Jerry, You're welcome. One of the reasons I use the abbreviations 1ns, 2ns, 3ns (firstness, secondness, thirdness) is to distinguish the categories from 1st, 2nd, 3rd (in order, first, second, third).
Best, Gary R. [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 9:52 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > Thanks Gary! > > I suspect we'll end up talking about whether it's 2, 1, 3 for the student > and > 1, 2, 3 for the philosopher, eventually... > > Best, > Jerry R > > On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 7:46 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jerry, Jeff, list, >> >> As I read him, Peirce holds firstly (that is, 1st in semiosic order) that >> the object (associated with 2ns; whether the dynamic object is >> 'existential' or not--its 'ground' in any case will *not* be so) >> determines a sign (that is, a representamen, associated with possibility, >> 1ns), which in turn determines the interpretant (associated with 3ns, >> whatever 'interprets' the sign (in human semiosis, a mind; in biosemiosis, >> etc. a quasi-mind) to mean whatever it does mean to that mind or >> quasi-mind, the interpretant standing in the same (or, in the case of a >> slightly more developed sign, in similar) relation to the object as the >> sign itself stands to its object. And, as has been repeatedly discussed >> here, one errs if one thinks of semiosic determination in a physical sense. >> >> I think that it is important, therefore, to carefully distinguish the >> order of semiosis , what I've called the vector or order of determination >> (== 2ns -> 1ns -> 3ns) from the categories themselves, for there are 6 >> possible vectors involving the 3 categories, so that, for example, 1ns is >> not 1st in 4 of these vectors. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R. >> >> >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >> >> On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 7:40 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Jeff, list: >>> >>> >>> >>> In various writings by Peirce and by interpreters of Peirce, >>> >>> it is one, two, three; sign, object, interpretant. (c.f., Brent, >>> >>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/brent/PURSUING.HTM >>> >>> >>> >>> Yet, your interpretation of determination from the quote above says, >>> >>> object (one), sign (two), interpretant (three). >>> >>> >>> >>> Where’s the proof for which is *correct* or can *both be correct*? >>> >>> >>> >>> That is, how should we enter inquiry when we are received the finger (as >>> the moon) and not the moon, itself? >>> >>> >>> >>> c.f., at 1:15 of >>> >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sDW6vkuqGLg >>> >>> >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Jerry Rhee >>> >>> On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 1:28 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On Apr 20, 2016, at 12:31 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> First, an analysis of the essence of a sign, (stretching that word to >>>> its widest limits, as *anything which, being determined by an object, >>>> determines an interpretation to determination, through it, by the same >>>> object*), leads to a proof that every sign is determined by its >>>> object, either first, by partaking in the characters of the object, when I >>>> call the sign an *Icon*; secondly, by being really and in its >>>> individual existence connected with the individual object, when I call the >>>> sign an*Index*; thirdly, by more or less approximate certainty that it >>>> will be interpreted as denoting the object, in consequence of a habit >>>> (which term I use as including a natural disposition), when I call the sign >>>> a *Symbol*. (CP, 4.531) >>>> >>>> Peirce makes the following claim: All determination is by negation; we >>>> can first recognize any character only by putting an object which possesses >>>> it into comparison with an object which possesses it not. (CP 5.294) Having >>>> examined a number of places where Peirce describes different sorts of >>>> determination, one of the clearest sets of definitions and explanations are >>>> found in an unpublished set of manuscript. In particular, MS 612 contains >>>> a detailed analysis of the meaning of “determination,” “determined to >>>> accord,” and “determined after.” Here are links to the manuscript pages and >>>> (as yet unedited) transcriptions of the relevant passages in FromThePage: >>>> >>>> >>>> List, >>>> >>>> It may be helpful to recognize that these writings are simply >>>> re-statements and generalizations of the methods of chemical determination >>>> as they stood in the latter part of the 19 th Century. >>>> >>>> In particular, the sentence: >>>> >>>> All determination is by negation; we can first recognize any character >>>> only by putting an object which possesses it into comparison with an object >>>> which possesses it not. >>>> >>>> >>>> is absolutely essential as the first phase of erotetic logic. (What >>>> is it?) >>>> >>>> Logically, many chemical elements are known to exist and are potential >>>> precedences for the material at hand. >>>> If you want to determine what is in a thing, one must eliminate >>>> everything else. >>>> The antecedent of the determination must be an object. Otherwise, no >>>> sign exists. >>>> And, no determination is possible. >>>> >>>> In the habits of chemists, various methods are given names. These >>>> methods were not necessary specific and often inconsistent with one another >>>> so that double and triple checking of questionable tests were necessary. >>>> >>>> The specific goal of determination was to reach a conclusion with >>>> regard to the molecular formula (ratios of small whole numbers by weight of >>>> each element that appears in the determination. >>>> >>>> The broad goal of the chemist must be constrained for application of >>>> the semantics to non-material phenomena. >>>> >>>> >>>> Hope this is helpful >>>> >>>> Cheers >>>> >>>> Jerry >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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