Post : Definition and Determination : 11 http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/04/04/definition-and-determination-11/ Date : April 4, 2016 at 3:30 pm
Peircers, Rifling through some yellowed sheets of assertion (SAs), or previous states of the one universal and eternal SA, if you prefer to see it that way, I found that we had been discussing Peirce on Definition and Determination way back in June of 2012, that I had blogged a series of essays on it through that time, and a bit after when the subject came up elsewhere on the web. FWIW, here are the category links for what I posted on my blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/category/definition/ http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/category/determination/ And here is a light revision of my last post on this subject, adding a few additional resources: Re: Peirce List Discussion http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18561 • Gary Fuhrman http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18561 • Jeffrey Downard http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18563 The subject of determination comes up from time to time. Here is a link to an assortment of excerpts I collected back when I was first trying to understand the meaning of determination as it figures in Peirce's definition of a sign relation. • Collection Of Source Materials (COSM) http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/User:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS Looking back over many previous discussions on the Peirce List, I think the most important and frequently missed point is that concepts like correspondence and determination in Peirce refer to triadic forms of correspondence and determination, and that these do not reduce to the dyadic structures that are endemic to the more reductionist paradigms. In this more general perspective, the family of concepts including correspondence, determination, law, relation, structure, and so on all fall under the notion of constraint. Constraint is present in a system to the extent that one set of choices is distinguished by some mark from a larger set of choices. That mark may distinguish the actual from the possible, the desired from the conceivable, or any number of other possibilities depending on the subject in view. Resources ========= • C.S. Peirce • On the Definition of Logic http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/01/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-on-the-definition-of-logic/ • C.S. Peirce • Logic as Semiotic http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/04/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-logic-as-semiotic/ • C.S. Peirce • Of Triadic Being http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/14/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-of-triadic-being/ • Relation Theory http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Relation_theory On 6/13/2012 12:40 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Note 8 (Revised) Peircers, I wasn't too happy with my paragraph on the meaning of “normative” -- I have a feeling that I did a better job of capturing the essence in some things I wrote in the psst, so I may go looking for those -- at any rate, I amended the paragraph with a more verbose attempt. Re: Jim Willgoose At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8233 The most general meaning of “formal” is “concerned with form”, but the Latin “forma” may mean “beauty” in addition to “form”, so perhaps a normative “goodness of form” enters at this root. The Latin word “norma” literally means a “carpenter's square”. The Greek “gnomon” is a sundial pointer taking a similar form. The most general meaning of “normative” is “having to do with what a person ought to do”, but a pragmatic interpretation of ethical imperatives tends to treat that as “having to do with what a person ought to do in order to achieve a given object”, so another formula might be “relating to the good that befits a being of our kind, what must be done in order to bring that good into being, and how to tell the signs that show the way”. Defining logic as formal or normative semiotic differentiates logic from other species of semiotic under the general theory of signs, leaving a niche open for descriptive semiotic, just to mention the obvious branch. This brings us to the question: How does a concern with form, or goodness of form, along with the question of what is required to achieve an object, modify our perspective on sign relations in a way that duly marks it as a logical point of view? Regards, Jon
-- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
