Inquiry Blog • https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/04/11/readings-on-determination/
Peirce List : Readings JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18625 Peirce List : Discussion JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18631 JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18648 Peircers, As I mentioned before, I'll try to keep the thread of discussion separate from the thread containing source materials. I had a pleasant visit with friends old and new at the Chicago Art Institute -- all three versions of Van Gogh's “Bedroom” are there for a special exhibit until May 10, a must see for anyone in the neighborhood -- but a little tired from the trip so I'll just copy Jeff's post here so I can get back to it in context later. Regards, Jon On 4/20/2016 1:31 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > Gary F., Ben, Jon, List, > > Jon has supplied us with a number of passages that characterize > what it is for a sign to determine an interpretant — and he draws > our attention to two definitions that are published in the NEM. > Let’s note that both of those definitions are incomplete. > The key idea that is omitted is made clear if we compare > those definitions to the following passage: > > First, an analysis of the essence of a sign, (stretching that word > to its widest limits, as anything which, being determined by an object, > determines an interpretation to determination, through it, by the same > object), leads to a proof that every sign is determined by its object, > either first, by partaking in the characters of the object, when I call > the sign an Icon; secondly, by being really and in its individual existence > connected with the individual object, when I call the sign an Index; thirdly, > by more or less approximate certainty that it will be interpreted as denoting > the object, in consequence of a habit (which term I use as including a natural > disposition), when I call the sign a Symbol. (CP, 4.531) > > So, there are three relations of determination that we need to examine: > > a) A sign is anything that is determined by an object so that > b) an interpretant is determined by the sign and so that > c) the interpretant comes to have a determination through the sign by the same object. > > Based on what Peirce says in this passage, it appears that order of determination > in the relations between sign, object and interpretant are as follows: the object > determines sign, the sign determines interpretant, the same object that determines > the sign also determines the interpretant through the mediation of the sign. > > With that much said, let’s try to frame a set of questions that we’d like to answer. > Here are four questions that stand out in my mind. > > 1. What is Peirce’s general account of determination? > 2. How does the general account apply to the relations between possibilities, > existing individuals and general rules so that: > a. possibilities only determine other possibilities; > b. general rules are only determined by other general rules, but general rules > can determine both possibilities and the characters of existing individuals, > although general rules cannot determine individual objects to exist; > c. individual existing objects determine the possibilities of the characters > that they possess, and the order of the characters of existing objects may > be determined by general rules, although only existing individuals can > determine other individual objects to exist? > 3. How does the general account of determination apply to the different sorts > relations that hold between signs, objects and interpretants in the process > of semiosis? For instance, how do the different sorts of relations of > determination a help us to clarify and explain the relations of: > a. similarity so that the icon partakes of the characters of the objects; > b. connection between the token index and individually existing object; > c. the habit that determines with more or less certainty that the symbol > will be interpreted as denoting the object? > 4. How might the general account of determination help us clarify > what he says about the relations of reference that are central > in his account of the categories, that is, the relations of: > a. reference to ground, > b. reference to object, > c. and reference to interpretant? > > Let me know if I’ve omitted questions that we should > consider or if any of the questions are poorly framed. > For starters, let’s focus our attention on the first question: > What is Peirce’s general account of determination? Once we’ve > made some progress on that front, we can turn to the other > questions, one at a time. > > Peirce makes the following claim: All determination is by negation; > we can first recognize any character only by putting an object which > possesses it into comparison with an object which possesses it not. > (CP 5.294) > Having examined a number of places where Peirce describes different sorts > of determination, one of the clearest sets of definitions and explanations > are found in an unpublished set of manuscript. In particular, MS 612 contains > a detailed analysis of the meaning of “determination,” “determined to accord,” > and “determined after.” Here are links to the manuscript pages and (as yet > unedited) transcriptions of the relevant passages in FromThePage: > > http://fromthepage.com/display/read_work?page=9&work_id=149 > http://fromthepage.com/display/read_work?page=10&work_id=149 > > What Peirce is doing in these passages. As far as I can tell, > he starts with a nominal definition of how we use the word in > a relatively narrow context. Then, he provides a formal definition > that is designed to be adequate to the more general meaning of the > conception. That is, the procedure is to work from the first to the > second level of clarity. As such, more work is needed to arrive at > a definition of the conception of determination that will be adequate > for the scientific employment of the conception in philosophical > explanations — such as in a speculative grammar. That is, we still > need to apply the pragmatic maxim in order to arrive at a third grade > of clarity in our understanding of the conception of determination. > My hunch is that the definitions of "determined to accord" and > "determined after" are needed for such an application of the > pragmatic maxim. > > Yours, > > Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> > Sent: Friday, April 8, 2016 11:00 AM > To: Peirce List > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce on Definition and Determination > > Peircers, > > I was trying to spare a few gray cells by looking up > the discussions we had on this subject the last time > it came up but it looks like that occurred during the > last half of 2012 when the List was migrating between > different servers and a lot of the Gmane archives from > that time are missing. > > It was my custom until recently (when the Arisbe Dev and > Inquiry List servers went down for maintenance or forever, > not sure which) to cross-post my Peirce List messages there, > so a lot of older material survives in the WayBak archives of > those two lists. I subbed the archive links in the post below. > > At any rate, it appears I first posted that collection of > excerpts to the Peirce List back in May and August of 2001. > Internal evidence, like the quote from Prigogine, tells me > that the assemblage goes back to 1997 or so, in the period > when I had gone back to grad school in systems engineering > and was cudgeling my brains to think about Peirce's theories > of signs, information, and inquiry in systems-theoretic terms. > > Good times ... > > Jon > > On 5/28/2012 10:46 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: >> Note 1 >> >> Peircers, >> >> It looks like we might be due for one of our recurring reviews >> on the closely related subjects of definition and determination, >> with especial reference to what Peirce himself recurrently wrote >> about them. >> >> Here is a set of excerpts that I collected in regard to determination, >> mostly from Peirce, but with a few thoughts from other thinkers, both >> before and after him, due to the larger questions of determinacy that >> I was pursuing at the time. >> >> Arisbe List Archive (serial thread) >> http://web.archive.org/web/20030619214031/http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2001-May/thread.html#489 >> http://web.archive.org/web/20030619212516/http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2001-August/thread.html#942 >> >> MyWikiBiz Page (all in one section) >> • http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS#Determination >> >> One naturally looks to the Baldwin and Century dictionaries for >> Peirce-connected definitions of definition, but I would like to >> start with a series of texts that I think are closer to Peirce's >> own thoughts on definition, where he is not so duty-bound to give >> a compendious account of every significant thinker's point of view. >> >> It may be a while before I get these all copied out: >> >> • http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS#Definition >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> On 4/12/2016 9:28 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > Inquiry Blog > • https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/04/11/readings-on-determination/ > > Peirce List > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18625 > > Peircers, > > What I'm really after here has to do with the way that > a certain concept of determination figures into Peirce's > better definitions of a sign relation — “better” meaning > the definitions that are strong enough to bear the load > of a consequential theory. > > That is a very old business with me, and there are > developments of it that are still unfinished, but > lately I have noticed a number of related issues > that are not as clear as they need to be. > > So I'll be trying to do something about that, by the by. > > Regards, > > Jon > > PS. I have always found it useful to maintain a clear > separation between the source material I cite and > my own commentary and discussions, so I will make > some attempt to do that in the sequel. > -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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