Inquiry Blog https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/04/11/readings-on-determination/
InterSciWiki : Readings http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/User:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS#Determination Peirce List : Readings JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18625 Peirce List : Discussion JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18631 JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18648 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18651 Jeff, List, Having been through this same discussion many times before I will try to sum up the more persistent confusions that never cease to bedevil the subject. Most of these arise from a failure to grasp a number of critical distinctions. 1. There is above all the distinction between relations and tuples. To emphasize the distinction I will sometimes describe relations as “relations in general” or “relations proper” while referring to tuples as “elementary relations”. 2. There is the corresponding distinction between sign relations and elementary sign relations or triples of the form (o, s, i). Relations are, generally speaking, much more complex structures than elementary relations, so classifying relations is much more complex than classifying elementary relations. The same goes for sign relations and elementary sign relations. Almost all the literature you see on “classifying sign relations” actually goes no further than the much simpler task of classifying elementary sign relations. Classifying sign relations, in the proper sense of the word, is a task for the future. 3. There is the distinction between formal or informational determination and causal or temporal determination. The latter is a special case of the former. A simple example of formal determination is found in such venerable phrases as “two points determine a line”. Pairs of points do not cause lines or precede them in time. Formal determination is defined at a higher level of abstraction than cause and time. 4. There is the distinction between dyadic forms of determination and triadic forms of determination. Here we run into a verbal problem. There seems to be something about the word “determination” — could be the grammatical category of “to determine” as a transitive verb — that almost inexorably drags the mind down into the ruts of dyadic thinking, so it helps to use the more general and less biased idea of constraint. We have a form of determination wherever we have a form of constraint. As it happens, one of the most general ways of expressing a constraint is in terms of the subset relation: A dyadic relation D is defined by the constraint D ⊆ X × Y, where X and Y are the domains of the relation D. A triadic relation T is defined by the constraint T ⊆ X × Y × Z, where X, Y, and Z are the domains of the relation T. A sign relation L is defined by the constraint L ⊆ O × S × I, where O, S, and I are the domains of the sign relation L. All I have time for now ... Jon On 4/20/2016 3:40 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Peircers, As I mentioned before, I'll try to keep the thread of discussion separate from the thread containing source materials. I had a pleasant visit with friends old and new at the Chicago Art Institute -- all three versions of Van Gogh's “Bedroom” are there for a special exhibit until May 10, a must see for anyone in the neighborhood -- but a little tired from the trip so I'll just copy Jeff's post here so I can get back to it in context later. Regards, Jon On 4/20/2016 1:31 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > Gary F., Ben, Jon, List, > > Jon has supplied us with a number of passages that characterize > what it is for a sign to determine an interpretant — and he draws > our attention to two definitions that are published in the NEM. > Let’s note that both of those definitions are incomplete. > The key idea that is omitted is made clear if we compare > those definitions to the following passage: > > First, an analysis of the essence of a sign, (stretching that word > to its widest limits, as anything which, being determined by an object, > determines an interpretation to determination, through it, by the same > object), leads to a proof that every sign is determined by its object, > either first, by partaking in the characters of the object, when I call > the sign an Icon; secondly, by being really and in its individual existence > connected with the individual object, when I call the sign an Index; thirdly, > by more or less approximate certainty that it will be interpreted as denoting > the object, in consequence of a habit (which term I use as including a natural > disposition), when I call the sign a Symbol. (CP, 4.531) > > So, there are three relations of determination that we need to examine: > > a) A sign is anything that is determined by an object so that > b) an interpretant is determined by the sign and so that > c) the interpretant comes to have a determination through the sign by the same object. > > Based on what Peirce says in this passage, it appears that order of determination > in the relations between sign, object and interpretant are as follows: the object > determines sign, the sign determines interpretant, the same object that determines > the sign also determines the interpretant through the mediation of the sign. > > With that much said, let’s try to frame a set of questions that we’d like to answer. > Here are four questions that stand out in my mind. > > 1. What is Peirce’s general account of determination? > 2. How does the general account apply to the relations between possibilities, > existing individuals and general rules so that: > a. possibilities only determine other possibilities; > b. general rules are only determined by other general rules, but general rules > can determine both possibilities and the characters of existing individuals, > although general rules cannot determine individual objects to exist; > c. individual existing objects determine the possibilities of the characters > that they possess, and the order of the characters of existing objects may > be determined by general rules, although only existing individuals can > determine other individual objects to exist? > 3. How does the general account of determination apply to the different sorts > relations that hold between signs, objects and interpretants in the process > of semiosis? For instance, how do the different sorts of relations of > determination a help us to clarify and explain the relations of: > a. similarity so that the icon partakes of the characters of the objects; > b. connection between the token index and individually existing object; > c. the habit that determines with more or less certainty that the symbol > will be interpreted as denoting the object? > 4. How might the general account of determination help us clarify > what he says about the relations of reference that are central > in his account of the categories, that is, the relations of: > a. reference to ground, > b. reference to object, > c. and reference to interpretant? > > Let me know if I’ve omitted questions that we should > consider or if any of the questions are poorly framed. > For starters, let’s focus our attention on the first question: > What is Peirce’s general account of determination? Once we’ve > made some progress on that front, we can turn to the other > questions, one at a time. > > Peirce makes the following claim: All determination is by negation; > we can first recognize any character only by putting an object which > possesses it into comparison with an object which possesses it not. > (CP 5.294) > Having examined a number of places where Peirce describes different sorts > of determination, one of the clearest sets of definitions and explanations > are found in an unpublished set of manuscript. In particular, MS 612 contains > a detailed analysis of the meaning of “determination,” “determined to accord,” > and “determined after.” Here are links to the manuscript pages and (as yet > unedited) transcriptions of the relevant passages in FromThePage: > > http://fromthepage.com/display/read_work?page=9&work_id=149 > http://fromthepage.com/display/read_work?page=10&work_id=149 > > What Peirce is doing in these passages. As far as I can tell, > he starts with a nominal definition of how we use the word in > a relatively narrow context. Then, he provides a formal definition > that is designed to be adequate to the more general meaning of the > conception. That is, the procedure is to work from the first to the > second level of clarity. As such, more work is needed to arrive at > a definition of the conception of determination that will be adequate > for the scientific employment of the conception in philosophical > explanations — such as in a speculative grammar. That is, we still > need to apply the pragmatic maxim in order to arrive at a third grade > of clarity in our understanding of the conception of determination. > My hunch is that the definitions of "determined to accord" and > "determined after" are needed for such an application of the > pragmatic maxim. > > Yours, > > Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> > Sent: Friday, April 8, 2016 11:00 AM > To: Peirce List > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce on Definition and Determination > > Peircers, > > I was trying to spare a few gray cells by looking up > the discussions we had on this subject the last time > it came up but it looks like that occurred during the > last half of 2012 when the List was migrating between > different servers and a lot of the Gmane archives from > that time are missing. > > It was my custom until recently (when the Arisbe Dev and > Inquiry List servers went down for maintenance or forever, > not sure which) to cross-post my Peirce List messages there, > so a lot of older material survives in the WayBak archives of > those two lists. I subbed the archive links in the post below. > > At any rate, it appears I first posted that collection of > excerpts to the Peirce List back in May and August of 2001. > Internal evidence, like the quote from Prigogine, tells me > that the assemblage goes back to 1997 or so, in the period > when I had gone back to grad school in systems engineering > and was cudgeling my brains to think about Peirce's theories > of signs, information, and inquiry in systems-theoretic terms. > > Good times ... > > Jon > > On 5/28/2012 10:46 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: >> Note 1 >> >> Peircers, >> >> It looks like we might be due for one of our recurring reviews >> on the closely related subjects of definition and determination, >> with especial reference to what Peirce himself recurrently wrote >> about them. >> >> Here is a set of excerpts that I collected in regard to determination, >> mostly from Peirce, but with a few thoughts from other thinkers, both >> before and after him, due to the larger questions of determinacy that >> I was pursuing at the time. >> >> Arisbe List Archive (serial thread) >> http://web.archive.org/web/20030619214031/http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2001-May/thread.html#489 >> http://web.archive.org/web/20030619212516/http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2001-August/thread.html#942 >> >> MyWikiBiz Page (all in one section) >> • http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS#Determination >> >> One naturally looks to the Baldwin and Century dictionaries for >> Peirce-connected definitions of definition, but I would like to >> start with a series of texts that I think are closer to Peirce's >> own thoughts on definition, where he is not so duty-bound to give >> a compendious account of every significant thinker's point of view. >> >> It may be a while before I get these all copied out: >> >> • http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS#Definition >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> On 4/12/2016 9:28 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > Inquiry Blog > • https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/04/11/readings-on-determination/ > > Peirce List > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18625 > > Peircers, > > What I'm really after here has to do with the way that > a certain concept of determination figures into Peirce's > better definitions of a sign relation — “better” meaning > the definitions that are strong enough to bear the load > of a consequential theory. > > That is a very old business with me, and there are > developments of it that are still unfinished, but > lately I have noticed a number of related issues > that are not as clear as they need to be. > > So I'll be trying to do something about that, by the by. > > Regards, > > Jon > > PS. I have always found it useful to maintain a clear > separation between the source material I cite and > my own commentary and discussions, so I will make > some attempt to do that in the sequel. >
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