Tom, List,
I know we've discussed the senses of “object” that make sense
in Peirce and semiotics in general on many previous occasions
since the turn of the millennium, so let me just link to one
of the more recent mentions that popped up in my anamnesis:
Re: Sciences As Communicational Communities -- Objectivity
http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/7358
Objects, Objectives, Objectivity
http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.comp.inquiry/3713
<QUOTE>
I am constantly reminded of this favorite line from Peirce:
“No longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object.”
-- C.S. Peirce (1861), “My Life”, (Chron. Ed. 1, p. 3)
The question of Objects, Objectives, and Objectivity is a persistent one.
The Latin-rooted English “object” springs from deeper roots in the Greek
“pragma”.
It was a personal revelation to me on first looking into Liddell and Scott and
reading all the meanings and ramifications of that pragmatic semantic complex:
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Dpra%3Dgma
It is especially the senses of the word “object” that refer to aims and
purposes,
in other words, intentional objects and objects of intention, that we are likely
to miss if we don't remind ourselves of their pertinence to pragmatic thinking.
</QUOTE>
There are of course the usual run of behaviorist, causal, stimulus-response
theories of “signal processing” and and “verbal behavior” that have enjoyed
their popularity and never-say-die revivals from the days of Charles Morris
to B.F. Skinner, but Peirce's semiotics includes them as degenerate species
of the more solid genre he had in mind.
Peirce's definition of a triadic sign relation is cast at such a level of
generality that nothing in it forbids a sign relation L ⊆ O × S × I from
having intentional objects in its object domain O.
To say that “coolness is a sign of rain” is a perfectly conventional,
idiomatic, and natural statement in English, and I think it would be
a more troubling narrowness to exclude it from sense.
In short, semiotic objects are any objects of discussion or thought,
and it should be obvious that we talk about and think about future,
imaginary, intentional, or “virtual” objects all the time.
On to your second point. The fact that coolness might be a sign of
many other things is exactly what calls for our peripatetic hero to
abduce a hypothesis (rain?), to deduce a prediction (dark clouds?),
and to test the prediction against further observations (look up!).
All of that is why we chose Dewey's story as an illustration of
a full-blown inquiry.
Regards,
Jon
On 3/16/2016 12:57 PM, Tom Gollier wrote:
Jon,
I think there's a troubling narrowness interpreting this situation as
something like:
"In this narrative we can identify the characters of the sign relation
as follows: *coolness *is a Sign of the Object *rain*, and the
Interpretant is *the* thought of the rain’s likelihood*."
First of all, how can something that has not yet occurred be the object?
And what of all the other things "coolness" might indicate (be a sign of
in that sense)? And the interpretant introduces the person as part of
the object-sign-interpretant structure?
Personally, I prefer to see the "sign" as a diagram of the elements and
relationships abstracted from this situation, the "object". And, the
interpretant, "rain," is then the inference being made using one of those
elements, "coolness", and its relationship to rain. I think this view
would accord well with Peirce's description of a diagram used in
problem-solving; it would allow the "rain" to remain virtual rather than
actual (along the lines set out by Deleuze); and it also doesn't bring the
man into the sign structure itself. He enters only in his use of it to make
the personal inference that he ought to quicken his pace.
Tom
On Tue, Mar 15, 2016 at 9:24 AM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote:
Jerry, List,
A very good question.
Susan Awbrey and I tried our hands at answering the “What Next?”
question in the medium of analyzing Dewey's “Sign of Rain” example:
https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry
Relevant excerpt below:
<QUOTE>
The Pattern and Stages of Inquiry
=================================
To illustrate the place of the sign relation in inquiry we begin with
Dewey's elegant and simple example of reflective thinking in everyday life:
<QUOTE>
A man is walking on a warm day. The sky was clear the last time he
observed it; but
presently he notes, while occupied primarily with other things, that the
air is cooler.
It occurs to him that it is probably going to rain; looking up, he sees a
dark cloud
between him and the sun, and he then quickens his steps. What, if
anything, in such
a situation can be called thought? Neither the act of walking nor the
noting of the
cold is a thought. Walking is one direction of activity; looking and
noting are other
modes of activity. The likelihood that it will rain is, however,
something suggested.
The pedestrian feels the cold; he thinks of clouds and a coming shower.
(Dewey 1991, 6-7).
</QUOTE>
In this narrative we can identify the characters of the sign relation
as follows: coolness is a Sign of the Object rain, and the Interpretant
is the thought of the rain's likelihood. In his 1910 description of
reflective thinking Dewey distinguishes two phases, “a state of perplexity,
hesitation, doubt” and “an act of search or investigation” (Dewey 1991, 9),
comprehensive stages which are further refined in his later model of
inquiry.
In this example reflection is the act of the interpreter which establishes
a
fund of connections between the sensory shock of coolness and the objective
danger of rain, by way of his impression that rain is likely. But
reflection
is more than irresponsible speculation. In reflection the interpreter acts
to charge or defuse the thought of rain (the probability of rain in
thought)
by seeking other signs which this thought implies and evaluating the
thought
according to the results of this search.
Figure 2 illustrates Dewey's “Rain” example, tracing the structure and
function
of the sign relation as it informs the activity of inquiry, including both
the
movements of surprise explanation and intentional action. The dyadic
faces of
the sign relation are labeled with just a few of the loosest terms that
apply,
indicating the “significance” of signs for eventual occurrences and the
“correspondence” of ideas with external orientations. Nothing essential
is meant by these dyadic role distinctions, since it is only in special
or degenerate cases that their shadowy projections can maintain enough
information to determine the original sign relation.
Figure 2. Signs and Inquiry in Dewey [see attached]
If we follow this example far enough to consider the import of thought
for action, we realize that the subsequent conduct of the interpreter,
progressing up through the natural conclusion of the episode — the
quickening steps, seeking shelter in time to escape the rain — all of
these acts form a series of further interpretants, contingent on the
active causes of the individual, for the originally recognized signs
of rain and for the first impressions of the actual case. Just as
critical reflection develops the associated and alternative signs
which gather about an idea, pragmatic interpretation explores the
consequential and contrasting actions which give effective and
testable meaning to a person's belief in it.
</QUOTE>
Regards,
Jon
On 3/9/2016 5:07 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
John, Clark, List:
The simple question arises: If an abductive step is taken by the
inquirer,
then what?
For example, say that a sinsign and its legisigns and qualisigns provide
the informative extension to generate an index, how does one take this
abductive object and move through the inferential steps needed to
generate a valid argument?
Or, from a different logical perspective, what information is needed
to extend (in the Aristotelian sense of intensional logic) the index
to the (telelogical?) goal of the inquirer?
Cheers
Jerry
--
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my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
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