Peircers, I keep coming back to Peirce's early lectures on the logic of science because we see there the first inklings of his prospective theory of information, one of those ideas whose time was ripe enough but whose complete fruition lies yet in the future. The ideas of constraint, definition, determination, information, and inquiry are, of course, deeply intertwined.
Here is a link to my ongoing study of those lectures, focusing on the formula: • Information = Comprehension × Extension http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension Definitions of Peirce's various terms (content, sphere, etc.) may be found there. Regards, Jon On 4/22/2016 11:00 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > Post : Readings On Determination • 1 > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/04/22/readings-on-determination-%e2%80%a2-1/ > Date : April 22, 2016 at 10:00 pm > > The concepts of definition and determination converge in their > concern for setting bounds to the point where they coincide > at a certain level of abstraction. One avenue of approach > to determination may then begin from a consideration of > definition. > > <QUOTE> > > The moment, then, that we pass from nothing and the vacuity of being > to any content or sphere, we come at once to a composite content and > sphere. In fact, extension and comprehension — like space and time — > are quantities which are not composed of ultimate elements; but > every part however small is divisible. > > The consequence of this fact is that when we wish to enumerate the > sphere of a term — a process termed division — or when we wish to > run over the content of a term — a process called definition — > since we cannot take the elements of our enumeration singly but > must take them in groups, there is danger that we shall take > some element twice over, or that we shall omit some. Hence > the extension and comprehension which we know will be somewhat > indeterminate. But we must distinguish two kinds of these > quantities. If we were to subtilize we might make other > distinctions but I shall be content with two. They are > the extension and comprehension relatively to our actual > knowledge, and what these would be were our knowledge > perfect. (Peirce, CE 1, 462) > > </QUOTE> > > Reference > ========= > > • Peirce, C.S. (1866), “The Logic of Science; or, Induction and Hypothesis”, > pp. 357–504 in Writings of Charles S. Peirce : A Chronological Edition, > Volume 1, 1857–1866, Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, > Bloomington, IN, 1982. > > Resource > ======== > > • Collection Of Source Materials > http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/User:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS > -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
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