Thanks Gary! I suspect we'll end up talking about whether it's 2, 1, 3 for the student and 1, 2, 3 for the philosopher, eventually...
Best, Jerry R On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 7:46 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jerry, Jeff, list, > > As I read him, Peirce holds firstly (that is, 1st in semiosic order) that > the object (associated with 2ns; whether the dynamic object is > 'existential' or not--its 'ground' in any case will *not* be so) > determines a sign (that is, a representamen, associated with possibility, > 1ns), which in turn determines the interpretant (associated with 3ns, > whatever 'interprets' the sign (in human semiosis, a mind; in biosemiosis, > etc. a quasi-mind) to mean whatever it does mean to that mind or > quasi-mind, the interpretant standing in the same (or, in the case of a > slightly more developed sign, in similar) relation to the object as the > sign itself stands to its object. And, as has been repeatedly discussed > here, one errs if one thinks of semiosic determination in a physical sense. > > I think that it is important, therefore, to carefully distinguish the > order of semiosis , what I've called the vector or order of determination > (== 2ns -> 1ns -> 3ns) from the categories themselves, for there are 6 > possible vectors involving the 3 categories, so that, for example, 1ns is > not 1st in 4 of these vectors. > > Best, > > Gary R. > > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 7:40 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jeff, list: >> >> >> >> In various writings by Peirce and by interpreters of Peirce, >> >> it is one, two, three; sign, object, interpretant. (c.f., Brent, >> >> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/brent/PURSUING.HTM >> >> >> >> Yet, your interpretation of determination from the quote above says, >> >> object (one), sign (two), interpretant (three). >> >> >> >> Where’s the proof for which is *correct* or can *both be correct*? >> >> >> >> That is, how should we enter inquiry when we are received the finger (as >> the moon) and not the moon, itself? >> >> >> >> c.f., at 1:15 of >> >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sDW6vkuqGLg >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Jerry Rhee >> >> On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 1:28 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On Apr 20, 2016, at 12:31 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> First, an analysis of the essence of a sign, (stretching that word to >>> its widest limits, as *anything which, being determined by an object, >>> determines an interpretation to determination, through it, by the same >>> object*), leads to a proof that every sign is determined by its object, >>> either first, by partaking in the characters of the object, when I call the >>> sign an *Icon*; secondly, by being really and in its individual >>> existence connected with the individual object, when I call the sign an >>> *Index*; thirdly, by more or less approximate certainty that it will be >>> interpreted as denoting the object, in consequence of a habit (which term I >>> use as including a natural disposition), when I call the sign a *Symbol* >>> . (CP, 4.531) >>> >>> Peirce makes the following claim: All determination is by negation; we >>> can first recognize any character only by putting an object which possesses >>> it into comparison with an object which possesses it not. (CP 5.294) Having >>> examined a number of places where Peirce describes different sorts of >>> determination, one of the clearest sets of definitions and explanations are >>> found in an unpublished set of manuscript. In particular, MS 612 contains >>> a detailed analysis of the meaning of “determination,” “determined to >>> accord,” and “determined after.” Here are links to the manuscript pages and >>> (as yet unedited) transcriptions of the relevant passages in FromThePage: >>> >>> >>> List, >>> >>> It may be helpful to recognize that these writings are simply >>> re-statements and generalizations of the methods of chemical determination >>> as they stood in the latter part of the 19 th Century. >>> >>> In particular, the sentence: >>> >>> All determination is by negation; we can first recognize any character >>> only by putting an object which possesses it into comparison with an object >>> which possesses it not. >>> >>> >>> is absolutely essential as the first phase of erotetic logic. (What is >>> it?) >>> >>> Logically, many chemical elements are known to exist and are potential >>> precedences for the material at hand. >>> If you want to determine what is in a thing, one must eliminate >>> everything else. >>> The antecedent of the determination must be an object. Otherwise, no >>> sign exists. >>> And, no determination is possible. >>> >>> In the habits of chemists, various methods are given names. These >>> methods were not necessary specific and often inconsistent with one another >>> so that double and triple checking of questionable tests were necessary. >>> >>> The specific goal of determination was to reach a conclusion with regard >>> to the molecular formula (ratios of small whole numbers by weight of each >>> element that appears in the determination. >>> >>> The broad goal of the chemist must be constrained for application of the >>> semantics to non-material phenomena. >>> >>> >>> Hope this is helpful >>> >>> Cheers >>> >>> Jerry >>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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