of Rain” example:
>
>
> https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry
>
> Relevant excerpt below:
>
> <QUOTE>
>
> The Pattern and Stages of Inquiry
> =================================
>
> To illustrate the place of the sign relation in inquiry we begin with
> Dewey's elegant and simple example of reflective thinking in everyday life:
>
> <QUOTE>
> A man is walking on a warm day. The sky was clear the last time he
> observed it; but
> presently he notes, while occupied primarily with other things, that the
> air is cooler.
> It occurs to him that it is probably going to rain; looking up, he sees a
> dark cloud
> between him and the sun, and he then quickens his steps. What, if
> anything, in such
> a situation can be called thought? Neither the act of walking nor the
> noting of the
> cold is a thought. Walking is one direction of activity; looking and
> noting are other
> modes of activity. The likelihood that it will rain is, however,
> something suggested.
> The pedestrian feels the cold; he thinks of clouds and a coming shower.
>
> (Dewey 1991, 6-7).
> </QUOTE>
>
> In this narrative we can identify the characters of the sign relation
> as follows: coolness is a Sign of the Object rain, and the Interpretant
> is the thought of the rain's likelihood. In his 1910 description of
> reflective thinking Dewey distinguishes two phases, “a state of perplexity,
> hesitation, doubt” and “an act of search or investigation” (Dewey 1991, 9),
> comprehensive stages which are further refined in his later model of
> inquiry.
> In this example reflection is the act of the interpreter which establishes
> a
> fund of connections between the sensory shock of coolness and the objective
> danger of rain, by way of his impression that rain is likely. But
> reflection
> is more than irresponsible speculation. In reflection the interpreter acts
> to charge or defuse the thought of rain (the probability of rain in
> thought)
> by seeking other signs which this thought implies and evaluating the
> thought
> according to the results of this search.
>
> Figure 2 illustrates Dewey's “Rain” example, tracing the structure and
> function
> of the sign relation as it informs the activity of inquiry, including both
> the
> movements of surprise explanation and intentional action. The dyadic
> faces of
> the sign relation are labeled with just a few of the loosest terms that
> apply,
> indicating the “significance” of signs for eventual occurrences and the
> “correspondence” of ideas with external orientations. Nothing essential
> is meant by these dyadic role distinctions, since it is only in special
> or degenerate cases that their shadowy projections can maintain enough
> information to determine the original sign relation.
>
> Figure 2. Signs and Inquiry in Dewey [see attached]
>
> If we follow this example far enough to consider the import of thought
> for action, we realize that the subsequent conduct of the interpreter,
> progressing up through the natural conclusion of the episode — the
> quickening steps, seeking shelter in time to escape the rain — all of
> these acts form a series of further interpretants, contingent on the
> active causes of the individual, for the originally recognized signs
> of rain and for the first impressions of the actual case. Just as
> critical reflection develops the associated and alternative signs
> which gather about an idea, pragmatic interpretation explores the
> consequential and contrasting actions which give effective and
> testable meaning to a person's belief in it.
>
> </QUOTE>
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 3/9/2016 5:07 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
> > John, Clark, List:
> >
> > The simple question arises: If an abductive step is taken by the
> inquirer,
> > then what?
> >
> > For example, say that a sinsign and its legisigns and qualisigns provide
> > the informative extension to generate an index, how does one take this
> > abductive object and move through the inferential steps needed to
> > generate a valid argument?
> >
> > Or, from a different logical perspective, what information is needed
> > to extend (in the Aristotelian sense of intensional logic) the index
> > to the (telelogical?) goal of the inquirer?
> >
> > Cheers
> >
> > Jerry
> >
>
> --
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
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> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>
>
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