List, Kirsti:
Very interesting response, it is appended below.
Yes, a crucial question is the relation, if any, between natural phenomenology
and artificial phenomenology.
This question appears to be a conundrum that is not solvable by either topology
or category theory because of the nature of nature.
Mother Nature appears to me, from my experience, to be formed from separable
units.
Pure mathematics avoids the concept of scaling, and its implication of natural
units. It makes no appeals to nature. For a pure mathematician to appeal to
nature would defy the Gods of the mathematical universe!
Physical units (mass, electricity, light,…) provide the scales of artificial
phenomenology of physical origin. Thus, in my view, neither the logic of pure
mathematics (logic of topology or category theory) provide the basis for the
logic of human experience of nature. (If one takes the 13 questions of
"universal logic” seriously, the role of physical units in the sciences needs
to be re-evaluated.)
I believe that Nature operates on pragmatic units, the units of the sub-atomic
particles of atoms. Pragmatically and empirically, electrical particles appear
to be things that represent forms. Sub-atomic units appear to form nature, not
pre-subatomic units. Pre-subatomic units (sub-sub-atomic particles, that is,
as parts of electrons and as parts of nuclei) are represented as non-durable
electrical things of unknown form but with potential for form.
Does, in your view, Artificial phenomenology (Kant?, Schelling? Husserl?) go
straight to the mathematical continuum (of the CSP form of a “welded” whole)?
In other words, my question is, how does one distinguish between percepts of
natural phenomenology and the precepts of artificial phenomenology? (I hasten
to admit that I have not been consistent in my usage of these two terms,
precepts and percepts. The distinction between the two terms is now a critical
element of my reading of CSP. In CSP usage, Legisigns are precepts for terms of
logic and hence the cycles FROM other terms TO Legisigns. Sinsigns are called
sinsigns because of the perceptions (qualisigns,) they generate for the related
terms of Peircian propositions. CSP uses the term “index” to specify the atoms
of logic of concern. (In this sense, the form Peircian propositions must be
contrasted with symbolic grounding Whitehead-Russell “propositional functions”
in set theory.)
In yet another form, the erotetic logic is:
Does mind independent reality exist?
Does mind dependent reality exist?
Does mind-reality interdependence exist?
(In this form, the domain of concern avoids the pseudo-logical conundrums of
Mobius strips and Klein bottles, which are merely examples of the conundrums of
linear geometric thinking).
With regard to personal philosophy (as distinct from the profession
activities), a wise man once told me:
“I express my personal values by what I choose to study;
I express my professional values by how I study it.”
I choose to study public health. My professional life was lived as a Public
Health Service Officer at the National Institutes of Health.
My metaphysical maxim, which guides my study of public health, remains:
“The union of units unifies the unity.”
Once again, my interpretation of CSP writings differs markedly from the view
proposed in Natural Propositions.
Thanks for the reference to your brother’s book. I will seek it. See info below.
Cheers Jerry
Jerry, list,
Your response helped a lot in proceeding towards some answers, hopefully more
connecting with your interests & current problems you are seeking to find
solutions. (I hope!)
First, it now seems clear to me, that your homefield is to be found in
naturalistic philosophy. Thus I heartily recommend to you a brilliant new
book by Pentti Määttänen, my younger brother. He is a Peircean, just as I am,
but he has never been keen on Peircean phaenomenology (as I have always been).
As a philosopher, he belongs to the naturalistic kind. - As do your
philosophical problems.
Note that I am not saying his book is brilliant because he is my brother,
rather in spite of it.
He 'speaks the same language' as does the author of "13 questions about
universal logic". In other words, he participates in the same discussions the
13 questions are about. Whilst I have left these long ago.
So, look up:
Määttänen, Pentti (2015) Mind and Embodied Cognition in Pragmatism. Springer
publishers.
I do think you could gain a lot by consulting it.
In your advanced stage of inquiry, my meddlings with phaenomenological issues
do not seem currenty relevant.
Those issues I find most relevant within the natural sciences, just as well.
But only so in earlier stages of an inquiry. If I have understood correctly,
your interests lie mostly in giving philosphical groundings to the inferences &
conclusions you have already committed yourself into.
My mind is itching to pick on some details in your response. But I'll restrain
myself from these impulses. For the time being, at least.
Cheers, for now
Kirsti
For your Information
> On Apr 19, 2016, at 7:59 AM, [email protected]
> <mailto:[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Määttänen, Pentti (2015) Mind and Embodied Cognition in Pragmatism.
From the Back Cover
The book questions two key dichotomies: that of the apparent and real, and that
of the internal and external. This leads to revised notions of the structure of
experience and the object of knowledge. Our world is experienced as
possibilities of action, and to know is to know what to do. A further
consequence is that the mind is best considered as a property of organisms’
interactions with their environment. The unit of analysis is the loop of action
and perception, and the central concept is the notion of habit of action, which
provides the embodied basis of cognition as the anticipation of action. This
holds for non-linguistic tacit meanings as well as for linguistic meanings.
Habit of action is a teleological notion and thus opens a possibility for
defining intentionality and normativity in terms of the soft naturalism adopted
in the book. The mind is embodied, and this embodiment determines our physical
perspective on the world. Our sensory organs and other instruments give us
instrumental access to the world, and this access is epistemic in character.
The distinction between the physical and conceptual viewpoint allows us to
define truth as the correspondence with operational fit. This embodied
epistemic truth is however not a sign of antirealism, as the instrumentally
accessed theoretical objects are precisely those objects that experimental
science deals with.
Product Details
Series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics (Book
18)
Hardcover: 94 pages
Publisher: Springer; 2015 edition (April 14, 2015)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 3319176226
ISBN-13: 978-3319176222
Product Dimensions: 6.1 x 0.3 x 9.2 inches
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